[51770] | 1 | /* $Id: SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp 66525 2017-04-12 10:48:30Z vboxsync $ */
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| 2 | /** @file
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| 3 | * VirtualBox Support Library/Driver - Hardened Image Verification, Windows.
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| 4 | */
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| 5 |
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| 6 | /*
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[62490] | 7 | * Copyright (C) 2006-2016 Oracle Corporation
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[51770] | 8 | *
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| 9 | * This file is part of VirtualBox Open Source Edition (OSE), as
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| 10 | * available from http://www.virtualbox.org. This file is free software;
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| 11 | * you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU
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| 12 | * General Public License (GPL) as published by the Free Software
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| 13 | * Foundation, in version 2 as it comes in the "COPYING" file of the
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| 14 | * VirtualBox OSE distribution. VirtualBox OSE is distributed in the
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| 15 | * hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY of any kind.
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| 16 | *
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| 17 | * The contents of this file may alternatively be used under the terms
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| 18 | * of the Common Development and Distribution License Version 1.0
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| 19 | * (CDDL) only, as it comes in the "COPYING.CDDL" file of the
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| 20 | * VirtualBox OSE distribution, in which case the provisions of the
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| 21 | * CDDL are applicable instead of those of the GPL.
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| 22 | *
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| 23 | * You may elect to license modified versions of this file under the
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| 24 | * terms and conditions of either the GPL or the CDDL or both.
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| 25 | */
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| 26 |
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[57358] | 27 |
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| 28 | /*********************************************************************************************************************************
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| 29 | * Header Files *
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| 30 | *********************************************************************************************************************************/
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[51770] | 31 | #ifdef IN_RING0
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| 32 | # define IPRT_NT_MAP_TO_ZW
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| 33 | # include <iprt/nt/nt.h>
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| 34 | # include <ntimage.h>
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| 35 | #else
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| 36 | # include <iprt/nt/nt-and-windows.h>
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| 37 | # include "Wintrust.h"
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| 38 | # include "Softpub.h"
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| 39 | # include "mscat.h"
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| 40 | # ifndef LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_APPLICATION_DIR
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| 41 | # define LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32 0x800
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| 42 | # endif
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| 43 | #endif
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| 44 |
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| 45 | #include <VBox/sup.h>
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| 46 | #include <VBox/err.h>
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| 47 | #include <iprt/ctype.h>
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| 48 | #include <iprt/ldr.h>
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| 49 | #include <iprt/log.h>
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| 50 | #include <iprt/path.h>
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| 51 | #include <iprt/string.h>
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| 52 | #include <iprt/crypto/pkcs7.h>
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| 53 | #include <iprt/crypto/store.h>
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| 54 |
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| 55 | #ifdef IN_RING0
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| 56 | # include "SUPDrvInternal.h"
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| 57 | #else
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| 58 | # include "SUPLibInternal.h"
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| 59 | #endif
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| 60 | #include "win/SUPHardenedVerify-win.h"
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| 61 |
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| 62 |
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[57358] | 63 | /*********************************************************************************************************************************
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| 64 | * Defined Constants And Macros *
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| 65 | *********************************************************************************************************************************/
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[51770] | 66 | /** The size of static hash (output) buffers.
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| 67 | * Avoids dynamic allocations and cleanups for of small buffers as well as extra
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| 68 | * calls for getting the appropriate buffer size. The largest digest in regular
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| 69 | * use by current windows version is SHA-512, we double this and hope it's
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| 70 | * enough a good while. */
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| 71 | #define SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE 128
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| 72 |
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| 73 |
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[52404] | 74 | #if defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE)
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| 75 | # error "VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE without VBOX_PERMIT_MORE!"
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| 76 | #endif
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| 77 |
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| 78 |
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[57358] | 79 | /*********************************************************************************************************************************
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| 80 | * Structures and Typedefs *
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| 81 | *********************************************************************************************************************************/
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[51770] | 82 |
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| 83 | #ifdef IN_RING3
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| 84 | typedef LONG (WINAPI * PFNWINVERIFYTRUST)(HWND hwnd, GUID const *pgActionID, PVOID pWVTData);
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| 85 | typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT)(HCATADMIN *phCatAdmin, const GUID *pGuidSubsystem, DWORD dwFlags);
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| 86 | typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2)(HCATADMIN *phCatAdmin, const GUID *pGuidSubsystem, PCWSTR pwszHashAlgorithm,
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| 87 | struct _CERT_STRONG_SIGN_PARA const *pStrongHashPolicy, DWORD dwFlags);
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| 88 | typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE)(HANDLE hFile, DWORD *pcbHash, BYTE *pbHash, DWORD dwFlags);
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| 89 | typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, HANDLE hFile, DWORD *pcbHash,
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| 90 | BYTE *pbHash, DWORD dwFlags);
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| 91 | typedef HCATINFO (WINAPI *PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, BYTE *pbHash, DWORD cbHash,
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| 92 | DWORD dwFlags, HCATINFO *phPrevCatInfo);
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| 93 | typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, HCATINFO hCatInfo, DWORD dwFlags);
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| 94 | typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT)(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, DWORD dwFlags);
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| 95 | typedef BOOL (WINAPI * PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT)(HCATINFO hCatInfo, CATALOG_INFO *psCatInfo, DWORD dwFlags);
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| 96 |
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| 97 | typedef HCERTSTORE (WINAPI *PFNCERTOPENSTORE)(PCSTR pszStoreProvider, DWORD dwEncodingType, HCRYPTPROV_LEGACY hCryptProv,
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| 98 | DWORD dwFlags, const void *pvParam);
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| 99 | typedef BOOL (WINAPI *PFNCERTCLOSESTORE)(HCERTSTORE hCertStore, DWORD dwFlags);
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| 100 | typedef PCCERT_CONTEXT (WINAPI *PFNCERTENUMCERTIFICATESINSTORE)(HCERTSTORE hCertStore, PCCERT_CONTEXT pPrevCertContext);
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[54997] | 101 |
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| 102 | typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *PFNBCRYPTOPENALGORTIHMPROVIDER)(BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE *phAlgo, PCWSTR pwszAlgoId,
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| 103 | PCWSTR pwszImpl, DWORD dwFlags);
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[51770] | 104 | #endif
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| 105 |
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| 106 |
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[57358] | 107 | /*********************************************************************************************************************************
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| 108 | * Global Variables *
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| 109 | *********************************************************************************************************************************/
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[51770] | 110 | /** The build certificate. */
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| 111 | static RTCRX509CERTIFICATE g_BuildX509Cert;
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| 112 |
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| 113 | /** Store for root software publisher certificates. */
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| 114 | static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
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| 115 | /** Store for root NT kernel certificates. */
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| 116 | static RTCRSTORE g_hNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
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| 117 |
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| 118 | /** Store containing SPC, NT kernel signing, and timestamp root certificates. */
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| 119 | static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
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| 120 | /** Store for supplemental certificates for use with
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| 121 | * g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore. */
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| 122 | static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
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| 123 |
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| 124 | /** The full \\SystemRoot\\System32 path. */
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| 125 | SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_System32NtPath;
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| 126 | /** The full \\SystemRoot\\WinSxS path. */
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| 127 | SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_WinSxSNtPath;
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[52943] | 128 | #if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
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[52365] | 129 | /** The full 'Program Files' path. */
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| 130 | SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_ProgramFilesNtPath;
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| 131 | # ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
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| 132 | /** The full 'Program Files (x86)' path. */
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| 133 | SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath;
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| 134 | # endif
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| 135 | /** The full 'Common Files' path. */
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| 136 | SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_CommonFilesNtPath;
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| 137 | # ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
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| 138 | /** The full 'Common Files (x86)' path. */
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| 139 | SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_CommonFilesX86NtPath;
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| 140 | # endif
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[52943] | 141 | #endif /* IN_RING3 && !VBOX_PERMIT_MORE*/
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[51770] | 142 |
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[66525] | 143 | /**
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| 144 | * Blacklisted DLL names.
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| 145 | */
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| 146 | const RTSTRTUPLE g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[] =
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| 147 | {
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| 148 | { RT_STR_TUPLE("SCROBJ.dll") },
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| 149 | { NULL, 0 } /* terminator entry */
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| 150 | };
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| 151 |
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| 152 |
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[52365] | 153 | static union
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| 154 | {
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| 155 | SID Sid;
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| 156 | uint8_t abPadding[SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE];
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[52482] | 157 | }
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| 158 | /** The TrustedInstaller SID (Vista+). */
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| 159 | g_TrustedInstallerSid,
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| 160 | /** Local system ID (S-1-5-21). */
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[52907] | 161 | g_LocalSystemSid,
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| 162 | /** Builtin Administrators group alias (S-1-5-32-544). */
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| 163 | g_AdminsGroupSid;
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[52365] | 164 |
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[52482] | 165 |
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[51770] | 166 | /** Set after we've retrived other SPC root certificates from the system. */
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| 167 | static bool g_fHaveOtherRoots = false;
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| 168 |
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| 169 | #if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3)
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| 170 | /** Combined windows NT version number. See SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_COMBINED and
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| 171 | * SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE. */
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| 172 | uint32_t g_uNtVerCombined;
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| 173 | #endif
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| 174 |
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| 175 | #ifdef IN_RING3
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[51826] | 176 | /** Timestamp hack working around issues with old DLLs that we ship.
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| 177 | * See supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle() for details. */
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[51819] | 178 | static uint64_t g_uBuildTimestampHack = 0;
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| 179 | #endif
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| 180 |
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| 181 | #ifdef IN_RING3
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[51770] | 182 | /** Pointer to WinVerifyTrust. */
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| 183 | PFNWINVERIFYTRUST g_pfnWinVerifyTrust;
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| 184 | /** Pointer to CryptCATAdminAcquireContext. */
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| 185 | PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext;
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| 186 | /** Pointer to CryptCATAdminAcquireContext2 if available. */
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| 187 | PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2 g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2;
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| 188 | /** Pointer to CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle. */
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| 189 | PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle;
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| 190 | /** Pointer to CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2. */
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| 191 | PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2 g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2;
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| 192 | /** Pointer to CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash. */
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| 193 | PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH g_pfnCryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash;
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| 194 | /** Pointer to CryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext. */
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| 195 | PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext;
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| 196 | /** Pointer to CryptCATAdminReleaseContext. */
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| 197 | PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext;
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| 198 | /** Pointer to CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext. */
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| 199 | PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext;
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[52403] | 200 |
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[52414] | 201 | /** Where we store the TLS entry for detecting WinVerifyTrustRecursion. */
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| 202 | static uint32_t g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion = UINT32_MAX;
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| 203 | /** Fallback WinVerifyTrust recursion protection. */
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[52403] | 204 | static uint32_t volatile g_idActiveThread = UINT32_MAX;
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| 205 |
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[51770] | 206 | #endif
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| 207 |
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| 208 |
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[57358] | 209 | /*********************************************************************************************************************************
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| 210 | * Internal Functions *
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| 211 | *********************************************************************************************************************************/
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[51770] | 212 | #ifdef IN_RING3
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| 213 | static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
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[53042] | 214 | PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust, HRESULT *phrcWinVerifyTrust);
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[51770] | 215 | static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
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| 216 | PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust);
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| 217 | #endif
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| 218 |
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| 219 |
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| 220 |
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| 221 |
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| 222 | /** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnRead */
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| 223 | static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrRead(PRTLDRREADER pReader, void *pvBuf, size_t cb, RTFOFF off)
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| 224 | {
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| 225 | PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
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| 226 | Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
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[53035] | 227 | NTSTATUS rcNt;
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[51770] | 228 |
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[53035] | 229 | /* Check for type overflow (paranoia). */
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[51770] | 230 | if ((ULONG)cb != cb)
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| 231 | return VERR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
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| 232 |
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[53035] | 233 | #ifdef IN_RING3
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| 234 | /* Make sure the event semaphore is reset (normally we don't use one). */
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| 235 | if (pNtViRdr->hEvent)
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[51770] | 236 | {
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[53035] | 237 | rcNt = NtClearEvent(pNtViRdr->hEvent);
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| 238 | if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
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| 239 | return RTErrConvertFromNtStatus(rcNt);
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| 240 | }
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| 241 | #endif
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[51770] | 242 |
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[53035] | 243 | /* Perform the read. */
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| 244 | LARGE_INTEGER offNt;
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| 245 | offNt.QuadPart = off;
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| 246 |
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| 247 | IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
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| 248 | rcNt = NtReadFile(pNtViRdr->hFile,
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| 249 | pNtViRdr->hEvent,
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| 250 | NULL /*ApcRoutine*/,
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| 251 | NULL /*ApcContext*/,
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| 252 | &Ios,
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| 253 | pvBuf,
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| 254 | (ULONG)cb,
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| 255 | &offNt,
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| 256 | NULL);
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| 257 |
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| 258 | #ifdef IN_RING0
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| 259 | /* In ring-0 the handles shall be synchronized and not alertable. */
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| 260 | AssertMsg(rcNt == STATUS_SUCCESS || !NT_SUCCESS(rcNt), ("%#x\n", rcNt));
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| 261 | #else
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| 262 | /* In ring-3 we like our handles synchronized and non-alertable, but we
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| 263 | sometimes have to take what we can get. So, deal with pending I/O as
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| 264 | best we can. */
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| 265 | if (rcNt == STATUS_PENDING)
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| 266 | rcNt = NtWaitForSingleObject(pNtViRdr->hEvent ? pNtViRdr->hEvent : pNtViRdr->hFile, FALSE /*Alertable*/, NULL);
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[51770] | 267 | #endif
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[53035] | 268 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
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| 269 | rcNt = Ios.Status;
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| 270 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
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| 271 | {
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| 272 | /* We require the caller to not read beyond the end of the file since
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| 273 | we don't have any way to communicate that we've read less that
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| 274 | requested. */
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| 275 | if (Ios.Information == cb)
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[51770] | 276 | {
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[53035] | 277 | pNtViRdr->off = off + cb; /* (just for show) */
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| 278 | return VINF_SUCCESS;
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[51770] | 279 | }
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| 280 | #ifdef IN_RING3
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[53035] | 281 | supR3HardenedError(VERR_READ_ERROR, false,
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| 282 | "supHardNtViRdrRead: Only got %#zx bytes when requesting %#zx bytes at %#llx in '%s'.\n",
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| 283 | Ios.Information, off, cb, pNtViRdr->szFilename);
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[51770] | 284 | #endif
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| 285 | }
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[53035] | 286 | pNtViRdr->off = -1;
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| 287 | return VERR_READ_ERROR;
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[51770] | 288 | }
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| 289 |
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| 290 |
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| 291 | /** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnTell */
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| 292 | static DECLCALLBACK(RTFOFF) supHardNtViRdrTell(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
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| 293 | {
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| 294 | PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
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| 295 | Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
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| 296 | return pNtViRdr->off;
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| 297 | }
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| 298 |
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| 299 |
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| 300 | /** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnSize */
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| 301 | static DECLCALLBACK(RTFOFF) supHardNtViRdrSize(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
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| 302 | {
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| 303 | PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
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| 304 | Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
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| 305 | return pNtViRdr->cbFile;
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| 306 | }
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| 307 |
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| 308 |
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| 309 | /** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnLogName */
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| 310 | static DECLCALLBACK(const char *) supHardNtViRdrLogName(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
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| 311 | {
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| 312 | PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
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| 313 | return pNtViRdr->szFilename;
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| 314 | }
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| 315 |
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| 316 |
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| 317 | /** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnMap */
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| 318 | static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrMap(PRTLDRREADER pReader, const void **ppvBits)
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| 319 | {
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[62677] | 320 | RT_NOREF2(pReader, ppvBits);
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[51770] | 321 | return VERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
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| 322 | }
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| 323 |
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| 324 |
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| 325 | /** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnUnmap */
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| 326 | static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrUnmap(PRTLDRREADER pReader, const void *pvBits)
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| 327 | {
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[62677] | 328 | RT_NOREF2(pReader, pvBits);
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[51770] | 329 | return VERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
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| 330 | }
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| 331 |
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| 332 |
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| 333 | /** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnDestroy */
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| 334 | static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrDestroy(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
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| 335 | {
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| 336 | PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
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| 337 | Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
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| 338 |
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| 339 | pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic = ~RTLDRREADER_MAGIC;
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| 340 | pNtViRdr->hFile = NULL;
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[53035] | 341 | #ifdef IN_RING3
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| 342 | if (pNtViRdr->hEvent)
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| 343 | {
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| 344 | NtClose(pNtViRdr->hEvent);
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| 345 | pNtViRdr->hEvent = NULL;
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| 346 | }
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| 347 | #endif
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[51770] | 348 | RTMemFree(pNtViRdr);
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| 349 | return VINF_SUCCESS;
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| 350 | }
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| 351 |
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| 352 |
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| 353 | /**
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| 354 | * Creates a loader reader instance for the given NT file handle.
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| 355 | *
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| 356 | * @returns iprt status code.
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| 357 | * @param hFile Native NT file handle.
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| 358 | * @param pwszName Optional file name.
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| 359 | * @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
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| 360 | * @param ppNtViRdr Where to store the reader instance on success.
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| 361 | */
|
---|
[52204] | 362 | DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardNtViRdrCreate(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PSUPHNTVIRDR *ppNtViRdr)
|
---|
[51770] | 363 | {
|
---|
| 364 | /*
|
---|
| 365 | * Try determine the size of the file.
|
---|
| 366 | */
|
---|
| 367 | IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
|
---|
| 368 | FILE_STANDARD_INFORMATION StdInfo;
|
---|
| 369 | NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &Ios, &StdInfo, sizeof(StdInfo), FileStandardInformation);
|
---|
| 370 | if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) || !NT_SUCCESS(Ios.Status))
|
---|
| 371 | return VERR_LDRVI_FILE_LENGTH_ERROR;
|
---|
| 372 |
|
---|
| 373 | /*
|
---|
[53035] | 374 | * Figure the file mode so we can see whether we'll be needing an event
|
---|
| 375 | * semaphore for waiting on reads. This may happen in very unlikely
|
---|
| 376 | * NtCreateSection scenarios.
|
---|
| 377 | */
|
---|
| 378 | #if defined(IN_RING3) || defined(VBOX_STRICT)
|
---|
| 379 | Ios.Status = STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
|
---|
| 380 | ULONG fMode;
|
---|
| 381 | rcNt = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &Ios, &fMode, sizeof(fMode), FileModeInformation);
|
---|
| 382 | if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) || !NT_SUCCESS(Ios.Status))
|
---|
| 383 | return VERR_SUP_VP_FILE_MODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 384 | #endif
|
---|
| 385 |
|
---|
| 386 | HANDLE hEvent = NULL;
|
---|
| 387 | #ifdef IN_RING3
|
---|
| 388 | if (!(fMode & (FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_ALERT)))
|
---|
| 389 | {
|
---|
| 390 | rcNt = NtCreateEvent(&hEvent, EVENT_ALL_ACCESS, NULL, NotificationEvent, FALSE);
|
---|
| 391 | if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 392 | return VERR_SUP_VP_CREATE_READ_EVT_SEM_FAILED;
|
---|
| 393 | }
|
---|
| 394 | #else
|
---|
| 395 | Assert(fMode & FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT);
|
---|
| 396 | #endif
|
---|
| 397 |
|
---|
| 398 | /*
|
---|
[51770] | 399 | * Calc the file name length and allocate memory for the reader instance.
|
---|
| 400 | */
|
---|
| 401 | size_t cchFilename = 0;
|
---|
| 402 | if (pwszName)
|
---|
| 403 | cchFilename = RTUtf16CalcUtf8Len(pwszName);
|
---|
| 404 |
|
---|
| 405 | int rc = VERR_NO_MEMORY;
|
---|
| 406 | PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)RTMemAllocZ(sizeof(*pNtViRdr) + cchFilename);
|
---|
| 407 | if (!pNtViRdr)
|
---|
[53035] | 408 | {
|
---|
| 409 | #ifdef IN_RING3
|
---|
| 410 | if (hEvent != NULL)
|
---|
| 411 | NtClose(hEvent);
|
---|
| 412 | #endif
|
---|
[51770] | 413 | return VERR_NO_MEMORY;
|
---|
[53035] | 414 | }
|
---|
[51770] | 415 |
|
---|
| 416 | /*
|
---|
| 417 | * Initialize the structure.
|
---|
| 418 | */
|
---|
| 419 | if (cchFilename)
|
---|
| 420 | {
|
---|
| 421 | char *pszName = &pNtViRdr->szFilename[0];
|
---|
| 422 | rc = RTUtf16ToUtf8Ex(pwszName, RTSTR_MAX, &pszName, cchFilename + 1, NULL);
|
---|
| 423 | AssertStmt(RT_SUCCESS(rc), pNtViRdr->szFilename[0] = '\0');
|
---|
| 424 | }
|
---|
| 425 | else
|
---|
| 426 | pNtViRdr->szFilename[0] = '\0';
|
---|
| 427 |
|
---|
| 428 | pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic = RTLDRREADER_MAGIC;
|
---|
| 429 | pNtViRdr->Core.pfnRead = supHardNtViRdrRead;
|
---|
| 430 | pNtViRdr->Core.pfnTell = supHardNtViRdrTell;
|
---|
| 431 | pNtViRdr->Core.pfnSize = supHardNtViRdrSize;
|
---|
| 432 | pNtViRdr->Core.pfnLogName = supHardNtViRdrLogName;
|
---|
| 433 | pNtViRdr->Core.pfnMap = supHardNtViRdrMap;
|
---|
| 434 | pNtViRdr->Core.pfnUnmap = supHardNtViRdrUnmap;
|
---|
| 435 | pNtViRdr->Core.pfnDestroy = supHardNtViRdrDestroy;
|
---|
| 436 | pNtViRdr->hFile = hFile;
|
---|
[53035] | 437 | pNtViRdr->hEvent = hEvent;
|
---|
[51770] | 438 | pNtViRdr->off = 0;
|
---|
| 439 | pNtViRdr->cbFile = StdInfo.EndOfFile.QuadPart;
|
---|
| 440 | pNtViRdr->fFlags = fFlags;
|
---|
| 441 | *ppNtViRdr = pNtViRdr;
|
---|
| 442 | return VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 443 | }
|
---|
| 444 |
|
---|
| 445 |
|
---|
| 446 | /**
|
---|
[52482] | 447 | * Checks if the file is owned by TrustedInstaller (Vista+) or similar.
|
---|
[52365] | 448 | *
|
---|
| 449 | * @returns true if owned by TrustedInstaller of pre-Vista, false if not.
|
---|
| 450 | *
|
---|
| 451 | * @param hFile The handle to the file.
|
---|
| 452 | * @param pwszName The name of the file.
|
---|
| 453 | */
|
---|
[52482] | 454 | static bool supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName)
|
---|
[52365] | 455 | {
|
---|
| 456 | if (g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA)
|
---|
| 457 | return true;
|
---|
| 458 |
|
---|
| 459 | /*
|
---|
| 460 | * Get the ownership information.
|
---|
| 461 | */
|
---|
| 462 | union
|
---|
| 463 | {
|
---|
| 464 | SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_RELATIVE Rel;
|
---|
| 465 | SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR Abs;
|
---|
| 466 | uint8_t abView[256];
|
---|
| 467 | } uBuf;
|
---|
| 468 | ULONG cbActual;
|
---|
| 469 | NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQuerySecurityObject(hFile, OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION, &uBuf.Abs, sizeof(uBuf), &cbActual);
|
---|
| 470 | if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 471 | {
|
---|
| 472 | SUP_DPRINTF(("NtQuerySecurityObject failed with rcNt=%#x on '%ls'\n", rcNt, pwszName));
|
---|
| 473 | return false;
|
---|
| 474 | }
|
---|
| 475 |
|
---|
| 476 | /*
|
---|
| 477 | * Check the owner.
|
---|
[52482] | 478 | *
|
---|
[52484] | 479 | * Initially we wished to only allow TrustedInstaller. But a Windows CAPI
|
---|
[52482] | 480 | * plugin "Program Files\Tumbleweed\Desktop Validator\tmwdcapiclient.dll"
|
---|
| 481 | * turned up owned by the local system user, and we cannot operate without
|
---|
| 482 | * the plugin loaded once it's installed (WinVerityTrust fails).
|
---|
[52487] | 483 | *
|
---|
[52907] | 484 | * We'd like to avoid allowing Builtin\Administrators here since it's the
|
---|
| 485 | * default owner of anything an admin user creates (at least when elevated).
|
---|
| 486 | * Seems windows update or someone ends up installing or modifying system
|
---|
| 487 | * DLL ownership to this group, so for system32 and winsxs it's unavoidable.
|
---|
| 488 | * And, not surprise, a bunch of products, including AV, firewalls and similar
|
---|
| 489 | * ends up with their files installed with this group as owner. For instance
|
---|
| 490 | * if we wish to have NAT continue working, we need to allow this.
|
---|
| 491 | *
|
---|
| 492 | * Hopefully, we can limit the allowed files to these owners though, so
|
---|
| 493 | * we won't be subject to ordinary (non-admin, or not elevated) users
|
---|
| 494 | * downloading or be tricked into putting evil DLLs around the place...
|
---|
[52365] | 495 | */
|
---|
| 496 | PSID pOwner = uBuf.Rel.Control & SE_SELF_RELATIVE ? &uBuf.abView[uBuf.Rel.Owner] : uBuf.Abs.Owner;
|
---|
| 497 | Assert((uintptr_t)pOwner - (uintptr_t)&uBuf < sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(SID));
|
---|
| 498 | if (RtlEqualSid(pOwner, &g_TrustedInstallerSid))
|
---|
| 499 | return true;
|
---|
[52482] | 500 | if (RtlEqualSid(pOwner, &g_LocalSystemSid))
|
---|
| 501 | return true;
|
---|
[52907] | 502 | if (RtlEqualSid(pOwner, &g_AdminsGroupSid))
|
---|
| 503 | {
|
---|
| 504 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Owner is administrators group.\n", pwszName));
|
---|
| 505 | return true;
|
---|
| 506 | }
|
---|
[52365] | 507 |
|
---|
| 508 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Owner is not trusted installer (%.*Rhxs)\n",
|
---|
| 509 | pwszName, ((uint8_t *)pOwner)[1] /*SubAuthorityCount*/ * sizeof(ULONG) + 8, pOwner));
|
---|
[62677] | 510 | RT_NOREF1(pwszName);
|
---|
[52365] | 511 | return false;
|
---|
| 512 | }
|
---|
| 513 |
|
---|
| 514 |
|
---|
| 515 | /**
|
---|
[51770] | 516 | * Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII path compare.
|
---|
| 517 | *
|
---|
| 518 | * @returns true if equal, false if not.
|
---|
[52627] | 519 | * @param pawcLeft The UTF-16 path string, not necessarily null
|
---|
| 520 | * terminated.
|
---|
| 521 | * @param cwcLeft The number of chars in the left string,
|
---|
| 522 | * RTSTR_MAX if unknown but terminated.
|
---|
[51770] | 523 | * @param pszRight The ascii string.
|
---|
| 524 | */
|
---|
[52627] | 525 | DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUtf16PathIsEqualEx(PCRTUTF16 pawcLeft, size_t cwcLeft, const char *pszRight)
|
---|
[51770] | 526 | {
|
---|
| 527 | for (;;)
|
---|
| 528 | {
|
---|
[52627] | 529 | RTUTF16 wc;
|
---|
| 530 | if (cwcLeft-- > 0)
|
---|
| 531 | wc =*pawcLeft++;
|
---|
| 532 | else
|
---|
| 533 | wc = 0;
|
---|
[51770] | 534 | uint8_t b = *pszRight++;
|
---|
| 535 | if (b != wc)
|
---|
| 536 | {
|
---|
| 537 | if (wc >= 0x80)
|
---|
| 538 | return false;
|
---|
| 539 | wc = RT_C_TO_LOWER(wc);
|
---|
| 540 | if (wc != b)
|
---|
| 541 | {
|
---|
| 542 | b = RT_C_TO_LOWER(b);
|
---|
| 543 | if (wc != b)
|
---|
| 544 | {
|
---|
| 545 | if (wc == '/')
|
---|
| 546 | wc = '\\';
|
---|
| 547 | if (b == '/')
|
---|
| 548 | b = '\\';
|
---|
| 549 | if (wc != b)
|
---|
| 550 | return false;
|
---|
| 551 | }
|
---|
| 552 | }
|
---|
| 553 | }
|
---|
| 554 | if (!b)
|
---|
| 555 | return true;
|
---|
| 556 | }
|
---|
| 557 | }
|
---|
| 558 |
|
---|
| 559 |
|
---|
| 560 | /**
|
---|
[52627] | 561 | * Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII path compare.
|
---|
| 562 | *
|
---|
| 563 | * @returns true if equal, false if not.
|
---|
| 564 | * @param pwszLeft The UTF-16 path string.
|
---|
| 565 | * @param pszRight The ascii string.
|
---|
| 566 | */
|
---|
| 567 | static bool supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, const char *pszRight)
|
---|
| 568 | {
|
---|
| 569 | return supHardViUtf16PathIsEqualEx(pwszLeft, RTSTR_MAX, pszRight);
|
---|
| 570 | }
|
---|
| 571 |
|
---|
| 572 |
|
---|
[62677] | 573 | #if 0 /* unused */
|
---|
[52627] | 574 | /**
|
---|
[51770] | 575 | * Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII ends-with path predicate.
|
---|
| 576 | *
|
---|
| 577 | * @returns true if equal, false if not.
|
---|
| 578 | * @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
|
---|
| 579 | * @param pszSuffix The ascii suffix string.
|
---|
| 580 | */
|
---|
| 581 | static bool supHardViUtf16PathEndsWith(PCRTUTF16 pwsz, const char *pszSuffix)
|
---|
| 582 | {
|
---|
| 583 | size_t cwc = RTUtf16Len(pwsz);
|
---|
| 584 | size_t cchSuffix = strlen(pszSuffix);
|
---|
| 585 | if (cwc >= cchSuffix)
|
---|
| 586 | return supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz + cwc - cchSuffix, pszSuffix);
|
---|
| 587 | return false;
|
---|
| 588 | }
|
---|
[62677] | 589 | #endif
|
---|
[51770] | 590 |
|
---|
| 591 |
|
---|
| 592 | /**
|
---|
| 593 | * Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII starts-with path predicate.
|
---|
| 594 | *
|
---|
| 595 | * @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
|
---|
[58339] | 596 | * @param pwszLeft The UTF-16 path string.
|
---|
| 597 | * @param pszRight The ascii prefix string.
|
---|
[51770] | 598 | */
|
---|
[52356] | 599 | static bool supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithAscii(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, const char *pszRight)
|
---|
[51770] | 600 | {
|
---|
| 601 | for (;;)
|
---|
| 602 | {
|
---|
| 603 | RTUTF16 wc = *pwszLeft++;
|
---|
| 604 | uint8_t b = *pszRight++;
|
---|
| 605 | if (b != wc)
|
---|
| 606 | {
|
---|
| 607 | if (!b)
|
---|
| 608 | return true;
|
---|
| 609 | if (wc >= 0x80 || wc == 0)
|
---|
| 610 | return false;
|
---|
| 611 | wc = RT_C_TO_LOWER(wc);
|
---|
| 612 | if (wc != b)
|
---|
| 613 | {
|
---|
| 614 | b = RT_C_TO_LOWER(b);
|
---|
| 615 | if (wc != b)
|
---|
| 616 | {
|
---|
| 617 | if (wc == '/')
|
---|
| 618 | wc = '\\';
|
---|
| 619 | if (b == '/')
|
---|
| 620 | b = '\\';
|
---|
| 621 | if (wc != b)
|
---|
| 622 | return false;
|
---|
| 623 | }
|
---|
| 624 | }
|
---|
| 625 | }
|
---|
| 626 | }
|
---|
| 627 | }
|
---|
| 628 |
|
---|
| 629 |
|
---|
| 630 | /**
|
---|
[52356] | 631 | * Simple case insensitive UNICODE_STRING starts-with path predicate.
|
---|
| 632 | *
|
---|
| 633 | * @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
|
---|
| 634 | * @param pwszLeft The path to check.
|
---|
| 635 | * @param cwcLeft The length of @a pwszLeft
|
---|
| 636 | * @param pwszRight The starts-with path.
|
---|
| 637 | * @param cwcRight The length of @a pwszRight.
|
---|
| 638 | * @param fCheckSlash Check for a slash following the prefix.
|
---|
| 639 | */
|
---|
| 640 | DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, uint32_t cwcLeft,
|
---|
| 641 | PCRTUTF16 pwszRight, uint32_t cwcRight, bool fCheckSlash)
|
---|
| 642 | {
|
---|
[52365] | 643 | if (cwcLeft < cwcRight || !cwcRight || !pwszRight)
|
---|
[52356] | 644 | return false;
|
---|
| 645 |
|
---|
| 646 | /* See if we can get away with a case sensitive compare first. */
|
---|
[52376] | 647 | if (memcmp(pwszLeft, pwszRight, cwcRight * sizeof(RTUTF16)) == 0)
|
---|
[52356] | 648 | pwszLeft += cwcRight;
|
---|
| 649 | else
|
---|
| 650 | {
|
---|
| 651 | /* No luck, do a slow case insensitive comapre. */
|
---|
| 652 | uint32_t cLeft = cwcRight;
|
---|
| 653 | while (cLeft-- > 0)
|
---|
| 654 | {
|
---|
| 655 | RTUTF16 wcLeft = *pwszLeft++;
|
---|
| 656 | RTUTF16 wcRight = *pwszRight++;
|
---|
| 657 | if (wcLeft != wcRight)
|
---|
| 658 | {
|
---|
| 659 | wcLeft = wcLeft < 0x80 ? wcLeft == '/' ? '\\' : RT_C_TO_LOWER(wcLeft) : wcLeft;
|
---|
| 660 | wcRight = wcRight < 0x80 ? wcRight == '/' ? '\\' : RT_C_TO_LOWER(wcRight) : wcRight;
|
---|
| 661 | if (wcLeft != wcRight)
|
---|
| 662 | return false;
|
---|
| 663 | }
|
---|
| 664 | }
|
---|
| 665 | }
|
---|
| 666 |
|
---|
| 667 | /* Check for slash following the prefix, if request. */
|
---|
| 668 | if ( !fCheckSlash
|
---|
| 669 | || *pwszLeft == '\\'
|
---|
| 670 | || *pwszLeft == '/')
|
---|
| 671 | return true;
|
---|
| 672 | return false;
|
---|
| 673 | }
|
---|
| 674 |
|
---|
| 675 |
|
---|
| 676 | /**
|
---|
| 677 | * Simple case insensitive UNICODE_STRING starts-with path predicate.
|
---|
| 678 | *
|
---|
| 679 | * @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
|
---|
| 680 | * @param pUniStrLeft The path to check.
|
---|
| 681 | * @param pUniStrRight The starts-with path.
|
---|
| 682 | * @param fCheckSlash Check for a slash following the prefix.
|
---|
| 683 | */
|
---|
| 684 | DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUniStrPathStartsWithUniStr(UNICODE_STRING const *pUniStrLeft, UNICODE_STRING const *pUniStrRight,
|
---|
| 685 | bool fCheckSlash)
|
---|
| 686 | {
|
---|
| 687 | return supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pUniStrLeft->Buffer, pUniStrLeft->Length / sizeof(WCHAR),
|
---|
| 688 | pUniStrRight->Buffer, pUniStrRight->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), fCheckSlash);
|
---|
| 689 | }
|
---|
| 690 |
|
---|
| 691 |
|
---|
[62677] | 692 | #ifndef IN_RING0
|
---|
[52356] | 693 | /**
|
---|
[51770] | 694 | * Counts slashes in the given UTF-8 path string.
|
---|
| 695 | *
|
---|
| 696 | * @returns Number of slashes.
|
---|
| 697 | * @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
|
---|
| 698 | */
|
---|
| 699 | static uint32_t supHardViUtf16PathCountSlashes(PCRTUTF16 pwsz)
|
---|
| 700 | {
|
---|
| 701 | uint32_t cSlashes = 0;
|
---|
| 702 | RTUTF16 wc;
|
---|
| 703 | while ((wc = *pwsz++) != '\0')
|
---|
| 704 | if (wc == '/' || wc == '\\')
|
---|
| 705 | cSlashes++;
|
---|
| 706 | return cSlashes;
|
---|
| 707 | }
|
---|
[62677] | 708 | #endif
|
---|
[51770] | 709 |
|
---|
| 710 |
|
---|
[52030] | 711 | #ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE
|
---|
[51770] | 712 | /**
|
---|
[52030] | 713 | * Checks if the path goes into %windir%\apppatch\.
|
---|
| 714 | *
|
---|
| 715 | * @returns true if apppatch, false if not.
|
---|
| 716 | * @param pwszPath The path to examine.
|
---|
| 717 | */
|
---|
| 718 | DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViIsAppPatchDir(PCRTUTF16 pwszPath, uint32_t cwcName)
|
---|
| 719 | {
|
---|
| 720 | uint32_t cwcWinDir = (g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length - sizeof(L"System32")) / sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
| 721 |
|
---|
| 722 | if (cwcName <= cwcWinDir + sizeof("AppPatch"))
|
---|
| 723 | return false;
|
---|
| 724 |
|
---|
| 725 | if (memcmp(pwszPath, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcWinDir * sizeof(WCHAR)))
|
---|
| 726 | return false;
|
---|
| 727 |
|
---|
[52356] | 728 | if (!supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithAscii(&pwszPath[cwcWinDir], "\\AppPatch\\"))
|
---|
[52030] | 729 | return false;
|
---|
| 730 |
|
---|
| 731 | return g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_NT_VER_VISTA;
|
---|
| 732 | }
|
---|
| 733 | #else
|
---|
| 734 | # error should not get here..
|
---|
| 735 | #endif
|
---|
| 736 |
|
---|
| 737 |
|
---|
| 738 |
|
---|
| 739 | /**
|
---|
[51770] | 740 | * Checks if the unsigned DLL is fine or not.
|
---|
| 741 | *
|
---|
| 742 | * @returns VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED or @a rc.
|
---|
| 743 | * @param hLdrMod The loader module handle.
|
---|
| 744 | * @param pwszName The NT name of the DLL/EXE.
|
---|
| 745 | * @param fFlags Flags.
|
---|
[52365] | 746 | * @param hFile The file handle.
|
---|
[51770] | 747 | * @param rc The status code..
|
---|
| 748 | */
|
---|
[52365] | 749 | static int supHardNtViCheckIfNotSignedOk(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, HANDLE hFile, int rc)
|
---|
[51770] | 750 | {
|
---|
[62677] | 751 | RT_NOREF1(hLdrMod);
|
---|
| 752 |
|
---|
[51770] | 753 | if (fFlags & (SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT | SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING))
|
---|
| 754 | return rc;
|
---|
| 755 |
|
---|
| 756 | /*
|
---|
| 757 | * Version macros.
|
---|
| 758 | */
|
---|
| 759 | uint32_t const uNtVer = g_uNtVerCombined;
|
---|
| 760 | #define IS_XP() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 1) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 2) )
|
---|
| 761 | #define IS_W2K3() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 2) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 3) )
|
---|
| 762 | #define IS_VISTA() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 1) )
|
---|
| 763 | #define IS_W70() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 1) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2) )
|
---|
| 764 | #define IS_W80() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 3) )
|
---|
| 765 | #define IS_W81() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 3) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) )
|
---|
| 766 |
|
---|
| 767 | /*
|
---|
| 768 | * The System32 directory.
|
---|
| 769 | *
|
---|
| 770 | * System32 is full of unsigned DLLs shipped by microsoft, graphics
|
---|
| 771 | * hardware vendors, input device/method vendors and whatnot else that
|
---|
| 772 | * actually needs to be loaded into a process for it to work correctly.
|
---|
| 773 | * We have to ASSUME that anything our process attempts to load from
|
---|
| 774 | * System32 is trustworthy and that the Windows system with the help of
|
---|
| 775 | * anti-virus software make sure there is nothing evil lurking in System32
|
---|
| 776 | * or being loaded from it.
|
---|
| 777 | *
|
---|
| 778 | * A small measure of protection is to list DLLs we know should be signed
|
---|
| 779 | * and decline loading unsigned versions of them, assuming they have been
|
---|
| 780 | * replaced by an adversary with evil intentions.
|
---|
| 781 | */
|
---|
| 782 | PCRTUTF16 pwsz;
|
---|
| 783 | uint32_t cwcName = (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName);
|
---|
| 784 | uint32_t cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
[52356] | 785 | if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /*fCheckSlash*/))
|
---|
[51770] | 786 | {
|
---|
| 787 | pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
|
---|
| 788 |
|
---|
[52453] | 789 | /* Must be owned by trusted installer. (This test is superfuous, thus no relaxation here.) */
|
---|
[52365] | 790 | if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
|
---|
[52482] | 791 | && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
|
---|
[52365] | 792 | return rc;
|
---|
| 793 |
|
---|
[51770] | 794 | /* Core DLLs. */
|
---|
| 795 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "ntdll.dll"))
|
---|
| 796 | return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
|
---|
| 797 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernel32.dll"))
|
---|
| 798 | return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
|
---|
| 799 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernelbase.dll"))
|
---|
| 800 | return IS_W80() || IS_W70() ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
|
---|
| 801 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "apisetschema.dll"))
|
---|
| 802 | return IS_W70() ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
|
---|
| 803 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "apphelp.dll"))
|
---|
[57165] | 804 | return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED; /* So far, never signed... */
|
---|
[52529] | 805 | #ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_VERIFIER_DLL
|
---|
| 806 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "verifier.dll"))
|
---|
| 807 | return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
|
---|
| 808 | #endif
|
---|
[52030] | 809 | #ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE
|
---|
| 810 | if (uNtVer >= SUP_NT_VER_W70) /* hard limit: user32.dll is unwanted prior to w7. */
|
---|
| 811 | {
|
---|
| 812 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "sfc.dll"))
|
---|
| 813 | return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
|
---|
| 814 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "sfc_os.dll"))
|
---|
| 815 | return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
|
---|
| 816 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "user32.dll"))
|
---|
| 817 | return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
|
---|
| 818 | }
|
---|
| 819 | #endif
|
---|
[51770] | 820 |
|
---|
| 821 | #ifndef IN_RING0
|
---|
| 822 | /* Check that this DLL isn't supposed to be signed on this windows
|
---|
| 823 | version. If it should, it's likely to be a fake. */
|
---|
| 824 | /** @todo list of signed dlls for various windows versions. */
|
---|
| 825 | return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
| 826 | #else
|
---|
| 827 | return rc;
|
---|
[52365] | 828 | #endif /* IN_RING0 */
|
---|
[51770] | 829 | }
|
---|
| 830 |
|
---|
[52404] | 831 |
|
---|
[51770] | 832 | #ifndef IN_RING0
|
---|
| 833 | /*
|
---|
| 834 | * The WinSxS white list.
|
---|
| 835 | *
|
---|
| 836 | * Just like with System32 there are potentially a number of DLLs that
|
---|
[52365] | 837 | * could be required from WinSxS.
|
---|
[51770] | 838 | */
|
---|
| 839 | cwcOther = g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
[52356] | 840 | if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /*fCheckSlash*/))
|
---|
[51770] | 841 | {
|
---|
| 842 | pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
|
---|
| 843 | cwcName -= cwcOther + 1;
|
---|
| 844 |
|
---|
| 845 | /* The WinSxS layout means everything worth loading is exactly one level down. */
|
---|
| 846 | uint32_t cSlashes = supHardViUtf16PathCountSlashes(pwsz);
|
---|
| 847 | if (cSlashes != 1)
|
---|
| 848 | return rc;
|
---|
| 849 |
|
---|
[52404] | 850 | /* Must be owned by trusted installer. */
|
---|
| 851 | if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
|
---|
[52482] | 852 | && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
|
---|
[52404] | 853 | return rc;
|
---|
| 854 | return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
[51770] | 855 | }
|
---|
[52365] | 856 | #endif /* !IN_RING0 */
|
---|
[51770] | 857 |
|
---|
[52404] | 858 |
|
---|
[52030] | 859 | #ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE
|
---|
| 860 | /*
|
---|
| 861 | * AppPatch whitelist.
|
---|
| 862 | */
|
---|
| 863 | if (supHardViIsAppPatchDir(pwszName, cwcName))
|
---|
| 864 | {
|
---|
| 865 | cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR); /* ASSUMES System32 is called System32. */
|
---|
| 866 | pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
|
---|
| 867 |
|
---|
[52365] | 868 | if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
|
---|
[52482] | 869 | && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
|
---|
[52365] | 870 | return rc;
|
---|
| 871 |
|
---|
[52404] | 872 | # ifndef VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE
|
---|
[52030] | 873 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "acres.dll"))
|
---|
| 874 | return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
| 875 |
|
---|
[52404] | 876 | # ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
|
---|
[52030] | 877 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "AppPatch64\\AcGenral.dll"))
|
---|
| 878 | return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
[52404] | 879 | # elif defined(RT_ARCH_X86)
|
---|
[52030] | 880 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "AcGenral.dll"))
|
---|
| 881 | return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
[52404] | 882 | # endif
|
---|
| 883 | # endif /* !VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE */
|
---|
[52030] | 884 |
|
---|
[52404] | 885 | # ifdef IN_RING0
|
---|
| 886 | return rc;
|
---|
| 887 | # else
|
---|
[52365] | 888 | return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
| 889 | # endif
|
---|
[52030] | 890 | }
|
---|
[52365] | 891 | #endif /* VBOX_PERMIT_MORE */
|
---|
[52030] | 892 |
|
---|
[52404] | 893 |
|
---|
| 894 | #ifndef IN_RING0
|
---|
| 895 | # if defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
|
---|
[52365] | 896 | /*
|
---|
| 897 | * Program files and common files.
|
---|
| 898 | * Permit anything that's signed and correctly installed.
|
---|
| 899 | */
|
---|
| 900 | if ( supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
|
---|
| 901 | g_ProgramFilesNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_ProgramFilesNtPath.UniStr.Length,
|
---|
| 902 | true /*fCheckSlash*/)
|
---|
| 903 | || supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
|
---|
| 904 | g_CommonFilesNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_CommonFilesNtPath.UniStr.Length,
|
---|
| 905 | true /*fCheckSlash*/)
|
---|
| 906 | # ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
|
---|
| 907 | || supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
|
---|
| 908 | g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Length,
|
---|
| 909 | true /*fCheckSlash*/)
|
---|
| 910 | || supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
|
---|
| 911 | g_CommonFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_CommonFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Length,
|
---|
| 912 | true /*fCheckSlash*/)
|
---|
| 913 | # endif
|
---|
| 914 | )
|
---|
| 915 | {
|
---|
[52404] | 916 | if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
|
---|
[52482] | 917 | && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
|
---|
[52404] | 918 | return rc;
|
---|
| 919 | return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
[52365] | 920 | }
|
---|
| 921 |
|
---|
[52404] | 922 | # elif defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE) && defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
|
---|
| 923 | /*
|
---|
| 924 | * Anything that's owned by the trusted installer.
|
---|
| 925 | */
|
---|
| 926 | if ( (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
|
---|
[52482] | 927 | || supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
|
---|
[52404] | 928 | return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
| 929 |
|
---|
| 930 | # endif
|
---|
| 931 | #endif /* !IN_RING0 */
|
---|
| 932 |
|
---|
| 933 | /*
|
---|
| 934 | * Not permitted.
|
---|
| 935 | */
|
---|
[51770] | 936 | return rc;
|
---|
| 937 | }
|
---|
| 938 |
|
---|
| 939 |
|
---|
| 940 | /**
|
---|
[57501] | 941 | * @callback_method_impl{FNRTDUMPPRINTFV, Formats into RTERRINFO. }
|
---|
| 942 | */
|
---|
| 943 | static DECLCALLBACK(void) supHardNtViAsn1DumpToErrInfo(void *pvUser, const char *pszFormat, va_list va)
|
---|
| 944 | {
|
---|
| 945 | PRTERRINFO pErrInfo = (PRTERRINFO)pvUser;
|
---|
| 946 | RTErrInfoAddV(pErrInfo, pErrInfo->rc, pszFormat, va);
|
---|
| 947 | }
|
---|
| 948 |
|
---|
| 949 |
|
---|
| 950 | /**
|
---|
| 951 | * @callback_method_impl{FNRTCRPKCS7VERIFYCERTCALLBACK,
|
---|
[51770] | 952 | * Standard code signing. Use this for Microsoft SPC.}
|
---|
| 953 | */
|
---|
| 954 | static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViCertVerifyCallback(PCRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert, RTCRX509CERTPATHS hCertPaths,
|
---|
[52537] | 955 | uint32_t fFlags, void *pvUser, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
|
---|
[51770] | 956 | {
|
---|
| 957 | PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pvUser;
|
---|
| 958 | Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
|
---|
| 959 |
|
---|
| 960 | /*
|
---|
| 961 | * If there is no certificate path build & validator associated with this
|
---|
| 962 | * callback, it must be because of the build certificate. We trust the
|
---|
| 963 | * build certificate without any second thoughts.
|
---|
| 964 | */
|
---|
| 965 | if (hCertPaths == NIL_RTCRX509CERTPATHS)
|
---|
| 966 | {
|
---|
| 967 | if (RTCrX509Certificate_Compare(pCert, &g_BuildX509Cert) == 0) /* healthy paranoia */
|
---|
| 968 | return VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
[57501] | 969 | int rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_BUILD_CERT_IPE, "Not valid kernel code signature (fFlags=%#x).", fFlags);
|
---|
| 970 | if (pErrInfo)
|
---|
| 971 | {
|
---|
| 972 | RTErrInfoAdd(pErrInfo, rc, "\n\nExe cert:\n");
|
---|
| 973 | RTAsn1Dump(&pCert->SeqCore.Asn1Core, 0 /*fFlags*/, 0 /*uLevel*/, supHardNtViAsn1DumpToErrInfo, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 974 | RTErrInfoAdd(pErrInfo, rc, "\n\nBuild cert:\n");
|
---|
| 975 | RTAsn1Dump(&g_BuildX509Cert.SeqCore.Asn1Core, 0 /*fFlags*/, 0 /*uLevel*/, supHardNtViAsn1DumpToErrInfo, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 976 | }
|
---|
| 977 | return rc;
|
---|
[51770] | 978 | }
|
---|
| 979 |
|
---|
| 980 | /*
|
---|
| 981 | * Standard code signing capabilites required.
|
---|
| 982 | */
|
---|
[52537] | 983 | int rc = RTCrPkcs7VerifyCertCallbackCodeSigning(pCert, hCertPaths, fFlags, NULL, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 984 | if ( RT_SUCCESS(rc)
|
---|
| 985 | && (fFlags & RTCRPKCS7VCC_F_SIGNED_DATA))
|
---|
[51770] | 986 | {
|
---|
| 987 | /*
|
---|
| 988 | * If kernel signing, a valid certificate path must be anchored by the
|
---|
| 989 | * microsoft kernel signing root certificate.
|
---|
| 990 | */
|
---|
| 991 | if (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING)
|
---|
| 992 | {
|
---|
| 993 | uint32_t cPaths = RTCrX509CertPathsGetPathCount(hCertPaths);
|
---|
| 994 | uint32_t cFound = 0;
|
---|
| 995 | uint32_t cValid = 0;
|
---|
| 996 | for (uint32_t iPath = 0; iPath < cPaths; iPath++)
|
---|
| 997 | {
|
---|
| 998 | bool fTrusted;
|
---|
| 999 | PCRTCRX509NAME pSubject;
|
---|
| 1000 | PCRTCRX509SUBJECTPUBLICKEYINFO pPublicKeyInfo;
|
---|
| 1001 | int rcVerify;
|
---|
| 1002 | rc = RTCrX509CertPathsQueryPathInfo(hCertPaths, iPath, &fTrusted, NULL /*pcNodes*/, &pSubject, &pPublicKeyInfo,
|
---|
| 1003 | NULL, NULL /*pCertCtx*/, &rcVerify);
|
---|
| 1004 | AssertRCBreak(rc);
|
---|
| 1005 |
|
---|
| 1006 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rcVerify))
|
---|
| 1007 | {
|
---|
| 1008 | Assert(fTrusted);
|
---|
| 1009 | cValid++;
|
---|
| 1010 |
|
---|
| 1011 | /*
|
---|
| 1012 | * Search the kernel signing root store for a matching anchor.
|
---|
| 1013 | */
|
---|
| 1014 | RTCRSTORECERTSEARCH Search;
|
---|
| 1015 | rc = RTCrStoreCertFindBySubjectOrAltSubjectByRfc5280(g_hNtKernelRootStore, pSubject, &Search);
|
---|
| 1016 | AssertRCBreak(rc);
|
---|
| 1017 |
|
---|
| 1018 | PCRTCRCERTCTX pCertCtx;
|
---|
| 1019 | while ((pCertCtx = RTCrStoreCertSearchNext(g_hNtKernelRootStore, &Search)) != NULL)
|
---|
| 1020 | {
|
---|
[51812] | 1021 | PCRTCRX509SUBJECTPUBLICKEYINFO pCertPubKeyInfo = NULL;
|
---|
| 1022 | if (pCertCtx->pCert)
|
---|
| 1023 | pCertPubKeyInfo = &pCertCtx->pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo;
|
---|
| 1024 | else if (pCertCtx->pTaInfo)
|
---|
| 1025 | pCertPubKeyInfo = &pCertCtx->pTaInfo->PubKey;
|
---|
| 1026 | else
|
---|
| 1027 | pCertPubKeyInfo = NULL;
|
---|
| 1028 | if ( pCertPubKeyInfo
|
---|
| 1029 | && RTCrX509SubjectPublicKeyInfo_Compare(pCertPubKeyInfo, pPublicKeyInfo) == 0)
|
---|
[51770] | 1030 | cFound++;
|
---|
| 1031 | RTCrCertCtxRelease(pCertCtx);
|
---|
| 1032 | }
|
---|
| 1033 |
|
---|
| 1034 | int rc2 = RTCrStoreCertSearchDestroy(g_hNtKernelRootStore, &Search); AssertRC(rc2);
|
---|
| 1035 | }
|
---|
| 1036 | }
|
---|
| 1037 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && cFound == 0)
|
---|
| 1038 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_VALID_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNATURE, "Not valid kernel code signature.");
|
---|
[51818] | 1039 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && cValid < 2 && g_fHaveOtherRoots)
|
---|
[51770] | 1040 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_UNEXPECTED_VALID_PATH_COUNT,
|
---|
[51817] | 1041 | "Expected at least %u valid paths, not %u.", 2, cValid);
|
---|
[51770] | 1042 | }
|
---|
| 1043 | }
|
---|
| 1044 |
|
---|
| 1045 | /*
|
---|
| 1046 | * More requirements? NT5 build lab?
|
---|
| 1047 | */
|
---|
| 1048 |
|
---|
| 1049 | return rc;
|
---|
| 1050 | }
|
---|
| 1051 |
|
---|
| 1052 |
|
---|
| 1053 | static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViCallback(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, RTLDRSIGNATURETYPE enmSignature,
|
---|
| 1054 | void const *pvSignature, size_t cbSignature,
|
---|
| 1055 | PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, void *pvUser)
|
---|
| 1056 | {
|
---|
[62677] | 1057 | RT_NOREF2(hLdrMod, enmSignature);
|
---|
| 1058 |
|
---|
[51770] | 1059 | /*
|
---|
| 1060 | * Check out the input.
|
---|
| 1061 | */
|
---|
| 1062 | PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pvUser;
|
---|
| 1063 | Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
|
---|
| 1064 |
|
---|
| 1065 | AssertReturn(cbSignature == sizeof(RTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO), VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
|
---|
| 1066 | PCRTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO pContentInfo = (PCRTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO)pvSignature;
|
---|
| 1067 | AssertReturn(RTCrPkcs7ContentInfo_IsSignedData(pContentInfo), VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
|
---|
| 1068 | AssertReturn(pContentInfo->u.pSignedData->SignerInfos.cItems == 1, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
|
---|
[64883] | 1069 | PCRTCRPKCS7SIGNERINFO pSignerInfo = pContentInfo->u.pSignedData->SignerInfos.papItems[0];
|
---|
[51770] | 1070 |
|
---|
| 1071 | /*
|
---|
| 1072 | * If special certificate requirements, check them out before validating
|
---|
| 1073 | * the signature.
|
---|
| 1074 | */
|
---|
| 1075 | if (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT)
|
---|
| 1076 | {
|
---|
| 1077 | if (!RTCrX509Certificate_MatchIssuerAndSerialNumber(&g_BuildX509Cert,
|
---|
| 1078 | &pSignerInfo->IssuerAndSerialNumber.Name,
|
---|
| 1079 | &pSignerInfo->IssuerAndSerialNumber.SerialNumber))
|
---|
| 1080 | return RTErrInfoSet(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_SIGNED_WITH_BUILD_CERT, "Not signed with the build certificate.");
|
---|
| 1081 | }
|
---|
| 1082 |
|
---|
| 1083 | /*
|
---|
[52537] | 1084 | * Verify the signature. We instruct the verifier to use the signing time
|
---|
| 1085 | * counter signature present when present, falling back on the timestamp
|
---|
| 1086 | * planted by the linker when absent. In ring-0 we don't have all the
|
---|
| 1087 | * necessary timestamp server root certificate info, so we have to allow
|
---|
[52541] | 1088 | * using counter signatures unverified there. Ditto for the early period
|
---|
| 1089 | * of ring-3 hardened stub execution.
|
---|
[51770] | 1090 | */
|
---|
| 1091 | RTTIMESPEC ValidationTime;
|
---|
| 1092 | RTTimeSpecSetSeconds(&ValidationTime, pNtViRdr->uTimestamp);
|
---|
| 1093 |
|
---|
[52537] | 1094 | uint32_t fFlags = RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_ALWAYS_USE_SIGNING_TIME_IF_PRESENT
|
---|
[52600] | 1095 | | RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_ALWAYS_USE_MS_TIMESTAMP_IF_PRESENT
|
---|
[52537] | 1096 | | RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_COUNTER_SIGNATURE_SIGNING_TIME_ONLY;
|
---|
[52541] | 1097 | #ifndef IN_RING0
|
---|
| 1098 | if (!g_fHaveOtherRoots)
|
---|
[52537] | 1099 | #endif
|
---|
[52600] | 1100 | fFlags |= RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_USE_SIGNING_TIME_UNVERIFIED | RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_USE_MS_TIMESTAMP_UNVERIFIED;
|
---|
[52537] | 1101 | return RTCrPkcs7VerifySignedData(pContentInfo, fFlags, g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore, g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore,
|
---|
| 1102 | &ValidationTime, supHardNtViCertVerifyCallback, pNtViRdr, pErrInfo);
|
---|
[51770] | 1103 | }
|
---|
| 1104 |
|
---|
| 1105 |
|
---|
| 1106 | /**
|
---|
[64731] | 1107 | * RTTimeNow equivaltent that handles ring-3 where we cannot use it.
|
---|
| 1108 | *
|
---|
| 1109 | * @returns pNow
|
---|
| 1110 | * @param pNow Where to return the current time.
|
---|
| 1111 | */
|
---|
| 1112 | static PRTTIMESPEC supHardNtTimeNow(PRTTIMESPEC pNow)
|
---|
| 1113 | {
|
---|
| 1114 | #ifdef IN_RING3
|
---|
| 1115 | /*
|
---|
| 1116 | * Just read system time.
|
---|
| 1117 | */
|
---|
| 1118 | KUSER_SHARED_DATA volatile *pUserSharedData = (KUSER_SHARED_DATA volatile *)MM_SHARED_USER_DATA_VA;
|
---|
| 1119 | # ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
|
---|
| 1120 | uint64_t uRet = *(uint64_t volatile *)&pUserSharedData->SystemTime; /* This is what KeQuerySystemTime does (missaligned). */
|
---|
| 1121 | return RTTimeSpecSetNtTime(pNow, uRet);
|
---|
| 1122 | # else
|
---|
| 1123 |
|
---|
| 1124 | LARGE_INTEGER NtTime;
|
---|
| 1125 | do
|
---|
| 1126 | {
|
---|
| 1127 | NtTime.HighPart = pUserSharedData->SystemTime.High1Time;
|
---|
| 1128 | NtTime.LowPart = pUserSharedData->SystemTime.LowPart;
|
---|
| 1129 | } while (pUserSharedData->SystemTime.High2Time != NtTime.HighPart);
|
---|
| 1130 | return RTTimeSpecSetNtTime(pNow, NtTime.QuadPart);
|
---|
| 1131 | # endif
|
---|
| 1132 | #else /* IN_RING0 */
|
---|
| 1133 | return RTTimeNow(pNow);
|
---|
| 1134 | #endif /* IN_RING0 */
|
---|
| 1135 | }
|
---|
| 1136 |
|
---|
| 1137 |
|
---|
| 1138 | /**
|
---|
[52204] | 1139 | * Verifies the given loader image.
|
---|
| 1140 | *
|
---|
| 1141 | * @returns IPRT status code.
|
---|
[52403] | 1142 | * @param hLdrMod File handle to the executable file.
|
---|
| 1143 | * @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
|
---|
| 1144 | * dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
|
---|
| 1145 | * error/logging.
|
---|
| 1146 | * @param pNtViRdr The reader instance /w flags.
|
---|
[52634] | 1147 | * @param fAvoidWinVerifyTrust Whether to avoid WinVerifyTrust because of
|
---|
| 1148 | * deadlock or other loader related dangers.
|
---|
[52403] | 1149 | * @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was used.
|
---|
| 1150 | * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
|
---|
[52204] | 1151 | */
|
---|
| 1152 | DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr,
|
---|
[52634] | 1153 | bool fAvoidWinVerifyTrust, bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
|
---|
[52204] | 1154 | {
|
---|
[52403] | 1155 | if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
|
---|
| 1156 | *pfWinVerifyTrust = false;
|
---|
| 1157 |
|
---|
[52204] | 1158 | #ifdef IN_RING3
|
---|
| 1159 | /* Check that the caller has performed the necessary library initialization. */
|
---|
| 1160 | if (!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert))
|
---|
| 1161 | return RTErrInfoSet(pErrInfo, VERR_WRONG_ORDER,
|
---|
| 1162 | "supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier was not called.");
|
---|
| 1163 | #endif
|
---|
| 1164 |
|
---|
| 1165 | /*
|
---|
[52365] | 1166 | * Check the trusted installer bit first, if requested as it's somewhat
|
---|
[52484] | 1167 | * cheaper than the rest.
|
---|
| 1168 | *
|
---|
[52690] | 1169 | * We relax this for system32 and a little for WinSxS, like we used to, as
|
---|
| 1170 | * there are apparently some systems out there where the user, admin, or
|
---|
| 1171 | * someone has changed the ownership of core windows DLLs like user32.dll
|
---|
| 1172 | * and comctl32.dll. Since we need user32.dll and will be checking it's
|
---|
| 1173 | * digital signature, it's reasonably safe to let this thru. (The report
|
---|
| 1174 | * was of SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS
|
---|
[52482] | 1175 | * owning user32.dll, see public ticket 13187, VBoxStartup.3.log.)
|
---|
[52484] | 1176 | *
|
---|
| 1177 | * We've also had problems with graphics driver components like ig75icd64.dll
|
---|
| 1178 | * and atig6pxx.dll not being owned by TrustedInstaller, with the result
|
---|
| 1179 | * that 3D got broken (mod by zero issue in test build 5). These were also
|
---|
| 1180 | * SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS.
|
---|
[52690] | 1181 | *
|
---|
| 1182 | * In one report by 'thor' the WinSxS resident comctl32.dll was owned by
|
---|
| 1183 | * SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS (with 4.3.16).
|
---|
[52365] | 1184 | */
|
---|
[58157] | 1185 | /** @todo Since we're now allowing Builtin\\Administrators after all, perhaps we
|
---|
[52907] | 1186 | * could drop these system32 + winsxs hacks?? */
|
---|
[52365] | 1187 | if ( (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OWNER)
|
---|
[52482] | 1188 | && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(pNtViRdr->hFile, pwszName))
|
---|
[52453] | 1189 | {
|
---|
[52690] | 1190 | if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName),
|
---|
| 1191 | g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR),
|
---|
| 1192 | true /*fCheckSlash*/))
|
---|
| 1193 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Relaxing the TrustedInstaller requirement for this DLL (it's in system32).\n", pwszName));
|
---|
| 1194 | else if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName),
|
---|
| 1195 | g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR),
|
---|
| 1196 | true /*fCheckSlash*/))
|
---|
| 1197 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Relaxing the TrustedInstaller requirement for this DLL (it's in WinSxS).\n", pwszName));
|
---|
| 1198 | else
|
---|
[52453] | 1199 | return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_OWNED_BY_TRUSTED_INSTALLER,
|
---|
| 1200 | "supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: TrustedInstaller is not the owner of '%ls'.", pwszName);
|
---|
| 1201 | }
|
---|
[52365] | 1202 |
|
---|
| 1203 | /*
|
---|
[52204] | 1204 | * Verify it.
|
---|
| 1205 | *
|
---|
| 1206 | * The PKCS #7 SignedData signature is checked in the callback. Any
|
---|
| 1207 | * signing certificate restrictions are also enforced there.
|
---|
| 1208 | *
|
---|
| 1209 | * For the time being, we use the executable timestamp as the
|
---|
| 1210 | * certificate validation date. We must query that first to avoid
|
---|
| 1211 | * potential issues re-entering the loader code from the callback.
|
---|
| 1212 | *
|
---|
| 1213 | * Update: Save the first timestamp we validate with build cert and
|
---|
| 1214 | * use this as a minimum timestamp for further build cert
|
---|
| 1215 | * validations. This works around issues with old DLLs that
|
---|
| 1216 | * we sign against with our certificate (crt, sdl, qt).
|
---|
[64731] | 1217 | *
|
---|
| 1218 | * Update: If the validation fails, retry with the current timestamp. This
|
---|
| 1219 | * is a workaround for NTDLL.DLL in build 14971 having a weird
|
---|
| 1220 | * timestamp: 0xDF1E957E (Sat Aug 14 14:05:18 2088).
|
---|
[52204] | 1221 | */
|
---|
| 1222 | int rc = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_TIMESTAMP_SECONDS, &pNtViRdr->uTimestamp, sizeof(pNtViRdr->uTimestamp));
|
---|
| 1223 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1224 | {
|
---|
| 1225 | #ifdef IN_RING3 /* Hack alert! (see above) */
|
---|
| 1226 | if ( (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING)
|
---|
| 1227 | && (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE_ENFORCEMENT)
|
---|
| 1228 | && pNtViRdr->uTimestamp < g_uBuildTimestampHack)
|
---|
| 1229 | pNtViRdr->uTimestamp = g_uBuildTimestampHack;
|
---|
| 1230 | #endif
|
---|
| 1231 |
|
---|
| 1232 | rc = RTLdrVerifySignature(hLdrMod, supHardNtViCallback, pNtViRdr, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 1233 |
|
---|
| 1234 | #ifdef IN_RING3 /* Hack alert! (see above) */
|
---|
| 1235 | if ((pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT) && g_uBuildTimestampHack == 0 && RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1236 | g_uBuildTimestampHack = pNtViRdr->uTimestamp;
|
---|
| 1237 | #endif
|
---|
| 1238 |
|
---|
[64731] | 1239 | if (rc == VERR_CR_X509_CPV_NOT_VALID_AT_TIME)
|
---|
| 1240 | {
|
---|
| 1241 | RTTIMESPEC Now;
|
---|
| 1242 | uint64_t uOld = pNtViRdr->uTimestamp;
|
---|
| 1243 | pNtViRdr->uTimestamp = RTTimeSpecGetSeconds(supHardNtTimeNow(&Now));
|
---|
| 1244 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: VERR_CR_X509_CPV_NOT_VALID_AT_TIME for %#RX64; retrying against current time: %#RX64.\n",
|
---|
| 1245 | pwszName, uOld, pNtViRdr->uTimestamp)); NOREF(uOld);
|
---|
| 1246 | rc = RTLdrVerifySignature(hLdrMod, supHardNtViCallback, pNtViRdr, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 1247 | }
|
---|
| 1248 |
|
---|
[52204] | 1249 | /*
|
---|
| 1250 | * Microsoft doesn't sign a whole bunch of DLLs, so we have to
|
---|
| 1251 | * ASSUME that a bunch of system DLLs are fine.
|
---|
| 1252 | */
|
---|
| 1253 | if (rc == VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
|
---|
[52365] | 1254 | rc = supHardNtViCheckIfNotSignedOk(hLdrMod, pwszName, pNtViRdr->fFlags, pNtViRdr->hFile, rc);
|
---|
[52204] | 1255 | if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
|
---|
| 1256 | RTErrInfoAddF(pErrInfo, rc, ": %ls", pwszName);
|
---|
| 1257 |
|
---|
| 1258 | /*
|
---|
| 1259 | * Check for the signature checking enforcement, if requested to do so.
|
---|
| 1260 | */
|
---|
| 1261 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE_ENFORCEMENT))
|
---|
| 1262 | {
|
---|
| 1263 | bool fEnforced = false;
|
---|
| 1264 | int rc2 = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_ENFORCED, &fEnforced, sizeof(fEnforced));
|
---|
| 1265 | if (RT_FAILURE(rc2))
|
---|
| 1266 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc2, "Querying RTLDRPROP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_ENFORCED failed on %ls: %Rrc.",
|
---|
| 1267 | pwszName, rc2);
|
---|
| 1268 | else if (!fEnforced)
|
---|
| 1269 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_NOT_ENFORCED,
|
---|
| 1270 | "The image '%ls' was not linked with /IntegrityCheck.", pwszName);
|
---|
| 1271 | }
|
---|
| 1272 | }
|
---|
| 1273 | else
|
---|
| 1274 | RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "RTLdrQueryProp/RTLDRPROP_TIMESTAMP_SECONDS failed on %ls: %Rrc", pwszName, rc);
|
---|
| 1275 |
|
---|
| 1276 | #ifdef IN_RING3
|
---|
[52406] | 1277 | /*
|
---|
| 1278 | * Pass it thru WinVerifyTrust when possible.
|
---|
| 1279 | */
|
---|
[52634] | 1280 | if (!fAvoidWinVerifyTrust)
|
---|
| 1281 | rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageTrust(pNtViRdr->hFile, pwszName, pNtViRdr->fFlags, rc, pfWinVerifyTrust, pErrInfo);
|
---|
[62677] | 1282 | #else
|
---|
| 1283 | RT_NOREF1(fAvoidWinVerifyTrust);
|
---|
[52406] | 1284 | #endif
|
---|
[52356] | 1285 |
|
---|
[66525] | 1286 | /*
|
---|
| 1287 | * Check for blacklisted DLLs, both internal name and filename.
|
---|
| 1288 | */
|
---|
| 1289 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1290 | {
|
---|
| 1291 | size_t const cwcName = RTUtf16Len(pwszName);
|
---|
| 1292 | char szIntName[64];
|
---|
| 1293 | int rc2 = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_INTERNAL_NAME, szIntName, sizeof(szIntName));
|
---|
| 1294 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc2))
|
---|
| 1295 | {
|
---|
| 1296 | size_t const cchIntName = strlen(szIntName);
|
---|
| 1297 | for (unsigned i = 0; g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].psz != NULL; i++)
|
---|
| 1298 | if ( cchIntName == g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].cch
|
---|
| 1299 | && RTStrICmpAscii(szIntName, g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].psz) == 0)
|
---|
| 1300 | {
|
---|
| 1301 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_UNDESIRABLE_MODULE,
|
---|
| 1302 | "The image '%ls' is listed as undesirable.", pwszName);
|
---|
| 1303 | break;
|
---|
| 1304 | }
|
---|
| 1305 | }
|
---|
| 1306 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1307 | {
|
---|
| 1308 | for (unsigned i = 0; g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].psz != NULL; i++)
|
---|
| 1309 | if (cwcName >= g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].cch)
|
---|
| 1310 | {
|
---|
| 1311 | PCRTUTF16 pwszTmp = &pwszName[cwcName - g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].cch];
|
---|
| 1312 | if ( ( cwcName == g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].cch
|
---|
| 1313 | || pwszTmp[-1] == '\\'
|
---|
| 1314 | || pwszTmp[-1] == '/')
|
---|
| 1315 | && RTUtf16ICmpAscii(pwszTmp, g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].psz) == 0)
|
---|
| 1316 | {
|
---|
| 1317 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_UNDESIRABLE_MODULE,
|
---|
| 1318 | "The image '%ls' is listed as undesirable.", pwszName);
|
---|
| 1319 | break;
|
---|
| 1320 | }
|
---|
| 1321 | }
|
---|
| 1322 | }
|
---|
| 1323 | }
|
---|
| 1324 |
|
---|
[52403] | 1325 | #ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
|
---|
| 1326 | /*
|
---|
| 1327 | * Hook for the LdrLoadDll code to schedule scanning of imports.
|
---|
| 1328 | */
|
---|
| 1329 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1330 | supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheScheduleImports(hLdrMod, pwszName);
|
---|
| 1331 | #endif
|
---|
| 1332 |
|
---|
[52356] | 1333 | return rc;
|
---|
[52204] | 1334 | }
|
---|
| 1335 |
|
---|
| 1336 |
|
---|
| 1337 | /**
|
---|
[51770] | 1338 | * Verifies the given executable image.
|
---|
| 1339 | *
|
---|
| 1340 | * @returns IPRT status code.
|
---|
[52403] | 1341 | * @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
|
---|
| 1342 | * @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
|
---|
| 1343 | * dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
|
---|
| 1344 | * error/logging.
|
---|
| 1345 | * @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
|
---|
[52634] | 1346 | * @param fAvoidWinVerifyTrust Whether to avoid WinVerifyTrust because of
|
---|
| 1347 | * deadlock or other loader related dangers.
|
---|
[52403] | 1348 | * @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was used.
|
---|
| 1349 | * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
|
---|
[51770] | 1350 | */
|
---|
[52634] | 1351 | DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, bool fAvoidWinVerifyTrust,
|
---|
[52403] | 1352 | bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
|
---|
[51770] | 1353 | {
|
---|
| 1354 | /*
|
---|
| 1355 | * Create a reader instance.
|
---|
| 1356 | */
|
---|
| 1357 | PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr;
|
---|
| 1358 | int rc = supHardNtViRdrCreate(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, &pNtViRdr);
|
---|
| 1359 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1360 | {
|
---|
| 1361 | /*
|
---|
| 1362 | * Open the image.
|
---|
| 1363 | */
|
---|
[53820] | 1364 | RTLDRMOD hLdrMod;
|
---|
| 1365 | RTLDRARCH enmArch = fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_RC_IMAGE ? RTLDRARCH_X86_32 : RTLDRARCH_HOST;
|
---|
| 1366 | uint32_t fLdrFlags = RTLDR_O_FOR_VALIDATION | RTLDR_O_IGNORE_ARCH_IF_NO_CODE;
|
---|
[53220] | 1367 | if (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_IGNORE_ARCHITECTURE)
|
---|
[53820] | 1368 | fLdrFlags |= RTLDR_O_IGNORE_ARCH_IF_NO_CODE;
|
---|
| 1369 | rc = RTLdrOpenWithReader(&pNtViRdr->Core, fLdrFlags, enmArch, &hLdrMod, pErrInfo);
|
---|
[51770] | 1370 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1371 | {
|
---|
| 1372 | /*
|
---|
| 1373 | * Verify it.
|
---|
| 1374 | */
|
---|
[52634] | 1375 | rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod(hLdrMod, pwszName, pNtViRdr, fAvoidWinVerifyTrust, pfWinVerifyTrust, pErrInfo);
|
---|
[52204] | 1376 | int rc2 = RTLdrClose(hLdrMod); AssertRC(rc2);
|
---|
[51770] | 1377 | }
|
---|
| 1378 | else
|
---|
| 1379 | supHardNtViRdrDestroy(&pNtViRdr->Core);
|
---|
| 1380 | }
|
---|
[52403] | 1381 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: -> %d (%ls)%s\n",
|
---|
[57165] | 1382 | rc, pwszName, pfWinVerifyTrust && *pfWinVerifyTrust ? " WinVerifyTrust" : ""));
|
---|
[51770] | 1383 | return rc;
|
---|
| 1384 | }
|
---|
| 1385 |
|
---|
| 1386 |
|
---|
| 1387 | #ifdef IN_RING3
|
---|
| 1388 | /**
|
---|
| 1389 | * supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle version without the name.
|
---|
| 1390 | *
|
---|
| 1391 | * The name is derived from the handle.
|
---|
| 1392 | *
|
---|
| 1393 | * @returns IPRT status code.
|
---|
| 1394 | * @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
|
---|
| 1395 | * @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
|
---|
| 1396 | * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
|
---|
| 1397 | */
|
---|
| 1398 | DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandleNoName(HANDLE hFile, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
|
---|
| 1399 | {
|
---|
| 1400 | /*
|
---|
| 1401 | * Determine the NT name and call the verification function.
|
---|
| 1402 | */
|
---|
| 1403 | union
|
---|
| 1404 | {
|
---|
| 1405 | UNICODE_STRING UniStr;
|
---|
| 1406 | uint8_t abBuffer[(MAX_PATH + 8 + 1) * 2];
|
---|
| 1407 | } uBuf;
|
---|
| 1408 |
|
---|
| 1409 | ULONG cbIgn;
|
---|
| 1410 | NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile,
|
---|
| 1411 | ObjectNameInformation,
|
---|
| 1412 | &uBuf,
|
---|
| 1413 | sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(WCHAR),
|
---|
| 1414 | &cbIgn);
|
---|
| 1415 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1416 | uBuf.UniStr.Buffer[uBuf.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
|
---|
| 1417 | else
|
---|
| 1418 | uBuf.UniStr.Buffer = (WCHAR *)L"TODO3";
|
---|
| 1419 |
|
---|
[52634] | 1420 | return supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle(hFile, uBuf.UniStr.Buffer, fFlags, false /*fAvoidWinVerifyTrust*/,
|
---|
| 1421 | NULL /*pfWinVerifyTrust*/, pErrInfo);
|
---|
[51770] | 1422 | }
|
---|
| 1423 | #endif /* IN_RING3 */
|
---|
| 1424 |
|
---|
| 1425 |
|
---|
| 1426 | /**
|
---|
| 1427 | * Retrieves the full official path to the system root or one of it's sub
|
---|
| 1428 | * directories.
|
---|
| 1429 | *
|
---|
| 1430 | * This code is also used by the support driver.
|
---|
| 1431 | *
|
---|
| 1432 | * @returns VBox status code.
|
---|
| 1433 | * @param pvBuf The output buffer. This will contain a
|
---|
| 1434 | * UNICODE_STRING followed (at the kernel's
|
---|
| 1435 | * discretion) the string buffer.
|
---|
| 1436 | * @param cbBuf The size of the buffer @a pvBuf points to.
|
---|
| 1437 | * @param enmDir Which directory under the system root we're
|
---|
| 1438 | * interested in.
|
---|
| 1439 | * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
|
---|
| 1440 | */
|
---|
| 1441 | DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(void *pvBuf, uint32_t cbBuf, SUPHARDNTSYSROOTDIR enmDir, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
|
---|
| 1442 | {
|
---|
| 1443 | HANDLE hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
|
---|
| 1444 | IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
|
---|
| 1445 |
|
---|
| 1446 | UNICODE_STRING NtName;
|
---|
| 1447 | switch (enmDir)
|
---|
| 1448 | {
|
---|
| 1449 | case kSupHardNtSysRootDir_System32:
|
---|
| 1450 | {
|
---|
| 1451 | static const WCHAR s_wszNameSystem32[] = L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\";
|
---|
| 1452 | NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)s_wszNameSystem32;
|
---|
| 1453 | NtName.Length = sizeof(s_wszNameSystem32) - sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
| 1454 | NtName.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_wszNameSystem32);
|
---|
| 1455 | break;
|
---|
| 1456 | }
|
---|
| 1457 | case kSupHardNtSysRootDir_WinSxS:
|
---|
| 1458 | {
|
---|
| 1459 | static const WCHAR s_wszNameWinSxS[] = L"\\SystemRoot\\WinSxS\\";
|
---|
| 1460 | NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)s_wszNameWinSxS;
|
---|
| 1461 | NtName.Length = sizeof(s_wszNameWinSxS) - sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
| 1462 | NtName.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_wszNameWinSxS);
|
---|
| 1463 | break;
|
---|
| 1464 | }
|
---|
| 1465 | default:
|
---|
| 1466 | AssertFailed();
|
---|
| 1467 | return VERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
---|
| 1468 | }
|
---|
| 1469 |
|
---|
| 1470 | OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
|
---|
| 1471 | InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/);
|
---|
| 1472 |
|
---|
| 1473 | NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile,
|
---|
| 1474 | FILE_READ_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE,
|
---|
| 1475 | &ObjAttr,
|
---|
| 1476 | &Ios,
|
---|
| 1477 | NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
|
---|
| 1478 | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
|
---|
| 1479 | FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
|
---|
| 1480 | FILE_OPEN,
|
---|
| 1481 | FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
|
---|
| 1482 | NULL /*EaBuffer*/,
|
---|
| 1483 | 0 /*EaLength*/);
|
---|
| 1484 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1485 | rcNt = Ios.Status;
|
---|
| 1486 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1487 | {
|
---|
| 1488 | ULONG cbIgn;
|
---|
| 1489 | rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile,
|
---|
| 1490 | ObjectNameInformation,
|
---|
| 1491 | pvBuf,
|
---|
| 1492 | cbBuf - sizeof(WCHAR),
|
---|
| 1493 | &cbIgn);
|
---|
| 1494 | NtClose(hFile);
|
---|
| 1495 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1496 | {
|
---|
| 1497 | PUNICODE_STRING pUniStr = (PUNICODE_STRING)pvBuf;
|
---|
| 1498 | if (pUniStr->Length > 0)
|
---|
| 1499 | {
|
---|
| 1500 | /* Make sure it's terminated so it can safely be printed.*/
|
---|
| 1501 | pUniStr->Buffer[pUniStr->Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
|
---|
| 1502 | return VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 1503 | }
|
---|
| 1504 |
|
---|
| 1505 | return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH,
|
---|
| 1506 | "NtQueryObject returned an empty path for '%ls'", NtName.Buffer);
|
---|
| 1507 | }
|
---|
| 1508 | return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH, "NtQueryObject failed on '%ls' dir: %#x", NtName.Buffer, rcNt);
|
---|
| 1509 | }
|
---|
| 1510 | return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH, "Failure to open '%ls': %#x", NtName.Buffer, rcNt);
|
---|
| 1511 | }
|
---|
| 1512 |
|
---|
| 1513 |
|
---|
| 1514 | /**
|
---|
| 1515 | * Initialize one certificate entry.
|
---|
| 1516 | *
|
---|
| 1517 | * @returns VBox status code.
|
---|
| 1518 | * @param pCert The X.509 certificate representation to init.
|
---|
| 1519 | * @param pabCert The raw DER encoded certificate.
|
---|
| 1520 | * @param cbCert The size of the raw certificate.
|
---|
| 1521 | * @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
|
---|
| 1522 | * @param pszErrorTag Error tag.
|
---|
| 1523 | */
|
---|
| 1524 | static int supHardNtViCertInit(PRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert, unsigned char const *pabCert, unsigned cbCert,
|
---|
| 1525 | PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, const char *pszErrorTag)
|
---|
| 1526 | {
|
---|
| 1527 | AssertReturn(cbCert > 16 && cbCert < _128K,
|
---|
| 1528 | RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_3, "%s: cbCert=%#x out of range", pszErrorTag, cbCert));
|
---|
| 1529 | AssertReturn(!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(pCert),
|
---|
| 1530 | RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_WRONG_ORDER, "%s: Certificate already decoded?", pszErrorTag));
|
---|
| 1531 |
|
---|
| 1532 | RTASN1CURSORPRIMARY PrimaryCursor;
|
---|
| 1533 | RTAsn1CursorInitPrimary(&PrimaryCursor, pabCert, cbCert, pErrInfo, &g_RTAsn1DefaultAllocator, RTASN1CURSOR_FLAGS_DER, NULL);
|
---|
| 1534 | int rc = RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1(&PrimaryCursor.Cursor, 0, pCert, pszErrorTag);
|
---|
| 1535 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1536 | rc = RTCrX509Certificate_CheckSanity(pCert, 0, pErrInfo, pszErrorTag);
|
---|
| 1537 | return rc;
|
---|
| 1538 | }
|
---|
| 1539 |
|
---|
| 1540 |
|
---|
| 1541 | static int supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(RTCRSTORE hStore, PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts, unsigned cCerts, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
|
---|
| 1542 | {
|
---|
| 1543 | for (uint32_t i = 0; i < cCerts; i++)
|
---|
| 1544 | {
|
---|
| 1545 | int rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(hStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_TAF_DER, paCerts[i].pch, paCerts[i].cb, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 1546 | if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
|
---|
| 1547 | return rc;
|
---|
| 1548 | }
|
---|
| 1549 | return VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 1550 | }
|
---|
| 1551 |
|
---|
| 1552 |
|
---|
| 1553 | /**
|
---|
| 1554 | * Initialize a certificate table.
|
---|
| 1555 | *
|
---|
| 1556 | * @param phStore Where to return the store pointer.
|
---|
| 1557 | * @param paCerts1 Pointer to the first certificate table.
|
---|
| 1558 | * @param cCerts1 Entries in the first certificate table.
|
---|
| 1559 | * @param paCerts2 Pointer to the second certificate table.
|
---|
| 1560 | * @param cCerts2 Entries in the second certificate table.
|
---|
| 1561 | * @param paCerts3 Pointer to the third certificate table.
|
---|
| 1562 | * @param cCerts3 Entries in the third certificate table.
|
---|
| 1563 | * @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
|
---|
| 1564 | * @param pszErrorTag Error tag.
|
---|
| 1565 | */
|
---|
| 1566 | static int supHardNtViCertStoreInit(PRTCRSTORE phStore,
|
---|
| 1567 | PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts1, unsigned cCerts1,
|
---|
| 1568 | PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts2, unsigned cCerts2,
|
---|
| 1569 | PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts3, unsigned cCerts3,
|
---|
| 1570 | PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, const char *pszErrorTag)
|
---|
| 1571 | {
|
---|
| 1572 | AssertReturn(*phStore == NIL_RTCRSTORE, VERR_WRONG_ORDER);
|
---|
[62677] | 1573 | RT_NOREF1(pszErrorTag);
|
---|
[51770] | 1574 |
|
---|
| 1575 | int rc = RTCrStoreCreateInMem(phStore, cCerts1 + cCerts2);
|
---|
| 1576 | if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
|
---|
| 1577 | return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "RTCrStoreCreateMemoryStore failed: %Rrc", rc);
|
---|
| 1578 |
|
---|
| 1579 | rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts1, cCerts1, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 1580 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1581 | rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts2, cCerts2, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 1582 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1583 | rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts3, cCerts3, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 1584 | return rc;
|
---|
| 1585 | }
|
---|
| 1586 |
|
---|
| 1587 |
|
---|
[52943] | 1588 | #if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
|
---|
[51770] | 1589 | /**
|
---|
[52365] | 1590 | * Initializes the windows paths.
|
---|
| 1591 | */
|
---|
| 1592 | static void supHardenedWinInitImageVerifierWinPaths(void)
|
---|
| 1593 | {
|
---|
| 1594 | /*
|
---|
| 1595 | * Windows paths that we're interested in.
|
---|
| 1596 | */
|
---|
| 1597 | static const struct
|
---|
| 1598 | {
|
---|
| 1599 | SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF *pNtPath;
|
---|
| 1600 | WCHAR const *pwszRegValue;
|
---|
| 1601 | const char *pszLogName;
|
---|
| 1602 | } s_aPaths[] =
|
---|
| 1603 | {
|
---|
| 1604 | { &g_ProgramFilesNtPath, L"ProgramFilesDir", "ProgDir" },
|
---|
| 1605 | { &g_CommonFilesNtPath, L"CommonFilesDir", "ComDir" },
|
---|
| 1606 | # ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
|
---|
| 1607 | { &g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath, L"ProgramFilesDir (x86)", "ProgDir32" },
|
---|
| 1608 | { &g_CommonFilesX86NtPath, L"CommonFilesDir (x86)", "ComDir32" },
|
---|
| 1609 | # endif
|
---|
| 1610 | };
|
---|
| 1611 |
|
---|
| 1612 | /*
|
---|
| 1613 | * Open the registry key containing the paths.
|
---|
| 1614 | */
|
---|
| 1615 | UNICODE_STRING NtName = RTNT_CONSTANT_UNISTR(L"\\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion");
|
---|
| 1616 | OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
|
---|
| 1617 | InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/);
|
---|
| 1618 | HANDLE hKey;
|
---|
| 1619 | NTSTATUS rcNt = NtOpenKey(&hKey, KEY_QUERY_VALUE, &ObjAttr);
|
---|
| 1620 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1621 | {
|
---|
| 1622 | /*
|
---|
| 1623 | * Loop over the paths and resolve their NT paths.
|
---|
| 1624 | */
|
---|
| 1625 | for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPaths); i++)
|
---|
| 1626 | {
|
---|
| 1627 | /*
|
---|
| 1628 | * Query the value first.
|
---|
| 1629 | */
|
---|
| 1630 | UNICODE_STRING ValueName;
|
---|
| 1631 | ValueName.Buffer = (WCHAR *)s_aPaths[i].pwszRegValue;
|
---|
| 1632 | ValueName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(s_aPaths[i].pwszRegValue) * sizeof(WCHAR));
|
---|
| 1633 | ValueName.MaximumLength = ValueName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
| 1634 |
|
---|
| 1635 | union
|
---|
| 1636 | {
|
---|
| 1637 | KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION PartialInfo;
|
---|
| 1638 | uint8_t abPadding[sizeof(KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION) + sizeof(WCHAR) * 128];
|
---|
| 1639 | uint64_t uAlign;
|
---|
| 1640 | } uBuf;
|
---|
| 1641 |
|
---|
| 1642 | ULONG cbActual = 0;
|
---|
| 1643 | rcNt = NtQueryValueKey(hKey, &ValueName, KeyValuePartialInformation, &uBuf, sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(WCHAR), &cbActual);
|
---|
| 1644 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1645 | {
|
---|
| 1646 | /*
|
---|
| 1647 | * Must be a simple string value, terminate it.
|
---|
| 1648 | */
|
---|
| 1649 | if ( uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_EXPAND_SZ
|
---|
| 1650 | || uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_SZ)
|
---|
| 1651 | {
|
---|
| 1652 | /*
|
---|
| 1653 | * Expand any environment variable references before opening it.
|
---|
| 1654 | * We use the result buffer as storage for the expaneded path,
|
---|
| 1655 | * reserving space for the windows name space prefix.
|
---|
| 1656 | */
|
---|
| 1657 | UNICODE_STRING Src;
|
---|
| 1658 | Src.Buffer = (WCHAR *)uBuf.PartialInfo.Data;
|
---|
| 1659 | Src.Length = uBuf.PartialInfo.DataLength;
|
---|
| 1660 | if (Src.Length >= sizeof(WCHAR) && Src.Buffer[Src.Length / sizeof(WCHAR) - 1] == '\0')
|
---|
| 1661 | Src.Length -= sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
| 1662 | Src.MaximumLength = Src.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
| 1663 | Src.Buffer[uBuf.PartialInfo.DataLength / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
|
---|
| 1664 |
|
---|
| 1665 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[0] = '\\';
|
---|
| 1666 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[1] = '?';
|
---|
| 1667 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[2] = '?';
|
---|
| 1668 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[3] = '\\';
|
---|
| 1669 | UNICODE_STRING Dst;
|
---|
| 1670 | Dst.Buffer = &s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[4];
|
---|
| 1671 | Dst.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer) - sizeof(WCHAR) * 5;
|
---|
| 1672 | Dst.Length = Dst.MaximumLength;
|
---|
| 1673 |
|
---|
| 1674 | if (uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_EXPAND_SZ)
|
---|
| 1675 | rcNt = RtlExpandEnvironmentStrings_U(NULL, &Src, &Dst, NULL);
|
---|
| 1676 | else
|
---|
| 1677 | {
|
---|
| 1678 | memcpy(Dst.Buffer, Src.Buffer, Src.Length);
|
---|
| 1679 | Dst.Length = Src.Length;
|
---|
| 1680 | }
|
---|
| 1681 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1682 | {
|
---|
| 1683 | Dst.Buffer[Dst.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
|
---|
| 1684 |
|
---|
| 1685 | /*
|
---|
| 1686 | * Include the \\??\\ prefix in the result and open the path.
|
---|
| 1687 | */
|
---|
| 1688 | Dst.Buffer -= 4;
|
---|
| 1689 | Dst.Length += 4 * sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
| 1690 | Dst.MaximumLength += 4 * sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
| 1691 | InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &Dst, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/);
|
---|
| 1692 | HANDLE hFile = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
|
---|
| 1693 | IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
|
---|
| 1694 | NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile,
|
---|
| 1695 | FILE_READ_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE,
|
---|
| 1696 | &ObjAttr,
|
---|
| 1697 | &Ios,
|
---|
| 1698 | NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
|
---|
| 1699 | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
|
---|
| 1700 | FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
|
---|
| 1701 | FILE_OPEN,
|
---|
| 1702 | FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT
|
---|
| 1703 | | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
|
---|
| 1704 | NULL /*EaBuffer*/,
|
---|
| 1705 | 0 /*EaLength*/);
|
---|
| 1706 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1707 | rcNt = Ios.Status;
|
---|
| 1708 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1709 | {
|
---|
| 1710 | /*
|
---|
| 1711 | * Query the real NT name.
|
---|
| 1712 | */
|
---|
| 1713 | ULONG cbIgn;
|
---|
| 1714 | rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile,
|
---|
| 1715 | ObjectNameInformation,
|
---|
| 1716 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath,
|
---|
| 1717 | sizeof(*s_aPaths[i].pNtPath) - sizeof(WCHAR),
|
---|
| 1718 | &cbIgn);
|
---|
| 1719 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1720 | {
|
---|
| 1721 | if (s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length > 0)
|
---|
| 1722 | {
|
---|
| 1723 | /* Make sure it's terminated.*/
|
---|
| 1724 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer[s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
|
---|
| 1725 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%s:%*s %ls\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, 9 - strlen(s_aPaths[i].pszLogName), "",
|
---|
| 1726 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer));
|
---|
| 1727 | }
|
---|
| 1728 | else
|
---|
| 1729 | {
|
---|
| 1730 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryObject returned empty string\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName));
|
---|
| 1731 | rcNt = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
---|
| 1732 | }
|
---|
| 1733 | }
|
---|
| 1734 | else
|
---|
| 1735 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryObject failed: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt));
|
---|
| 1736 | NtClose(hFile);
|
---|
| 1737 | }
|
---|
| 1738 | else
|
---|
| 1739 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtCreateFile failed: %#x (%ls)\n",
|
---|
| 1740 | s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt, Dst.Buffer));
|
---|
| 1741 | }
|
---|
| 1742 | else
|
---|
| 1743 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: RtlExpandEnvironmentStrings_U failed: %#x (%ls)\n",
|
---|
| 1744 | s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt, Src.Buffer));
|
---|
| 1745 | }
|
---|
| 1746 | else
|
---|
| 1747 | {
|
---|
| 1748 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: type mismatch: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, uBuf.PartialInfo.Type));
|
---|
| 1749 | rcNt = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
---|
| 1750 | }
|
---|
| 1751 | }
|
---|
| 1752 | else
|
---|
| 1753 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryValueKey failed: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt));
|
---|
| 1754 |
|
---|
| 1755 | /* Stub the entry on failure. */
|
---|
| 1756 | if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1757 | {
|
---|
| 1758 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length = 0;
|
---|
| 1759 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer = NULL;
|
---|
| 1760 | }
|
---|
| 1761 | }
|
---|
| 1762 | NtClose(hKey);
|
---|
| 1763 | }
|
---|
| 1764 | else
|
---|
| 1765 | {
|
---|
| 1766 | SUP_DPRINTF(("NtOpenKey(%ls) failed: %#x\n", NtName.Buffer, rcNt));
|
---|
| 1767 |
|
---|
| 1768 | /* Stub all the entries on failure. */
|
---|
| 1769 | for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPaths); i++)
|
---|
| 1770 | {
|
---|
| 1771 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length = 0;
|
---|
| 1772 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer = NULL;
|
---|
| 1773 | }
|
---|
| 1774 | }
|
---|
| 1775 | }
|
---|
[52943] | 1776 | #endif /* IN_RING3 && !VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE */
|
---|
[52365] | 1777 |
|
---|
| 1778 |
|
---|
| 1779 | /**
|
---|
[51770] | 1780 | * This initializes the certificates globals so we don't have to reparse them
|
---|
| 1781 | * every time we need to verify an image.
|
---|
| 1782 | *
|
---|
| 1783 | * @returns IPRT status code.
|
---|
| 1784 | * @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
|
---|
| 1785 | */
|
---|
| 1786 | DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier(PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
|
---|
| 1787 | {
|
---|
| 1788 | AssertReturn(!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert), VERR_WRONG_ORDER);
|
---|
| 1789 |
|
---|
| 1790 | /*
|
---|
| 1791 | * Get the system root paths.
|
---|
| 1792 | */
|
---|
| 1793 | int rc = supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(&g_System32NtPath, sizeof(g_System32NtPath), kSupHardNtSysRootDir_System32, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 1794 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1795 | rc = supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(&g_WinSxSNtPath, sizeof(g_WinSxSNtPath), kSupHardNtSysRootDir_WinSxS, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 1796 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1797 | {
|
---|
[52365] | 1798 | SUP_DPRINTF(("System32: %ls\n", g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer));
|
---|
| 1799 | SUP_DPRINTF(("WinSxS: %ls\n", g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer));
|
---|
[52943] | 1800 | #if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
|
---|
[52365] | 1801 | supHardenedWinInitImageVerifierWinPaths();
|
---|
| 1802 | #endif
|
---|
| 1803 |
|
---|
[51770] | 1804 | /*
|
---|
| 1805 | * Initialize it, leaving the cleanup to the termination call.
|
---|
| 1806 | */
|
---|
| 1807 | rc = supHardNtViCertInit(&g_BuildX509Cert, g_abSUPBuildCert, g_cbSUPBuildCert, pErrInfo, "BuildCertificate");
|
---|
| 1808 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1809 | rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcRootStore, g_aSUPSpcRootTAs, g_cSUPSpcRootTAs,
|
---|
| 1810 | NULL, 0, NULL, 0, pErrInfo, "SpcRoot");
|
---|
| 1811 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1812 | rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hNtKernelRootStore, g_aSUPNtKernelRootTAs, g_cSUPNtKernelRootTAs,
|
---|
| 1813 | NULL, 0, NULL, 0, pErrInfo, "NtKernelRoot");
|
---|
| 1814 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1815 | rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore,
|
---|
| 1816 | g_aSUPSpcRootTAs, g_cSUPSpcRootTAs,
|
---|
| 1817 | g_aSUPNtKernelRootTAs, g_cSUPNtKernelRootTAs,
|
---|
| 1818 | g_aSUPTimestampTAs, g_cSUPTimestampTAs,
|
---|
| 1819 | pErrInfo, "SpcAndNtKernelRoot");
|
---|
| 1820 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1821 | rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore,
|
---|
| 1822 | NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
|
---|
| 1823 | pErrInfo, "SpcAndNtKernelSupplemental");
|
---|
| 1824 |
|
---|
[51824] | 1825 | #if 0 /* For the time being, always trust the build certificate. It bypasses the timestamp issues of CRT and SDL. */
|
---|
[51770] | 1826 | /* If the build certificate is a test singing certificate, it must be a
|
---|
| 1827 | trusted root or we'll fail to validate anything. */
|
---|
| 1828 | if ( RT_SUCCESS(rc)
|
---|
| 1829 | && RTCrX509Name_Compare(&g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.Subject, &g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.Issuer) == 0)
|
---|
[51824] | 1830 | #else
|
---|
| 1831 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1832 | #endif
|
---|
[51770] | 1833 | rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
|
---|
| 1834 | g_abSUPBuildCert, g_cbSUPBuildCert, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 1835 |
|
---|
| 1836 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
[52365] | 1837 | {
|
---|
| 1838 | /*
|
---|
| 1839 | * Finally initialize known SIDs that we use.
|
---|
| 1840 | */
|
---|
| 1841 | SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY s_NtAuth = SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY;
|
---|
| 1842 | NTSTATUS rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, &s_NtAuth, SECURITY_SERVICE_ID_RID_COUNT);
|
---|
| 1843 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1844 | {
|
---|
| 1845 | *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 0) = SECURITY_SERVICE_ID_BASE_RID;
|
---|
| 1846 | *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 1) = 956008885;
|
---|
| 1847 | *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 2) = 3418522649;
|
---|
| 1848 | *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 3) = 1831038044;
|
---|
| 1849 | *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 4) = 1853292631;
|
---|
| 1850 | *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 5) = 2271478464;
|
---|
[52482] | 1851 |
|
---|
[52907] | 1852 | rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_LocalSystemSid, &s_NtAuth, 1);
|
---|
[52482] | 1853 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1854 | {
|
---|
| 1855 | *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_LocalSystemSid, 0) = SECURITY_LOCAL_SYSTEM_RID;
|
---|
[52907] | 1856 |
|
---|
| 1857 | rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_AdminsGroupSid, &s_NtAuth, 2);
|
---|
| 1858 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1859 | {
|
---|
| 1860 | *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_AdminsGroupSid, 0) = SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID;
|
---|
| 1861 | *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_AdminsGroupSid, 1) = DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS;
|
---|
| 1862 | return VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 1863 | }
|
---|
[52482] | 1864 | }
|
---|
[52365] | 1865 | }
|
---|
| 1866 | rc = RTErrConvertFromNtStatus(rcNt);
|
---|
| 1867 | }
|
---|
[51770] | 1868 | supHardenedWinTermImageVerifier();
|
---|
| 1869 | }
|
---|
| 1870 | return rc;
|
---|
| 1871 | }
|
---|
| 1872 |
|
---|
| 1873 |
|
---|
| 1874 | /**
|
---|
| 1875 | * Releases resources allocated by supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier.
|
---|
| 1876 | */
|
---|
| 1877 | DECLHIDDEN(void) supHardenedWinTermImageVerifier(void)
|
---|
| 1878 | {
|
---|
| 1879 | if (RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert))
|
---|
| 1880 | RTAsn1VtDelete(&g_BuildX509Cert.SeqCore.Asn1Core);
|
---|
| 1881 |
|
---|
| 1882 | RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore);
|
---|
| 1883 | g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
|
---|
| 1884 | RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore);
|
---|
| 1885 | g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
|
---|
| 1886 |
|
---|
| 1887 | RTCrStoreRelease(g_hNtKernelRootStore);
|
---|
| 1888 | g_hNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
|
---|
| 1889 | RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcRootStore);
|
---|
| 1890 | g_hSpcRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
|
---|
| 1891 | }
|
---|
| 1892 |
|
---|
| 1893 | #ifdef IN_RING3
|
---|
| 1894 |
|
---|
| 1895 | /**
|
---|
| 1896 | * This is a hardcoded list of certificates we thing we might need.
|
---|
| 1897 | *
|
---|
| 1898 | * @returns true if wanted, false if not.
|
---|
| 1899 | * @param pCert The certificate.
|
---|
| 1900 | */
|
---|
| 1901 | static bool supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA(PCRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert)
|
---|
| 1902 | {
|
---|
[52500] | 1903 | char szSubject[512];
|
---|
| 1904 | szSubject[sizeof(szSubject) - 1] = '\0';
|
---|
| 1905 | RTCrX509Name_FormatAsString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, szSubject, sizeof(szSubject) - 1, NULL);
|
---|
| 1906 |
|
---|
[51770] | 1907 | /*
|
---|
| 1908 | * Check that it's a plausible root certificate.
|
---|
| 1909 | */
|
---|
| 1910 | if (!RTCrX509Certificate_IsSelfSigned(pCert))
|
---|
[52500] | 1911 | {
|
---|
| 1912 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - not-self-signed: %s\n", szSubject));
|
---|
[51770] | 1913 | return false;
|
---|
[52500] | 1914 | }
|
---|
| 1915 |
|
---|
[51770] | 1916 | if (RTAsn1Integer_UnsignedCompareWithU32(&pCert->TbsCertificate.T0.Version, 3) > 0)
|
---|
| 1917 | {
|
---|
| 1918 | if ( !(pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.fExtKeyUsage & RTCRX509CERT_KEY_USAGE_F_KEY_CERT_SIGN)
|
---|
| 1919 | && (pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.fFlags & RTCRX509TBSCERTIFICATE_F_PRESENT_KEY_USAGE) )
|
---|
[52500] | 1920 | {
|
---|
| 1921 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - non-cert-sign: %s\n", szSubject));
|
---|
[51770] | 1922 | return false;
|
---|
[52500] | 1923 | }
|
---|
[51770] | 1924 | if ( pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.pBasicConstraints
|
---|
| 1925 | && !pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.pBasicConstraints->CA.fValue)
|
---|
[52500] | 1926 | {
|
---|
| 1927 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - non-CA: %s\n", szSubject));
|
---|
[51770] | 1928 | return false;
|
---|
[52500] | 1929 | }
|
---|
[51770] | 1930 | }
|
---|
| 1931 | if (pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.cBits < 256) /* mostly for u64KeyId reading. */
|
---|
[52500] | 1932 | {
|
---|
| 1933 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - key too small: %u bits %s\n",
|
---|
| 1934 | pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.cBits, szSubject));
|
---|
[51770] | 1935 | return false;
|
---|
[52500] | 1936 | }
|
---|
| 1937 | uint64_t const u64KeyId = pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.uBits.pu64[1];
|
---|
[51770] | 1938 |
|
---|
[52500] | 1939 | # if 0
|
---|
[51770] | 1940 | /*
|
---|
[52500] | 1941 | * Whitelist - Array of names and key clues of the certificates we want.
|
---|
[51770] | 1942 | */
|
---|
| 1943 | static struct
|
---|
| 1944 | {
|
---|
| 1945 | uint64_t u64KeyId;
|
---|
| 1946 | const char *pszName;
|
---|
| 1947 | } const s_aWanted[] =
|
---|
| 1948 | {
|
---|
| 1949 | /* SPC */
|
---|
| 1950 | { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority" },
|
---|
| 1951 | { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "L=Internet, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Commercial Software Publishers CA" },
|
---|
| 1952 | { UINT64_C(0x491857ead79dde00), "C=US, O=The Go Daddy Group, Inc., OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority" },
|
---|
| 1953 |
|
---|
| 1954 | /* TS */
|
---|
| 1955 | { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "O=Microsoft Trust Network, OU=Microsoft Corporation, OU=Microsoft Time Stamping Service Root, OU=Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp." },
|
---|
| 1956 | { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "O=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Time Stamping Service Root, OU=NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, (c)97 VeriSign, Inc." },
|
---|
| 1957 | { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Durbanville, O=Thawte, OU=Thawte Certification, CN=Thawte Timestamping CA" },
|
---|
| 1958 |
|
---|
| 1959 | /* Additional Windows 8.1 list: */
|
---|
| 1960 | { UINT64_C(0x5ad46780fa5df300), "DC=com, DC=microsoft, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority" },
|
---|
| 1961 | { UINT64_C(0x3be670c1bd02a900), "OU=Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp., OU=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Authority" },
|
---|
| 1962 | { UINT64_C(0x4d3835aa4180b200), "C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2011" },
|
---|
| 1963 | { UINT64_C(0x646e3fe3ba08df00), "C=US, O=MSFT, CN=Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root Authority" },
|
---|
| 1964 | { UINT64_C(0xece4e4289e08b900), "C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010" },
|
---|
| 1965 | { UINT64_C(0x59faf1086271bf00), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2" },
|
---|
| 1966 | { UINT64_C(0x3d98ab22bb04a300), "C=IE, O=Baltimore, OU=CyberTrust, CN=Baltimore CyberTrust Root" },
|
---|
| 1967 | { UINT64_C(0x91e3728b8b40d000), "C=GB, ST=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=COMODO CA Limited, CN=COMODO Certification Authority" },
|
---|
| 1968 | { UINT64_C(0x61a3a33f81aace00), "C=US, ST=UT, L=Salt Lake City, O=The USERTRUST Network, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, CN=UTN-USERFirst-Object" },
|
---|
| 1969 | { UINT64_C(0x9e5bc2d78b6a3636), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, OU=Certification Services Division, CN=Thawte Premium Server CA, Email=premium-server@thawte.com" },
|
---|
| 1970 | { UINT64_C(0xf4fd306318ccda00), "C=US, O=GeoTrust Inc., CN=GeoTrust Global CA" },
|
---|
| 1971 | { UINT64_C(0xa0ee62086758b15d), "C=US, O=Equifax, OU=Equifax Secure Certificate Authority" },
|
---|
| 1972 | { UINT64_C(0x8ff6fc03c1edbd00), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., CN=Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2" },
|
---|
| 1973 | { UINT64_C(0xa3ce8d99e60eda00), "C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA" },
|
---|
| 1974 | { UINT64_C(0xa671e9fec832b700), "C=US, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., OU=Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority" },
|
---|
| 1975 | { UINT64_C(0xa8de7211e13be200), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root CA" },
|
---|
| 1976 | { UINT64_C(0x0ff3891b54348328), "C=US, O=Entrust.net, OU=www.entrust.net/CPS incorp. by ref. (limits liab.), OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited, CN=Entrust.netSecure Server Certification Authority" },
|
---|
| 1977 | { UINT64_C(0x7ae89c50f0b6a00f), "C=US, O=GTE Corporation, OU=GTE CyberTrust Solutions, Inc., CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root" },
|
---|
| 1978 | { UINT64_C(0xd45980fbf0a0ac00), "C=US, O=thawte, Inc., OU=Certification Services Division, OU=(c) 2006 thawte, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=thawte Primary Root CA" },
|
---|
| 1979 | { UINT64_C(0x9e5bc2d78b6a3636), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, OU=Certification Services Division, CN=Thawte Premium Server CA, Email=premium-server@thawte.com" },
|
---|
| 1980 | { UINT64_C(0x7c4fd32ec1b1ce00), "C=PL, O=Unizeto Sp. z o.o., CN=Certum CA" },
|
---|
| 1981 | { UINT64_C(0xd4fbe673e5ccc600), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA" },
|
---|
| 1982 | { UINT64_C(0x16e64d2a56ccf200), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., OU=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/, CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority" },
|
---|
| 1983 | { UINT64_C(0x6e2ba21058eedf00), "C=US, ST=UT, L=Salt Lake City, O=The USERTRUST Network, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, CN=UTN - DATACorp SGC" },
|
---|
| 1984 | { UINT64_C(0xb28612a94b4dad00), "O=Entrust.net, OU=www.entrust.net/CPS_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits liab.), OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited, CN=Entrust.netCertification Authority (2048)" },
|
---|
| 1985 | { UINT64_C(0x357a29080824af00), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5" },
|
---|
| 1986 | { UINT64_C(0x466cbc09db88c100), "C=IL, O=StartCom Ltd., OU=Secure Digital Certificate Signing, CN=StartCom Certification Authority" },
|
---|
| 1987 | { UINT64_C(0x9259c8abe5ca713a), "L=ValiCert Validation Network, O=ValiCert, Inc., OU=ValiCert Class 2 Policy Validation Authority, CN=http://www.valicert.com/, Email=info@valicert.com" },
|
---|
| 1988 | { UINT64_C(0x1f78fc529cbacb00), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 1999 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3" },
|
---|
| 1989 | { UINT64_C(0x8043e4ce150ead00), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root CA" },
|
---|
| 1990 | { UINT64_C(0x00f2e6331af7b700), "C=SE, O=AddTrust AB, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, CN=AddTrust External CA Root" },
|
---|
| 1991 | };
|
---|
| 1992 |
|
---|
| 1993 |
|
---|
| 1994 | uint32_t i = RT_ELEMENTS(s_aWanted);
|
---|
| 1995 | while (i-- > 0)
|
---|
| 1996 | if ( s_aWanted[i].u64KeyId == u64KeyId
|
---|
| 1997 | || s_aWanted[i].u64KeyId == UINT64_MAX)
|
---|
| 1998 | if (RTCrX509Name_MatchWithString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, s_aWanted[i].pszName))
|
---|
[52500] | 1999 | {
|
---|
| 2000 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: Adding %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
|
---|
[51770] | 2001 | return true;
|
---|
[52500] | 2002 | }
|
---|
[51770] | 2003 |
|
---|
[52500] | 2004 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
|
---|
[51770] | 2005 | return false;
|
---|
[52500] | 2006 | # else
|
---|
| 2007 | /*
|
---|
| 2008 | * Blacklist approach.
|
---|
| 2009 | */
|
---|
| 2010 | static struct
|
---|
| 2011 | {
|
---|
| 2012 | uint64_t u64KeyId;
|
---|
| 2013 | const char *pszName;
|
---|
| 2014 | } const s_aUnwanted[] =
|
---|
| 2015 | {
|
---|
| 2016 | { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=US, O=U.S. Robots and Mechanical Men, Inc., OU=V.I.K.I." }, /* dummy entry */
|
---|
| 2017 | };
|
---|
| 2018 |
|
---|
| 2019 | uint32_t i = RT_ELEMENTS(s_aUnwanted);
|
---|
| 2020 | while (i-- > 0)
|
---|
| 2021 | if ( s_aUnwanted[i].u64KeyId == u64KeyId
|
---|
| 2022 | || s_aUnwanted[i].u64KeyId == UINT64_MAX)
|
---|
| 2023 | if (RTCrX509Name_MatchWithString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, s_aUnwanted[i].pszName))
|
---|
| 2024 | {
|
---|
| 2025 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - blacklisted: %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
|
---|
| 2026 | return false;
|
---|
| 2027 | }
|
---|
| 2028 |
|
---|
| 2029 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: Adding %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
|
---|
| 2030 | return true;
|
---|
| 2031 | # endif
|
---|
[51770] | 2032 | }
|
---|
| 2033 |
|
---|
[52375] | 2034 |
|
---|
[51770] | 2035 | /**
|
---|
[52375] | 2036 | * Loads a module in the system32 directory.
|
---|
| 2037 | *
|
---|
[55017] | 2038 | * @returns Module handle on success. Won't return on failure if fMandatory = true.
|
---|
[52375] | 2039 | * @param pszName The name of the DLL to load.
|
---|
[55017] | 2040 | * @param fMandatory Whether the library is mandatory.
|
---|
[52375] | 2041 | */
|
---|
[55017] | 2042 | DECLHIDDEN(HMODULE) supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll(const char *pszName, bool fMandatory)
|
---|
[52375] | 2043 | {
|
---|
| 2044 | WCHAR wszName[200+60];
|
---|
[52403] | 2045 | UINT cwcDir = GetSystemDirectoryW(wszName, RT_ELEMENTS(wszName) - 60);
|
---|
| 2046 | wszName[cwcDir] = '\\';
|
---|
| 2047 | RTUtf16CopyAscii(&wszName[cwcDir + 1], RT_ELEMENTS(wszName) - cwcDir, pszName);
|
---|
[52375] | 2048 |
|
---|
| 2049 | DWORD fFlags = 0;
|
---|
| 2050 | if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
|
---|
| 2051 | fFlags = LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32;
|
---|
| 2052 | HMODULE hMod = LoadLibraryExW(wszName, NULL, fFlags);
|
---|
| 2053 | if ( hMod == NULL
|
---|
| 2054 | && fFlags
|
---|
| 2055 | && g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2)
|
---|
[52940] | 2056 | && RtlGetLastWin32Error() == ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER)
|
---|
[52375] | 2057 | {
|
---|
| 2058 | fFlags = 0;
|
---|
| 2059 | hMod = LoadLibraryExW(wszName, NULL, fFlags);
|
---|
| 2060 | }
|
---|
[55017] | 2061 | if ( hMod == NULL
|
---|
| 2062 | && fMandatory)
|
---|
[52940] | 2063 | supR3HardenedFatal("Error loading '%s': %u [%ls]", pszName, RtlGetLastWin32Error(), wszName);
|
---|
[52375] | 2064 | return hMod;
|
---|
| 2065 | }
|
---|
| 2066 |
|
---|
| 2067 |
|
---|
| 2068 | /**
|
---|
[51770] | 2069 | * Called by supR3HardenedWinResolveVerifyTrustApiAndHookThreadCreation to
|
---|
| 2070 | * import selected root CAs from the system certificate store.
|
---|
| 2071 | *
|
---|
| 2072 | * These certificates permits us to correctly validate third party DLLs.
|
---|
| 2073 | */
|
---|
[52375] | 2074 | static void supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs(void)
|
---|
[51770] | 2075 | {
|
---|
| 2076 | uint32_t cAdded = 0;
|
---|
| 2077 |
|
---|
| 2078 | /*
|
---|
| 2079 | * Load crypt32.dll and resolve the APIs we need.
|
---|
| 2080 | */
|
---|
[55017] | 2081 | HMODULE hCrypt32 = supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll("crypt32.dll", true /*fMandatory*/);
|
---|
[51770] | 2082 |
|
---|
| 2083 | #define RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(a_Name, a_pfnType) \
|
---|
| 2084 | a_pfnType pfn##a_Name = (a_pfnType)GetProcAddress(hCrypt32, #a_Name); \
|
---|
[52940] | 2085 | if (pfn##a_Name == NULL) supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating '" #a_Name "' in 'crypt32.dll': %u", RtlGetLastWin32Error())
|
---|
[51770] | 2086 | RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertOpenStore, PFNCERTOPENSTORE);
|
---|
| 2087 | RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertCloseStore, PFNCERTCLOSESTORE);
|
---|
| 2088 | RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertEnumCertificatesInStore, PFNCERTENUMCERTIFICATESINSTORE);
|
---|
| 2089 | #undef RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API
|
---|
| 2090 |
|
---|
| 2091 | /*
|
---|
| 2092 | * Open the root store and look for the certificates we wish to use.
|
---|
| 2093 | */
|
---|
| 2094 | DWORD fOpenStore = CERT_STORE_OPEN_EXISTING_FLAG | CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG;
|
---|
| 2095 | HCERTSTORE hStore = pfnCertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING | X509_ASN_ENCODING,
|
---|
| 2096 | NULL /* hCryptProv = default */, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE | fOpenStore, L"Root");
|
---|
| 2097 | if (!hStore)
|
---|
| 2098 | hStore = pfnCertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING | X509_ASN_ENCODING,
|
---|
| 2099 | NULL /* hCryptProv = default */, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER | fOpenStore, L"Root");
|
---|
| 2100 | if (hStore)
|
---|
| 2101 | {
|
---|
| 2102 | PCCERT_CONTEXT pCurCtx = NULL;
|
---|
| 2103 | while ((pCurCtx = pfnCertEnumCertificatesInStore(hStore, pCurCtx)) != NULL)
|
---|
| 2104 | {
|
---|
| 2105 | if (pCurCtx->dwCertEncodingType & X509_ASN_ENCODING)
|
---|
| 2106 | {
|
---|
[52207] | 2107 | RTERRINFOSTATIC StaticErrInfo;
|
---|
[51770] | 2108 | RTASN1CURSORPRIMARY PrimaryCursor;
|
---|
[52207] | 2109 | RTAsn1CursorInitPrimary(&PrimaryCursor, pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded,
|
---|
| 2110 | RTErrInfoInitStatic(&StaticErrInfo),
|
---|
[51770] | 2111 | &g_RTAsn1DefaultAllocator, RTASN1CURSOR_FLAGS_DER, "CurCtx");
|
---|
| 2112 | RTCRX509CERTIFICATE MyCert;
|
---|
| 2113 | int rc = RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1(&PrimaryCursor.Cursor, 0, &MyCert, "Cert");
|
---|
| 2114 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 2115 | {
|
---|
| 2116 | if (supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA(&MyCert))
|
---|
| 2117 | {
|
---|
| 2118 | rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
|
---|
| 2119 | pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded, NULL /*pErrInfo*/);
|
---|
| 2120 | AssertRC(rc);
|
---|
| 2121 |
|
---|
| 2122 | rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
|
---|
| 2123 | pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded, NULL /*pErrInfo*/);
|
---|
| 2124 | AssertRC(rc);
|
---|
| 2125 | cAdded++;
|
---|
| 2126 | }
|
---|
| 2127 |
|
---|
| 2128 | RTCrX509Certificate_Delete(&MyCert);
|
---|
| 2129 | }
|
---|
[52207] | 2130 | /* XP root certificate "C&W HKT SecureNet CA SGC Root" has non-standard validity
|
---|
| 2131 | timestamps, the UTC formatting isn't Zulu time but specifies timezone offsets.
|
---|
| 2132 | Ignore these failures and certificates. */
|
---|
| 2133 | else if (rc != VERR_ASN1_INVALID_UTC_TIME_ENCODING)
|
---|
| 2134 | AssertMsgFailed(("RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1 failed: rc=%#x: %s\n", rc, StaticErrInfo.szMsg));
|
---|
[51770] | 2135 | }
|
---|
| 2136 | }
|
---|
| 2137 | pfnCertCloseStore(hStore, CERT_CLOSE_STORE_CHECK_FLAG);
|
---|
| 2138 | g_fHaveOtherRoots = true;
|
---|
| 2139 | }
|
---|
| 2140 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs: cAdded=%u\n", cAdded));
|
---|
| 2141 | }
|
---|
| 2142 |
|
---|
| 2143 |
|
---|
| 2144 | /**
|
---|
| 2145 | * Resolves the WinVerifyTrust API after the process has been verified and
|
---|
| 2146 | * installs a thread creation hook.
|
---|
| 2147 | *
|
---|
| 2148 | * The WinVerifyTrust API is used in addition our own Authenticode verification
|
---|
| 2149 | * code. If the image has the IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_FORCE_INTEGRITY flag
|
---|
| 2150 | * set, it will be checked again by the kernel. All our image has this flag set
|
---|
| 2151 | * and we require all VBox extensions to have it set as well. In effect, the
|
---|
| 2152 | * authenticode signature will be checked two or three times.
|
---|
[52356] | 2153 | *
|
---|
| 2154 | * @param pszProgName The program name.
|
---|
[51770] | 2155 | */
|
---|
[52356] | 2156 | DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinResolveVerifyTrustApiAndHookThreadCreation(const char *pszProgName)
|
---|
[51770] | 2157 | {
|
---|
| 2158 | # ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
|
---|
| 2159 | /*
|
---|
| 2160 | * Load our the support library DLL that does the thread hooking as the
|
---|
| 2161 | * security API may trigger the creation of COM worker threads (or
|
---|
| 2162 | * whatever they are).
|
---|
| 2163 | *
|
---|
| 2164 | * The thread creation hook makes the threads very slippery to debuggers by
|
---|
| 2165 | * irreversably disabling most (if not all) debug events for them.
|
---|
| 2166 | */
|
---|
| 2167 | char szPath[RTPATH_MAX];
|
---|
[56733] | 2168 | supR3HardenedPathAppSharedLibs(szPath, sizeof(szPath) - sizeof("/VBoxSupLib.DLL"));
|
---|
[51770] | 2169 | suplibHardenedStrCat(szPath, "/VBoxSupLib.DLL");
|
---|
[56746] | 2170 | HMODULE hSupLibMod = (HMODULE)supR3HardenedWinLoadLibrary(szPath, true /*fSystem32Only*/, 0 /*fMainFlags*/);
|
---|
[51770] | 2171 | if (hSupLibMod == NULL)
|
---|
[52940] | 2172 | supR3HardenedFatal("Error loading '%s': %u", szPath, RtlGetLastWin32Error());
|
---|
[51770] | 2173 | # endif
|
---|
| 2174 |
|
---|
| 2175 | /*
|
---|
[52414] | 2176 | * Allocate TLS entry for WinVerifyTrust recursion prevention.
|
---|
| 2177 | */
|
---|
| 2178 | DWORD iTls = TlsAlloc();
|
---|
| 2179 | if (iTls != TLS_OUT_OF_INDEXES)
|
---|
| 2180 | g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion = iTls;
|
---|
| 2181 | else
|
---|
[52940] | 2182 | supR3HardenedError(RtlGetLastWin32Error(), false /*fFatal*/, "TlsAlloc failed");
|
---|
[52414] | 2183 |
|
---|
| 2184 | /*
|
---|
[54997] | 2185 | * Resolve the imports we need.
|
---|
[51770] | 2186 | */
|
---|
[55017] | 2187 | HMODULE hWintrust = supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll("Wintrust.dll", true /*fMandatory*/);
|
---|
[51770] | 2188 | #define RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(a_Name, a_pfnType, a_uMinWinVer) \
|
---|
| 2189 | do { \
|
---|
| 2190 | g_pfn##a_Name = (a_pfnType)GetProcAddress(hWintrust, #a_Name); \
|
---|
| 2191 | if (g_pfn##a_Name == NULL && (a_uMinWinVer) < g_uNtVerCombined) \
|
---|
[52940] | 2192 | supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating '" #a_Name "' in 'Wintrust.dll': %u", RtlGetLastWin32Error()); \
|
---|
[51770] | 2193 | } while (0)
|
---|
| 2194 |
|
---|
| 2195 | PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust = (PFNWINVERIFYTRUST)GetProcAddress(hWintrust, "WinVerifyTrust");
|
---|
| 2196 | if (!pfnWinVerifyTrust)
|
---|
[52940] | 2197 | supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating 'WinVerifyTrust' in 'Wintrust.dll': %u", RtlGetLastWin32Error());
|
---|
[51770] | 2198 |
|
---|
| 2199 | RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminAcquireContext, PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT, 0);
|
---|
| 2200 | RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE, 0);
|
---|
| 2201 | RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash, PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH, 0);
|
---|
| 2202 | RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext, PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT, 0);
|
---|
| 2203 | RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminReleaseContext, PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT, 0);
|
---|
| 2204 | RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext, PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT, 0);
|
---|
| 2205 |
|
---|
| 2206 | RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminAcquireContext2, PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2, SUP_NT_VER_W80);
|
---|
| 2207 | RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2, SUP_NT_VER_W80);
|
---|
| 2208 |
|
---|
[54997] | 2209 | # ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
|
---|
[51770] | 2210 | /*
|
---|
[54997] | 2211 | * Load bcrypt.dll and instantiate a few hashing and signing providers to
|
---|
| 2212 | * make sure the providers are cached for later us. Avoid recursion issues.
|
---|
[51770] | 2213 | */
|
---|
[55017] | 2214 | HMODULE hBCrypt = supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll("bcrypt.dll", false /*fMandatory*/);
|
---|
[54997] | 2215 | if (hBCrypt)
|
---|
| 2216 | {
|
---|
| 2217 | PFNBCRYPTOPENALGORTIHMPROVIDER pfnOpenAlgoProvider;
|
---|
| 2218 | pfnOpenAlgoProvider = (PFNBCRYPTOPENALGORTIHMPROVIDER)GetProcAddress(hBCrypt, "BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider");
|
---|
| 2219 | if (pfnOpenAlgoProvider)
|
---|
| 2220 | {
|
---|
| 2221 | SUP_DPRINTF(("bcrypt.dll loaded at %p, BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider at %p, preloading providers:\n",
|
---|
| 2222 | hBCrypt, pfnOpenAlgoProvider));
|
---|
| 2223 | # define PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(a_Name) \
|
---|
| 2224 | do { \
|
---|
| 2225 | BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgo = NULL; \
|
---|
| 2226 | NTSTATUS rcNt = pfnOpenAlgoProvider(&hAlgo, a_Name, NULL, 0); \
|
---|
| 2227 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%sBCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider(,'%ls',0,0) -> %#x (hAlgo=%p)\n", \
|
---|
| 2228 | NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) ? " " : "warning: ", a_Name, rcNt, hAlgo)); \
|
---|
| 2229 | } while (0)
|
---|
| 2230 | PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_MD2_ALGORITHM);
|
---|
| 2231 | PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_MD4_ALGORITHM);
|
---|
| 2232 | PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_MD5_ALGORITHM);
|
---|
| 2233 | PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_SHA1_ALGORITHM);
|
---|
| 2234 | PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_SHA256_ALGORITHM);
|
---|
| 2235 | PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_SHA512_ALGORITHM);
|
---|
| 2236 | PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_RSA_ALGORITHM);
|
---|
| 2237 | PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_DSA_ALGORITHM);
|
---|
| 2238 | # undef PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER
|
---|
| 2239 | }
|
---|
| 2240 | else
|
---|
| 2241 | SUP_DPRINTF(("Warning! Failed to find BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider in bcrypt.dll\n"));
|
---|
| 2242 | }
|
---|
| 2243 | else
|
---|
| 2244 | SUP_DPRINTF(("Warning! Failed to load bcrypt.dll\n"));
|
---|
| 2245 |
|
---|
| 2246 | /*
|
---|
| 2247 | * Call the verification API on ourselves and ntdll to make sure it works
|
---|
| 2248 | * and loads more stuff it needs, preventing any recursive fun we'd run
|
---|
| 2249 | * into after we set g_pfnWinVerifyTrust.
|
---|
| 2250 | */
|
---|
[51770] | 2251 | RTERRINFOSTATIC ErrInfoStatic;
|
---|
| 2252 | RTErrInfoInitStatic(&ErrInfoStatic);
|
---|
| 2253 | int rc = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(NULL, g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, 0,
|
---|
[53042] | 2254 | &ErrInfoStatic.Core, pfnWinVerifyTrust, NULL);
|
---|
[51770] | 2255 | if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
|
---|
[52356] | 2256 | supR3HardenedFatalMsg(pszProgName, kSupInitOp_Integrity, rc,
|
---|
| 2257 | "WinVerifyTrust failed on stub executable: %s", ErrInfoStatic.szMsg);
|
---|
[62677] | 2258 | # else
|
---|
| 2259 | RT_NOREF1(pszProgName);
|
---|
[51770] | 2260 | # endif
|
---|
| 2261 |
|
---|
| 2262 | if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0)) /* ntdll isn't signed on XP, assuming this is the case on W2K3 for now. */
|
---|
[53042] | 2263 | supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(NULL, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\ntdll.dll", 0, NULL, pfnWinVerifyTrust, NULL);
|
---|
[51770] | 2264 | supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(NULL, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\ntdll.dll", 0, NULL, pfnWinVerifyTrust);
|
---|
| 2265 |
|
---|
| 2266 | g_pfnWinVerifyTrust = pfnWinVerifyTrust;
|
---|
[52356] | 2267 | SUP_DPRINTF(("g_pfnWinVerifyTrust=%p\n", pfnWinVerifyTrust));
|
---|
[51770] | 2268 |
|
---|
[52375] | 2269 | # ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
|
---|
[51770] | 2270 | /*
|
---|
[52375] | 2271 | * Load some problematic DLLs into the verifier cache to prevent
|
---|
| 2272 | * recursion trouble.
|
---|
| 2273 | */
|
---|
| 2274 | supR3HardenedWinVerifyCachePreload(L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\crypt32.dll");
|
---|
| 2275 | supR3HardenedWinVerifyCachePreload(L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\Wintrust.dll");
|
---|
| 2276 | # endif
|
---|
| 2277 |
|
---|
| 2278 | /*
|
---|
[51770] | 2279 | * Now, get trusted root CAs so we can verify a broader scope of signatures.
|
---|
| 2280 | */
|
---|
[52375] | 2281 | supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs();
|
---|
[51770] | 2282 | }
|
---|
| 2283 |
|
---|
| 2284 |
|
---|
| 2285 | static int supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(PCRTUTF16 pwszNtName, PCRTUTF16 *ppwszWinPath,
|
---|
| 2286 | PRTUTF16 pwszWinPathBuf, size_t cwcWinPathBuf)
|
---|
| 2287 | {
|
---|
| 2288 | static const RTUTF16 s_wszPrefix[] = L"\\\\.\\GLOBALROOT";
|
---|
| 2289 |
|
---|
| 2290 | if (*pwszNtName != '\\' && *pwszNtName != '/')
|
---|
| 2291 | return VERR_PATH_DOES_NOT_START_WITH_ROOT;
|
---|
| 2292 |
|
---|
| 2293 | size_t cwcNtName = RTUtf16Len(pwszNtName);
|
---|
| 2294 | if (RT_ELEMENTS(s_wszPrefix) + cwcNtName > cwcWinPathBuf)
|
---|
| 2295 | return VERR_FILENAME_TOO_LONG;
|
---|
| 2296 |
|
---|
| 2297 | memcpy(pwszWinPathBuf, s_wszPrefix, sizeof(s_wszPrefix));
|
---|
| 2298 | memcpy(&pwszWinPathBuf[sizeof(s_wszPrefix) / sizeof(RTUTF16) - 1], pwszNtName, (cwcNtName + 1) * sizeof(RTUTF16));
|
---|
| 2299 | *ppwszWinPath = pwszWinPathBuf;
|
---|
| 2300 | return VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 2301 | }
|
---|
| 2302 |
|
---|
| 2303 |
|
---|
| 2304 | /**
|
---|
| 2305 | * Calls WinVerifyTrust to verify an PE image.
|
---|
| 2306 | *
|
---|
| 2307 | * @returns VBox status code.
|
---|
| 2308 | * @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
|
---|
| 2309 | * @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
|
---|
| 2310 | * dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
|
---|
| 2311 | * error/logging.
|
---|
| 2312 | * @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
|
---|
| 2313 | * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
|
---|
| 2314 | * @param pfnWinVerifyTrust Pointer to the API.
|
---|
[53042] | 2315 | * @param phrcWinVerifyTrust Where to WinVerifyTrust error status on failure,
|
---|
| 2316 | * optional.
|
---|
[51770] | 2317 | */
|
---|
| 2318 | static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
|
---|
[53042] | 2319 | PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust, HRESULT *phrcWinVerifyTrust)
|
---|
[51770] | 2320 | {
|
---|
[62677] | 2321 | RT_NOREF1(fFlags);
|
---|
[53042] | 2322 | if (phrcWinVerifyTrust)
|
---|
| 2323 | *phrcWinVerifyTrust = S_OK;
|
---|
| 2324 |
|
---|
[51770] | 2325 | /*
|
---|
| 2326 | * Convert the name into a Windows name.
|
---|
| 2327 | */
|
---|
| 2328 | RTUTF16 wszWinPathBuf[MAX_PATH];
|
---|
| 2329 | PCRTUTF16 pwszWinPath;
|
---|
| 2330 | int rc = supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(pwszName, &pwszWinPath, wszWinPathBuf, RT_ELEMENTS(wszWinPathBuf));
|
---|
| 2331 | if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
|
---|
| 2332 | return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "Bad path passed to supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust: rc=%Rrc '%ls'", rc, pwszName);
|
---|
| 2333 |
|
---|
| 2334 | /*
|
---|
| 2335 | * Construct input parameters and call the API.
|
---|
| 2336 | */
|
---|
| 2337 | WINTRUST_FILE_INFO FileInfo;
|
---|
| 2338 | RT_ZERO(FileInfo);
|
---|
| 2339 | FileInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(FileInfo);
|
---|
| 2340 | FileInfo.pcwszFilePath = pwszWinPath;
|
---|
| 2341 | FileInfo.hFile = hFile;
|
---|
| 2342 |
|
---|
| 2343 | GUID PolicyActionGuid = WINTRUST_ACTION_GENERIC_VERIFY_V2;
|
---|
| 2344 |
|
---|
| 2345 | WINTRUST_DATA TrustData;
|
---|
| 2346 | RT_ZERO(TrustData);
|
---|
| 2347 | TrustData.cbStruct = sizeof(TrustData);
|
---|
| 2348 | TrustData.fdwRevocationChecks = WTD_REVOKE_NONE; /* Keep simple for now. */
|
---|
| 2349 | TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_VERIFY;
|
---|
| 2350 | TrustData.dwUIChoice = WTD_UI_NONE;
|
---|
| 2351 | TrustData.dwProvFlags = 0;
|
---|
| 2352 | if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
|
---|
| 2353 | TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL;
|
---|
| 2354 | else
|
---|
| 2355 | TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_REVOCATION_CHECK_NONE;
|
---|
| 2356 | TrustData.dwUnionChoice = WTD_CHOICE_FILE;
|
---|
| 2357 | TrustData.pFile = &FileInfo;
|
---|
| 2358 |
|
---|
| 2359 | HRESULT hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /*hwnd*/, &PolicyActionGuid, &TrustData);
|
---|
| 2360 | if (hrc == S_OK)
|
---|
| 2361 | rc = VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 2362 | else
|
---|
| 2363 | {
|
---|
| 2364 | /*
|
---|
| 2365 | * Failed. Format a nice error message.
|
---|
| 2366 | */
|
---|
| 2367 | # ifdef DEBUG_bird
|
---|
[52213] | 2368 | if (hrc != CERT_E_CHAINING /* Un-updated vistas, XPs, ++ */)
|
---|
| 2369 | __debugbreak();
|
---|
[51770] | 2370 | # endif
|
---|
| 2371 | const char *pszErrConst = NULL;
|
---|
| 2372 | switch (hrc)
|
---|
| 2373 | {
|
---|
[52795] | 2374 | case TRUST_E_SYSTEM_ERROR: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SYSTEM_ERROR"; break;
|
---|
| 2375 | case TRUST_E_NO_SIGNER_CERT: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_NO_SIGNER_CERT"; break;
|
---|
| 2376 | case TRUST_E_COUNTER_SIGNER: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_COUNTER_SIGNER"; break;
|
---|
| 2377 | case TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE"; break;
|
---|
| 2378 | case TRUST_E_TIME_STAMP: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_TIME_STAMP"; break;
|
---|
| 2379 | case TRUST_E_BAD_DIGEST: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_BAD_DIGEST"; break;
|
---|
| 2380 | case TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS"; break;
|
---|
| 2381 | case TRUST_E_FINANCIAL_CRITERIA: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_FINANCIAL_CRITERIA"; break;
|
---|
| 2382 | case TRUST_E_PROVIDER_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_PROVIDER_UNKNOWN"; break;
|
---|
| 2383 | case TRUST_E_ACTION_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_ACTION_UNKNOWN"; break;
|
---|
| 2384 | case TRUST_E_SUBJECT_FORM_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SUBJECT_FORM_UNKNOWN"; break;
|
---|
| 2385 | case TRUST_E_SUBJECT_NOT_TRUSTED: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SUBJECT_NOT_TRUSTED"; break;
|
---|
| 2386 | case TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE"; break;
|
---|
| 2387 | case TRUST_E_FAIL: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_FAIL"; break;
|
---|
| 2388 | case TRUST_E_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST"; break;
|
---|
[58731] | 2389 | case CERT_E_EXPIRED: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_EXPIRED"; break;
|
---|
| 2390 | case CERT_E_VALIDITYPERIODNESTING: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_VALIDITYPERIODNESTING"; break;
|
---|
| 2391 | case CERT_E_ROLE: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_ROLE"; break;
|
---|
| 2392 | case CERT_E_PATHLENCONST: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_PATHLENCONST"; break;
|
---|
| 2393 | case CERT_E_CRITICAL: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_CRITICAL"; break;
|
---|
| 2394 | case CERT_E_PURPOSE: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_PURPOSE"; break;
|
---|
| 2395 | case CERT_E_ISSUERCHAINING: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_ISSUERCHAINING"; break;
|
---|
| 2396 | case CERT_E_MALFORMED: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_MALFORMED"; break;
|
---|
| 2397 | case CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT"; break;
|
---|
[52795] | 2398 | case CERT_E_CHAINING: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_CHAINING"; break;
|
---|
[58731] | 2399 | case CERT_E_REVOKED: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_REVOKED"; break;
|
---|
| 2400 | case CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDTESTROOT: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDTESTROOT"; break;
|
---|
[52795] | 2401 | case CERT_E_REVOCATION_FAILURE: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_REVOCATION_FAILURE"; break;
|
---|
[58731] | 2402 | case CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH"; break;
|
---|
| 2403 | case CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE"; break;
|
---|
| 2404 | case CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDCA: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDCA"; break;
|
---|
| 2405 | case CERT_E_INVALID_POLICY: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_INVALID_POLICY"; break;
|
---|
| 2406 | case CERT_E_INVALID_NAME: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_INVALID_NAME"; break;
|
---|
[52795] | 2407 | case CRYPT_E_FILE_ERROR: pszErrConst = "CRYPT_E_FILE_ERROR"; break;
|
---|
| 2408 | case CRYPT_E_REVOKED: pszErrConst = "CRYPT_E_REVOKED"; break;
|
---|
[51770] | 2409 | }
|
---|
| 2410 | if (pszErrConst)
|
---|
| 2411 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_LDRVI_UNSUPPORTED_ARCH,
|
---|
| 2412 | "WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%s on '%ls'", pszErrConst, pwszName);
|
---|
| 2413 | else
|
---|
| 2414 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_LDRVI_UNSUPPORTED_ARCH,
|
---|
| 2415 | "WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%Rhrc on '%ls'", hrc, pwszName);
|
---|
[52365] | 2416 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust: WinVerifyTrust failed with %#x (%s) on '%ls'\n",
|
---|
| 2417 | hrc, pszErrConst, pwszName));
|
---|
[53042] | 2418 | if (phrcWinVerifyTrust)
|
---|
| 2419 | *phrcWinVerifyTrust = hrc;
|
---|
[51770] | 2420 | }
|
---|
| 2421 |
|
---|
| 2422 | /* clean up state data. */
|
---|
| 2423 | TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_CLOSE;
|
---|
| 2424 | FileInfo.hFile = NULL;
|
---|
| 2425 | hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /*hwnd*/, &PolicyActionGuid, &TrustData);
|
---|
| 2426 |
|
---|
| 2427 | return rc;
|
---|
| 2428 | }
|
---|
| 2429 |
|
---|
| 2430 |
|
---|
| 2431 | /**
|
---|
| 2432 | * Calls WinVerifyTrust to verify an PE image via catalog files.
|
---|
| 2433 | *
|
---|
| 2434 | * @returns VBox status code.
|
---|
| 2435 | * @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
|
---|
| 2436 | * @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
|
---|
| 2437 | * dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
|
---|
| 2438 | * error/logging.
|
---|
| 2439 | * @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
|
---|
| 2440 | * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
|
---|
| 2441 | * @param pfnWinVerifyTrust Pointer to the API.
|
---|
| 2442 | */
|
---|
| 2443 | static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
|
---|
| 2444 | PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust)
|
---|
| 2445 | {
|
---|
[62677] | 2446 | RT_NOREF1(fFlags);
|
---|
[51770] | 2447 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: hFile=%p pwszName=%ls\n", hFile, pwszName));
|
---|
| 2448 |
|
---|
| 2449 | /*
|
---|
| 2450 | * Convert the name into a Windows name.
|
---|
| 2451 | */
|
---|
| 2452 | RTUTF16 wszWinPathBuf[MAX_PATH];
|
---|
| 2453 | PCRTUTF16 pwszWinPath;
|
---|
| 2454 | int rc = supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(pwszName, &pwszWinPath, wszWinPathBuf, RT_ELEMENTS(wszWinPathBuf));
|
---|
| 2455 | if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
|
---|
| 2456 | return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "Bad path passed to supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: rc=%Rrc '%ls'", rc, pwszName);
|
---|
| 2457 |
|
---|
| 2458 | /*
|
---|
| 2459 | * Open the file if we didn't get a handle.
|
---|
| 2460 | */
|
---|
| 2461 | HANDLE hFileClose = NULL;
|
---|
| 2462 | if (hFile == RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE || hFile == NULL)
|
---|
| 2463 | {
|
---|
| 2464 | hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
|
---|
| 2465 | IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
|
---|
| 2466 |
|
---|
| 2467 | UNICODE_STRING NtName;
|
---|
| 2468 | NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)pwszName;
|
---|
| 2469 | NtName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(pwszName) * sizeof(WCHAR));
|
---|
| 2470 | NtName.MaximumLength = NtName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
| 2471 |
|
---|
| 2472 | OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
|
---|
| 2473 | InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/);
|
---|
| 2474 |
|
---|
| 2475 | NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile,
|
---|
[52365] | 2476 | FILE_READ_DATA | READ_CONTROL | SYNCHRONIZE,
|
---|
[51770] | 2477 | &ObjAttr,
|
---|
| 2478 | &Ios,
|
---|
| 2479 | NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
|
---|
| 2480 | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
|
---|
| 2481 | FILE_SHARE_READ,
|
---|
| 2482 | FILE_OPEN,
|
---|
| 2483 | FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
|
---|
| 2484 | NULL /*EaBuffer*/,
|
---|
| 2485 | 0 /*EaLength*/);
|
---|
| 2486 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 2487 | rcNt = Ios.Status;
|
---|
| 2488 | if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 2489 | return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromNtStatus(rcNt),
|
---|
| 2490 | "NtCreateFile returned %#x opening '%ls'.", rcNt, pwszName);
|
---|
| 2491 | hFileClose = hFile;
|
---|
| 2492 | }
|
---|
| 2493 |
|
---|
| 2494 | /*
|
---|
| 2495 | * On Windows 8.0 and later there are more than one digest choice.
|
---|
| 2496 | */
|
---|
[53022] | 2497 | int fNoSignedCatalogFound = -1;
|
---|
[51770] | 2498 | rc = VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
| 2499 | static struct
|
---|
| 2500 | {
|
---|
| 2501 | /** The digest algorithm name. */
|
---|
| 2502 | const WCHAR *pszAlgorithm;
|
---|
| 2503 | /** Cached catalog admin handle. */
|
---|
| 2504 | HCATADMIN volatile hCachedCatAdmin;
|
---|
| 2505 | } s_aHashes[] =
|
---|
| 2506 | {
|
---|
| 2507 | { NULL, NULL },
|
---|
| 2508 | { L"SHA256", NULL },
|
---|
| 2509 | };
|
---|
| 2510 | for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aHashes); i++)
|
---|
| 2511 | {
|
---|
| 2512 | /*
|
---|
| 2513 | * Another loop for dealing with different trust provider policies
|
---|
| 2514 | * required for successfully validating different catalog signatures.
|
---|
| 2515 | */
|
---|
| 2516 | bool fTryNextPolicy;
|
---|
| 2517 | uint32_t iPolicy = 0;
|
---|
| 2518 | static const GUID s_aPolicies[] =
|
---|
| 2519 | {
|
---|
| 2520 | DRIVER_ACTION_VERIFY, /* Works with microsoft bits. Most frequently used, thus first. */
|
---|
| 2521 | WINTRUST_ACTION_GENERIC_VERIFY_V2, /* Works with ATI and other SPC kernel-code signed stuff. */
|
---|
| 2522 | };
|
---|
| 2523 | do
|
---|
| 2524 | {
|
---|
| 2525 | /*
|
---|
| 2526 | * Create a context.
|
---|
| 2527 | */
|
---|
| 2528 | fTryNextPolicy = false;
|
---|
[52403] | 2529 | bool fFreshContext = false;
|
---|
[51770] | 2530 | BOOL fRc;
|
---|
| 2531 | HCATADMIN hCatAdmin = ASMAtomicXchgPtr(&s_aHashes[i].hCachedCatAdmin, NULL);
|
---|
| 2532 | if (hCatAdmin)
|
---|
[52403] | 2533 | {
|
---|
| 2534 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: Cached context %p\n", hCatAdmin));
|
---|
| 2535 | fFreshContext = false;
|
---|
[51770] | 2536 | fRc = TRUE;
|
---|
[52403] | 2537 | }
|
---|
[51770] | 2538 | else
|
---|
[52403] | 2539 | {
|
---|
| 2540 | l_fresh_context:
|
---|
| 2541 | fFreshContext = true;
|
---|
| 2542 | if (g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2)
|
---|
| 2543 | fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2(&hCatAdmin, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], s_aHashes[i].pszAlgorithm,
|
---|
| 2544 | NULL /*pStrongHashPolicy*/, 0 /*dwFlags*/);
|
---|
| 2545 | else
|
---|
| 2546 | fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext(&hCatAdmin, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], 0 /*dwFlags*/);
|
---|
| 2547 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: New context %p\n", hCatAdmin));
|
---|
| 2548 | }
|
---|
[51770] | 2549 | if (fRc)
|
---|
| 2550 | {
|
---|
| 2551 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: hCatAdmin=%p\n", hCatAdmin));
|
---|
| 2552 |
|
---|
| 2553 | /*
|
---|
| 2554 | * Hash the file.
|
---|
| 2555 | */
|
---|
| 2556 | BYTE abHash[SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE];
|
---|
| 2557 | DWORD cbHash = sizeof(abHash);
|
---|
| 2558 | if (g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2)
|
---|
| 2559 | fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2(hCatAdmin, hFile, &cbHash, abHash, 0 /*dwFlags*/);
|
---|
| 2560 | else
|
---|
| 2561 | fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle(hFile, &cbHash, abHash, 0 /*dwFlags*/);
|
---|
| 2562 | if (fRc)
|
---|
| 2563 | {
|
---|
| 2564 | /* Produce a string version of it that we can pass to WinVerifyTrust. */
|
---|
| 2565 | RTUTF16 wszDigest[SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE * 2 + 1];
|
---|
| 2566 | int rc2 = RTUtf16PrintHexBytes(wszDigest, RT_ELEMENTS(wszDigest), abHash, cbHash, RTSTRPRINTHEXBYTES_F_UPPER);
|
---|
| 2567 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc2))
|
---|
| 2568 | {
|
---|
| 2569 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: cbHash=%u wszDigest=%ls\n", cbHash, wszDigest));
|
---|
| 2570 |
|
---|
| 2571 | /*
|
---|
| 2572 | * Enumerate catalog information that matches the hash.
|
---|
| 2573 | */
|
---|
| 2574 | uint32_t iCat = 0;
|
---|
| 2575 | HCATINFO hCatInfoPrev = NULL;
|
---|
| 2576 | do
|
---|
| 2577 | {
|
---|
| 2578 | /* Get the next match. */
|
---|
| 2579 | HCATINFO hCatInfo = g_pfnCryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash(hCatAdmin, abHash, cbHash, 0, &hCatInfoPrev);
|
---|
| 2580 | if (!hCatInfo)
|
---|
| 2581 | {
|
---|
[52403] | 2582 | if (!fFreshContext)
|
---|
| 2583 | {
|
---|
[52940] | 2584 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: Retrying with fresh context (CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash -> %u; iCat=%#x)\n", RtlGetLastWin32Error(), iCat));
|
---|
[52403] | 2585 | if (hCatInfoPrev != NULL)
|
---|
| 2586 | g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext(hCatAdmin, hCatInfoPrev, 0 /*dwFlags*/);
|
---|
| 2587 | g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext(hCatAdmin, 0 /*dwFlags*/);
|
---|
| 2588 | goto l_fresh_context;
|
---|
| 2589 | }
|
---|
[53022] | 2590 | ULONG ulErr = RtlGetLastWin32Error();
|
---|
| 2591 | fNoSignedCatalogFound = ulErr == ERROR_NOT_FOUND && fNoSignedCatalogFound != 0;
|
---|
[51770] | 2592 | if (iCat == 0)
|
---|
[53022] | 2593 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash failed ERRROR_NOT_FOUND (%u)\n", ulErr));
|
---|
| 2594 | else if (iCat == 0)
|
---|
| 2595 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash failed %u\n", ulErr));
|
---|
[51770] | 2596 | break;
|
---|
| 2597 | }
|
---|
[53022] | 2598 | fNoSignedCatalogFound = 0;
|
---|
[51770] | 2599 | Assert(hCatInfoPrev == NULL);
|
---|
| 2600 | hCatInfoPrev = hCatInfo;
|
---|
| 2601 |
|
---|
| 2602 | /*
|
---|
| 2603 | * Call WinVerifyTrust.
|
---|
| 2604 | */
|
---|
| 2605 | CATALOG_INFO CatInfo;
|
---|
| 2606 | CatInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(CatInfo);
|
---|
| 2607 | CatInfo.wszCatalogFile[0] = '\0';
|
---|
| 2608 | if (g_pfnCryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext(hCatInfo, &CatInfo, 0 /*dwFlags*/))
|
---|
| 2609 | {
|
---|
| 2610 | WINTRUST_CATALOG_INFO WtCatInfo;
|
---|
| 2611 | RT_ZERO(WtCatInfo);
|
---|
| 2612 | WtCatInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(WtCatInfo);
|
---|
| 2613 | WtCatInfo.dwCatalogVersion = 0;
|
---|
| 2614 | WtCatInfo.pcwszCatalogFilePath = CatInfo.wszCatalogFile;
|
---|
| 2615 | WtCatInfo.pcwszMemberTag = wszDigest;
|
---|
| 2616 | WtCatInfo.pcwszMemberFilePath = pwszWinPath;
|
---|
| 2617 | WtCatInfo.pbCalculatedFileHash = abHash;
|
---|
| 2618 | WtCatInfo.cbCalculatedFileHash = cbHash;
|
---|
| 2619 | WtCatInfo.pcCatalogContext = NULL;
|
---|
| 2620 |
|
---|
| 2621 | WINTRUST_DATA TrustData;
|
---|
| 2622 | RT_ZERO(TrustData);
|
---|
| 2623 | TrustData.cbStruct = sizeof(TrustData);
|
---|
| 2624 | TrustData.fdwRevocationChecks = WTD_REVOKE_NONE; /* Keep simple for now. */
|
---|
| 2625 | TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_VERIFY;
|
---|
| 2626 | TrustData.dwUIChoice = WTD_UI_NONE;
|
---|
| 2627 | TrustData.dwProvFlags = 0;
|
---|
| 2628 | if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
|
---|
| 2629 | TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL;
|
---|
| 2630 | else
|
---|
| 2631 | TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_REVOCATION_CHECK_NONE;
|
---|
| 2632 | TrustData.dwUnionChoice = WTD_CHOICE_CATALOG;
|
---|
| 2633 | TrustData.pCatalog = &WtCatInfo;
|
---|
| 2634 |
|
---|
| 2635 | HRESULT hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /*hwnd*/, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], &TrustData);
|
---|
[52365] | 2636 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: WinVerifyTrust => %#x; cat='%ls'; file='%ls'\n",
|
---|
| 2637 | hrc, CatInfo.wszCatalogFile, pwszName));
|
---|
[51770] | 2638 |
|
---|
| 2639 | if (SUCCEEDED(hrc))
|
---|
| 2640 | rc = VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 2641 | else if (hrc == TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE)
|
---|
| 2642 | { /* ignore because it's useless. */ }
|
---|
| 2643 | else if (hrc == ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER)
|
---|
| 2644 | { /* This is returned if the given file isn't found in the catalog, it seems. */ }
|
---|
| 2645 | else
|
---|
| 2646 | {
|
---|
| 2647 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_WINTRUST_CAT_FAILURE,
|
---|
| 2648 | "WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%#x on '%ls' and .cat-file='%ls'.",
|
---|
| 2649 | hrc, pwszWinPath, CatInfo.wszCatalogFile);
|
---|
[52403] | 2650 | fTryNextPolicy |= (hrc == CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT);
|
---|
[51770] | 2651 | }
|
---|
| 2652 |
|
---|
| 2653 | /* clean up state data. */
|
---|
| 2654 | TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_CLOSE;
|
---|
| 2655 | hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /*hwnd*/, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], &TrustData);
|
---|
| 2656 | Assert(SUCCEEDED(hrc));
|
---|
| 2657 | }
|
---|
| 2658 | else
|
---|
| 2659 | {
|
---|
[52940] | 2660 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(RtlGetLastWin32Error()),
|
---|
[51770] | 2661 | "CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext failed: %d [file=%s]",
|
---|
[52940] | 2662 | RtlGetLastWin32Error(), pwszName);
|
---|
[51770] | 2663 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext failed\n"));
|
---|
| 2664 | }
|
---|
| 2665 | iCat++;
|
---|
| 2666 | } while (rc == VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED && iCat < 128);
|
---|
| 2667 |
|
---|
| 2668 | if (hCatInfoPrev != NULL)
|
---|
| 2669 | if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext(hCatAdmin, hCatInfoPrev, 0 /*dwFlags*/))
|
---|
| 2670 | AssertFailed();
|
---|
| 2671 | }
|
---|
| 2672 | else
|
---|
| 2673 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc2, "RTUtf16PrintHexBytes failed: %Rrc", rc);
|
---|
| 2674 | }
|
---|
| 2675 | else
|
---|
[52940] | 2676 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(RtlGetLastWin32Error()),
|
---|
| 2677 | "CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle[2] failed: %d [file=%s]", RtlGetLastWin32Error(), pwszName);
|
---|
[51770] | 2678 |
|
---|
| 2679 | if (!ASMAtomicCmpXchgPtr(&s_aHashes[i].hCachedCatAdmin, hCatAdmin, NULL))
|
---|
| 2680 | if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext(hCatAdmin, 0 /*dwFlags*/))
|
---|
| 2681 | AssertFailed();
|
---|
| 2682 | }
|
---|
| 2683 | else
|
---|
[52940] | 2684 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(RtlGetLastWin32Error()),
|
---|
| 2685 | "CryptCATAdminAcquireContext[2] failed: %d [file=%s]", RtlGetLastWin32Error(), pwszName);
|
---|
[51770] | 2686 | iPolicy++;
|
---|
| 2687 | } while ( fTryNextPolicy
|
---|
| 2688 | && iPolicy < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPolicies));
|
---|
| 2689 |
|
---|
| 2690 | /*
|
---|
| 2691 | * Only repeat if we've got g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2 and can specify the hash algorithm.
|
---|
| 2692 | */
|
---|
| 2693 | if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2)
|
---|
| 2694 | break;
|
---|
| 2695 | if (rc != VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
|
---|
| 2696 | break;
|
---|
| 2697 | }
|
---|
| 2698 |
|
---|
| 2699 | if (hFileClose != NULL)
|
---|
| 2700 | NtClose(hFileClose);
|
---|
| 2701 |
|
---|
[53005] | 2702 | /*
|
---|
| 2703 | * DLLs that are likely candidates for local modifications.
|
---|
| 2704 | */
|
---|
| 2705 | if (rc == VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
|
---|
| 2706 | {
|
---|
[53022] | 2707 | bool fCoreSystemDll = false;
|
---|
| 2708 | PCRTUTF16 pwsz;
|
---|
| 2709 | uint32_t cwcName = (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName);
|
---|
| 2710 | uint32_t cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
[53005] | 2711 | if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /*fCheckSlash*/))
|
---|
| 2712 | {
|
---|
| 2713 | pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
|
---|
| 2714 | if ( supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "uxtheme.dll")
|
---|
| 2715 | || supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "user32.dll")
|
---|
| 2716 | || supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "gdi32.dll")
|
---|
| 2717 | || supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "opengl32.dll")
|
---|
[53022] | 2718 | || (fCoreSystemDll = supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "KernelBase.dll"))
|
---|
| 2719 | || (fCoreSystemDll = supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernel32.dll"))
|
---|
| 2720 | || (fCoreSystemDll = supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "ntdll.dll"))
|
---|
[53005] | 2721 | )
|
---|
| 2722 | {
|
---|
| 2723 | if (RTErrInfoIsSet(pErrInfo))
|
---|
| 2724 | RTErrInfoAdd(pErrInfo, rc, "\n");
|
---|
| 2725 | RTErrInfoAddF(pErrInfo, rc, "'%ls' is most likely modified.", pwszName);
|
---|
| 2726 | }
|
---|
| 2727 | }
|
---|
[53022] | 2728 |
|
---|
| 2729 | /* Kludge for ancient windows versions we don't want to support but
|
---|
| 2730 | users still wants to use. Keep things as safe as possible without
|
---|
| 2731 | unnecessary effort. Problem is that 3rd party catalog files cannot
|
---|
| 2732 | easily be found. Showstopper for ATI users. */
|
---|
| 2733 | if ( fNoSignedCatalogFound == 1
|
---|
| 2734 | && g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA
|
---|
| 2735 | && !fCoreSystemDll)
|
---|
| 2736 | {
|
---|
| 2737 | rc = VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
| 2738 | }
|
---|
[53005] | 2739 | }
|
---|
| 2740 |
|
---|
[51770] | 2741 | return rc;
|
---|
| 2742 | }
|
---|
| 2743 |
|
---|
| 2744 |
|
---|
| 2745 | /**
|
---|
[52406] | 2746 | * Verifies the given image using WinVerifyTrust in some way.
|
---|
| 2747 | *
|
---|
| 2748 | * This is used by supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod as well as
|
---|
| 2749 | * supR3HardenedScreenImage.
|
---|
| 2750 | *
|
---|
[58339] | 2751 | * @returns IPRT status code, modified @a rc.
|
---|
[52406] | 2752 | * @param hFile Handle of the file to verify.
|
---|
| 2753 | * @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
|
---|
| 2754 | * dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
|
---|
| 2755 | * error/logging.
|
---|
[58339] | 2756 | * @param fFlags SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
|
---|
| 2757 | * @param rc The current status code.
|
---|
[52406] | 2758 | * @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was
|
---|
| 2759 | * actually used.
|
---|
| 2760 | * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
|
---|
| 2761 | */
|
---|
| 2762 | DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, int rc,
|
---|
| 2763 | bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
|
---|
| 2764 | {
|
---|
| 2765 | if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
|
---|
| 2766 | *pfWinVerifyTrust = false;
|
---|
| 2767 |
|
---|
| 2768 | /*
|
---|
| 2769 | * Call the windows verify trust API if we've resolved it and aren't in
|
---|
[52414] | 2770 | * some obvious recursion.
|
---|
[52406] | 2771 | */
|
---|
| 2772 | if (g_pfnWinVerifyTrust != NULL)
|
---|
| 2773 | {
|
---|
[54997] | 2774 | uint32_t const idCurrentThread = RTNtCurrentThreadId();
|
---|
| 2775 |
|
---|
| 2776 | /* Check if loader lock owner. */
|
---|
| 2777 | struct _RTL_CRITICAL_SECTION volatile *pLoaderLock = NtCurrentPeb()->LoaderLock;
|
---|
| 2778 | bool fOwnsLoaderLock = pLoaderLock
|
---|
| 2779 | && pLoaderLock->OwningThread == (HANDLE)(uintptr_t)idCurrentThread
|
---|
[55007] | 2780 | && pLoaderLock->RecursionCount > 0;
|
---|
[54997] | 2781 | if (!fOwnsLoaderLock)
|
---|
[52406] | 2782 | {
|
---|
[54997] | 2783 | /* Check for recursion. */
|
---|
| 2784 | bool fNoRecursion;
|
---|
| 2785 | if (g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX)
|
---|
| 2786 | {
|
---|
| 2787 | fNoRecursion = TlsGetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion) == 0;
|
---|
| 2788 | if (fNoRecursion)
|
---|
| 2789 | TlsSetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion, (void *)1);
|
---|
| 2790 | }
|
---|
| 2791 | else
|
---|
| 2792 | fNoRecursion = ASMAtomicCmpXchgU32(&g_idActiveThread, idCurrentThread, UINT32_MAX);
|
---|
[52406] | 2793 |
|
---|
[54997] | 2794 | if (fNoRecursion && !fOwnsLoaderLock)
|
---|
[52406] | 2795 | {
|
---|
[54997] | 2796 | /* We can call WinVerifyTrust. */
|
---|
| 2797 | if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
|
---|
| 2798 | *pfWinVerifyTrust = true;
|
---|
| 2799 |
|
---|
| 2800 | if (rc != VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
|
---|
[52406] | 2801 | {
|
---|
[54997] | 2802 | if (rc == VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
|
---|
[52406] | 2803 | {
|
---|
[54997] | 2804 | if (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_ALLOW_CAT_FILE_VERIFICATION)
|
---|
| 2805 | {
|
---|
| 2806 | int rc2 = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo,
|
---|
| 2807 | g_pfnWinVerifyTrust);
|
---|
| 2808 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile -> %d (org %d)\n", rc2, rc));
|
---|
| 2809 | rc = rc2;
|
---|
| 2810 | }
|
---|
| 2811 | else
|
---|
| 2812 | {
|
---|
| 2813 | AssertFailed();
|
---|
| 2814 | rc = VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
| 2815 | }
|
---|
[52406] | 2816 | }
|
---|
[54997] | 2817 | else if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 2818 | {
|
---|
| 2819 | HRESULT hrcWinVerifyTrust;
|
---|
| 2820 | rc = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust,
|
---|
| 2821 | &hrcWinVerifyTrust);
|
---|
| 2822 |
|
---|
| 2823 | /* DLLs signed with special roots, like "Microsoft Digital Media Authority 2005",
|
---|
| 2824 | may fail here because the root cert is not in the normal certificate stores
|
---|
| 2825 | (if any). Our verification code has the basics of these certificates included
|
---|
| 2826 | and can verify them, which is why we end up here instead of in the
|
---|
| 2827 | VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED case above. Current workaround is to do as above.
|
---|
| 2828 | (Intel graphics driver DLLs, like igdusc64.dll. */
|
---|
| 2829 | if ( RT_FAILURE(rc)
|
---|
| 2830 | && hrcWinVerifyTrust == CERT_E_CHAINING
|
---|
| 2831 | && (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_ALLOW_CAT_FILE_VERIFICATION))
|
---|
| 2832 | {
|
---|
| 2833 | rc = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust);
|
---|
| 2834 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile -> %d (was CERT_E_CHAINING)\n", rc));
|
---|
| 2835 | }
|
---|
| 2836 | }
|
---|
[52406] | 2837 | else
|
---|
| 2838 | {
|
---|
[54997] | 2839 | int rc2 = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust, NULL);
|
---|
| 2840 | AssertMsg(RT_FAILURE_NP(rc2),
|
---|
| 2841 | ("rc=%Rrc, rc2=%Rrc %s", rc, rc2, pErrInfo ? pErrInfo->pszMsg : "<no-err-info>"));
|
---|
[62677] | 2842 | RT_NOREF_PV(rc2);
|
---|
[52406] | 2843 | }
|
---|
| 2844 | }
|
---|
[53042] | 2845 |
|
---|
[54997] | 2846 | /* Unwind recursion. */
|
---|
| 2847 | if (g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX)
|
---|
| 2848 | TlsSetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion, (void *)0);
|
---|
[52406] | 2849 | else
|
---|
[54997] | 2850 | ASMAtomicWriteU32(&g_idActiveThread, UINT32_MAX);
|
---|
[52406] | 2851 | }
|
---|
[54997] | 2852 | /*
|
---|
| 2853 | * No can do.
|
---|
| 2854 | */
|
---|
[52414] | 2855 | else
|
---|
[54997] | 2856 | SUP_DPRINTF(("Detected WinVerifyTrust recursion: rc=%Rrc '%ls'.\n", rc, pwszName));
|
---|
[52406] | 2857 | }
|
---|
| 2858 | else
|
---|
[54997] | 2859 | SUP_DPRINTF(("Detected loader lock ownership: rc=%Rrc '%ls'.\n", rc, pwszName));
|
---|
[52406] | 2860 | }
|
---|
| 2861 | return rc;
|
---|
| 2862 | }
|
---|
| 2863 |
|
---|
| 2864 |
|
---|
| 2865 | /**
|
---|
| 2866 | * Checks if WinVerifyTrust is callable on the current thread.
|
---|
| 2867 | *
|
---|
| 2868 | * Used by the main code to figure whether it makes sense to try revalidate an
|
---|
| 2869 | * image that hasn't passed thru WinVerifyTrust yet.
|
---|
| 2870 | *
|
---|
| 2871 | * @returns true if callable on current thread, false if not.
|
---|
| 2872 | */
|
---|
| 2873 | DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardenedWinIsWinVerifyTrustCallable(void)
|
---|
| 2874 | {
|
---|
| 2875 | return g_pfnWinVerifyTrust != NULL
|
---|
[52414] | 2876 | && ( g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX
|
---|
| 2877 | ? (uintptr_t)TlsGetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion) == 0
|
---|
[52940] | 2878 | : g_idActiveThread != RTNtCurrentThreadId() );
|
---|
[52406] | 2879 | }
|
---|
| 2880 |
|
---|
| 2881 |
|
---|
| 2882 |
|
---|
| 2883 | /**
|
---|
[51770] | 2884 | * Initializes g_uNtVerCombined and g_NtVerInfo.
|
---|
| 2885 | * Called from suplibHardenedWindowsMain and suplibOsInit.
|
---|
| 2886 | */
|
---|
[59810] | 2887 | DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinInitVersion(bool fEarly)
|
---|
[51770] | 2888 | {
|
---|
| 2889 | /*
|
---|
| 2890 | * Get the windows version. Use RtlGetVersion as GetVersionExW and
|
---|
| 2891 | * GetVersion might not be telling the whole truth (8.0 on 8.1 depending on
|
---|
| 2892 | * the application manifest).
|
---|
[59810] | 2893 | *
|
---|
| 2894 | * Note! Windows 10 build 14267+ touches BSS when calling RtlGetVersion, so we
|
---|
| 2895 | * have to use the fallback for the call from the early init code.
|
---|
[51770] | 2896 | */
|
---|
| 2897 | OSVERSIONINFOEXW NtVerInfo;
|
---|
| 2898 |
|
---|
[52160] | 2899 | RT_ZERO(NtVerInfo);
|
---|
[51770] | 2900 | NtVerInfo.dwOSVersionInfoSize = sizeof(RTL_OSVERSIONINFOEXW);
|
---|
[59810] | 2901 | if ( fEarly
|
---|
| 2902 | || !NT_SUCCESS(RtlGetVersion((PRTL_OSVERSIONINFOW)&NtVerInfo)))
|
---|
[51770] | 2903 | {
|
---|
[52160] | 2904 | RT_ZERO(NtVerInfo);
|
---|
| 2905 | PPEB pPeb = NtCurrentPeb();
|
---|
| 2906 | NtVerInfo.dwMajorVersion = pPeb->OSMajorVersion;
|
---|
| 2907 | NtVerInfo.dwMinorVersion = pPeb->OSMinorVersion;
|
---|
[59810] | 2908 | NtVerInfo.dwBuildNumber = pPeb->OSBuildNumber;
|
---|
[51770] | 2909 | }
|
---|
[52160] | 2910 |
|
---|
[51770] | 2911 | g_uNtVerCombined = SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_COMBINED(NtVerInfo.dwMajorVersion, NtVerInfo.dwMinorVersion, NtVerInfo.dwBuildNumber,
|
---|
| 2912 | NtVerInfo.wServicePackMajor, NtVerInfo.wServicePackMinor);
|
---|
| 2913 | }
|
---|
| 2914 |
|
---|
| 2915 | #endif /* IN_RING3 */
|
---|
| 2916 |
|
---|