[51770] | 1 | /* $Id: SUPHardenedVerifyImage-win.cpp 104384 2024-04-19 22:03:10Z vboxsync $ */
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| 2 | /** @file
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| 3 | * VirtualBox Support Library/Driver - Hardened Image Verification, Windows.
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| 4 | */
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| 5 |
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| 6 | /*
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[98103] | 7 | * Copyright (C) 2006-2023 Oracle and/or its affiliates.
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[51770] | 8 | *
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[96407] | 9 | * This file is part of VirtualBox base platform packages, as
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| 10 | * available from https://www.virtualbox.org.
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[51770] | 11 | *
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[96407] | 12 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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| 13 | * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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| 14 | * as published by the Free Software Foundation, in version 3 of the
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| 15 | * License.
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| 16 | *
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| 17 | * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
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| 18 | * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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| 19 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
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| 20 | * General Public License for more details.
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| 21 | *
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| 22 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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| 23 | * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses>.
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| 24 | *
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[51770] | 25 | * The contents of this file may alternatively be used under the terms
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| 26 | * of the Common Development and Distribution License Version 1.0
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[96407] | 27 | * (CDDL), a copy of it is provided in the "COPYING.CDDL" file included
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| 28 | * in the VirtualBox distribution, in which case the provisions of the
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[51770] | 29 | * CDDL are applicable instead of those of the GPL.
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| 30 | *
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| 31 | * You may elect to license modified versions of this file under the
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| 32 | * terms and conditions of either the GPL or the CDDL or both.
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[96407] | 33 | *
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| 34 | * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only OR CDDL-1.0
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[51770] | 35 | */
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| 36 |
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[57358] | 37 |
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| 38 | /*********************************************************************************************************************************
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| 39 | * Header Files *
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| 40 | *********************************************************************************************************************************/
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[51770] | 41 | #ifdef IN_RING0
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[77816] | 42 | # ifndef IPRT_NT_MAP_TO_ZW
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| 43 | # define IPRT_NT_MAP_TO_ZW
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| 44 | # endif
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[51770] | 45 | # include <iprt/nt/nt.h>
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| 46 | # include <ntimage.h>
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| 47 | #else
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| 48 | # include <iprt/nt/nt-and-windows.h>
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| 49 | # include "Wintrust.h"
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| 50 | # include "Softpub.h"
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| 51 | # include "mscat.h"
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| 52 | # ifndef LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_APPLICATION_DIR
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| 53 | # define LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32 0x800
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| 54 | # endif
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| 55 | #endif
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| 56 |
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| 57 | #include <VBox/sup.h>
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| 58 | #include <VBox/err.h>
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| 59 | #include <iprt/ctype.h>
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| 60 | #include <iprt/ldr.h>
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| 61 | #include <iprt/log.h>
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| 62 | #include <iprt/path.h>
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| 63 | #include <iprt/string.h>
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[76410] | 64 | #include <iprt/utf16.h>
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[51770] | 65 | #include <iprt/crypto/pkcs7.h>
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| 66 | #include <iprt/crypto/store.h>
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| 67 |
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| 68 | #ifdef IN_RING0
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| 69 | # include "SUPDrvInternal.h"
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| 70 | #else
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| 71 | # include "SUPLibInternal.h"
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| 72 | #endif
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| 73 | #include "win/SUPHardenedVerify-win.h"
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| 74 |
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| 75 |
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[57358] | 76 | /*********************************************************************************************************************************
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| 77 | * Defined Constants And Macros *
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| 78 | *********************************************************************************************************************************/
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[51770] | 79 | /** The size of static hash (output) buffers.
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| 80 | * Avoids dynamic allocations and cleanups for of small buffers as well as extra
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| 81 | * calls for getting the appropriate buffer size. The largest digest in regular
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| 82 | * use by current windows version is SHA-512, we double this and hope it's
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| 83 | * enough a good while. */
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| 84 | #define SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE 128
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| 85 |
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| 86 |
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[52404] | 87 | #if defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE)
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| 88 | # error "VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE without VBOX_PERMIT_MORE!"
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| 89 | #endif
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| 90 |
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| 91 |
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[57358] | 92 | /*********************************************************************************************************************************
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| 93 | * Structures and Typedefs *
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| 94 | *********************************************************************************************************************************/
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[51770] | 95 |
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| 96 | #ifdef IN_RING3
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[85121] | 97 | typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(LONG, WINAPI, PFNWINVERIFYTRUST,(HWND hwnd, GUID const *pgActionID, PVOID pWVTData));
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| 98 | typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(BOOL, WINAPI, PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT,(HCATADMIN *phCatAdmin, const GUID *pGuidSubsystem,
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| 99 | DWORD dwFlags));
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| 100 | typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(BOOL, WINAPI, PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2,(HCATADMIN *phCatAdmin, const GUID *pGuidSubsystem,
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| 101 | PCWSTR pwszHashAlgorithm,
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| 102 | struct _CERT_STRONG_SIGN_PARA const *pStrongHashPolicy,
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| 103 | DWORD dwFlags));
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| 104 | typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(BOOL, WINAPI, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE,(HANDLE hFile, DWORD *pcbHash, BYTE *pbHash,
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| 105 | DWORD dwFlags));
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| 106 | typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(BOOL, WINAPI, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2,(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, HANDLE hFile,
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| 107 | DWORD *pcbHash, BYTE *pbHash, DWORD dwFlags));
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| 108 | typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(HCATINFO, WINAPI, PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH,(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, BYTE *pbHash, DWORD cbHash,
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| 109 | DWORD dwFlags, HCATINFO *phPrevCatInfo));
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| 110 | typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(BOOL, WINAPI, PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT,(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, HCATINFO hCatInfo,
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| 111 | DWORD dwFlags));
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| 112 | typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(BOOL, WINAPI, PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT,(HCATADMIN hCatAdmin, DWORD dwFlags));
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| 113 | typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(BOOL, WINAPI, PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT,(HCATINFO hCatInfo, CATALOG_INFO *psCatInfo,
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| 114 | DWORD dwFlags));
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[51770] | 115 |
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[85121] | 116 | typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(HCERTSTORE, WINAPI, PFNCERTOPENSTORE,(PCSTR pszStoreProvider, DWORD dwEncodingType,
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| 117 | HCRYPTPROV_LEGACY hCryptProv, DWORD dwFlags, const void *pvParam));
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| 118 | typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(BOOL, WINAPI, PFNCERTCLOSESTORE,(HCERTSTORE hCertStore, DWORD dwFlags));
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| 119 | typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(PCCERT_CONTEXT, WINAPI, PFNCERTENUMCERTIFICATESINSTORE,(HCERTSTORE hCertStore,
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| 120 | PCCERT_CONTEXT pPrevCertContext));
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[54997] | 121 |
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[85121] | 122 | typedef DECLCALLBACKPTR_EX(NTSTATUS, WINAPI, PFNBCRYPTOPENALGORTIHMPROVIDER,(BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE *phAlgo, PCWSTR pwszAlgoId,
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| 123 | PCWSTR pwszImpl, DWORD dwFlags));
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[51770] | 124 | #endif
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| 125 |
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| 126 |
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[57358] | 127 | /*********************************************************************************************************************************
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| 128 | * Global Variables *
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| 129 | *********************************************************************************************************************************/
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[51770] | 130 | /** The build certificate. */
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| 131 | static RTCRX509CERTIFICATE g_BuildX509Cert;
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| 132 |
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| 133 | /** Store for root software publisher certificates. */
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| 134 | static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
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| 135 | /** Store for root NT kernel certificates. */
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| 136 | static RTCRSTORE g_hNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
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| 137 |
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| 138 | /** Store containing SPC, NT kernel signing, and timestamp root certificates. */
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| 139 | static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
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| 140 | /** Store for supplemental certificates for use with
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| 141 | * g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore. */
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| 142 | static RTCRSTORE g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
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| 143 |
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| 144 | /** The full \\SystemRoot\\System32 path. */
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| 145 | SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_System32NtPath;
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| 146 | /** The full \\SystemRoot\\WinSxS path. */
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| 147 | SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_WinSxSNtPath;
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[52943] | 148 | #if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
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[52365] | 149 | /** The full 'Program Files' path. */
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| 150 | SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_ProgramFilesNtPath;
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| 151 | # ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
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| 152 | /** The full 'Program Files (x86)' path. */
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| 153 | SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath;
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| 154 | # endif
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| 155 | /** The full 'Common Files' path. */
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| 156 | SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_CommonFilesNtPath;
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| 157 | # ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
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| 158 | /** The full 'Common Files (x86)' path. */
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| 159 | SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF g_CommonFilesX86NtPath;
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| 160 | # endif
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[52943] | 161 | #endif /* IN_RING3 && !VBOX_PERMIT_MORE*/
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[51770] | 162 |
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[66525] | 163 | /**
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| 164 | * Blacklisted DLL names.
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| 165 | */
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| 166 | const RTSTRTUPLE g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[] =
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| 167 | {
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| 168 | { RT_STR_TUPLE("SCROBJ.dll") },
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| 169 | { NULL, 0 } /* terminator entry */
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| 170 | };
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| 171 |
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| 172 |
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[52365] | 173 | static union
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| 174 | {
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| 175 | SID Sid;
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| 176 | uint8_t abPadding[SECURITY_MAX_SID_SIZE];
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[52482] | 177 | }
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| 178 | /** The TrustedInstaller SID (Vista+). */
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| 179 | g_TrustedInstallerSid,
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| 180 | /** Local system ID (S-1-5-21). */
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[52907] | 181 | g_LocalSystemSid,
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| 182 | /** Builtin Administrators group alias (S-1-5-32-544). */
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| 183 | g_AdminsGroupSid;
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[52365] | 184 |
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[52482] | 185 |
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[51770] | 186 | /** Set after we've retrived other SPC root certificates from the system. */
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| 187 | static bool g_fHaveOtherRoots = false;
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| 188 |
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| 189 | #if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3)
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| 190 | /** Combined windows NT version number. See SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_COMBINED and
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| 191 | * SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE. */
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| 192 | uint32_t g_uNtVerCombined;
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| 193 | #endif
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| 194 |
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| 195 | #ifdef IN_RING3
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[51826] | 196 | /** Timestamp hack working around issues with old DLLs that we ship.
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| 197 | * See supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle() for details. */
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[51819] | 198 | static uint64_t g_uBuildTimestampHack = 0;
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| 199 | #endif
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| 200 |
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| 201 | #ifdef IN_RING3
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[51770] | 202 | /** Pointer to WinVerifyTrust. */
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| 203 | PFNWINVERIFYTRUST g_pfnWinVerifyTrust;
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| 204 | /** Pointer to CryptCATAdminAcquireContext. */
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| 205 | PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext;
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| 206 | /** Pointer to CryptCATAdminAcquireContext2 if available. */
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| 207 | PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2 g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2;
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| 208 | /** Pointer to CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle. */
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| 209 | PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle;
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| 210 | /** Pointer to CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2. */
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| 211 | PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2 g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2;
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| 212 | /** Pointer to CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash. */
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| 213 | PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH g_pfnCryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash;
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| 214 | /** Pointer to CryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext. */
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| 215 | PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext;
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| 216 | /** Pointer to CryptCATAdminReleaseContext. */
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| 217 | PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext;
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| 218 | /** Pointer to CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext. */
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| 219 | PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT g_pfnCryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext;
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[52403] | 220 |
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[52414] | 221 | /** Where we store the TLS entry for detecting WinVerifyTrustRecursion. */
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| 222 | static uint32_t g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion = UINT32_MAX;
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| 223 | /** Fallback WinVerifyTrust recursion protection. */
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[52403] | 224 | static uint32_t volatile g_idActiveThread = UINT32_MAX;
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| 225 |
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[51770] | 226 | #endif
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| 227 |
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| 228 |
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[57358] | 229 | /*********************************************************************************************************************************
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| 230 | * Internal Functions *
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| 231 | *********************************************************************************************************************************/
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[51770] | 232 | #ifdef IN_RING3
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| 233 | static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
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[53042] | 234 | PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust, HRESULT *phrcWinVerifyTrust);
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[51770] | 235 | static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
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| 236 | PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust);
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| 237 | #endif
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| 238 |
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| 239 |
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| 240 |
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| 241 |
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| 242 | /** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnRead */
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| 243 | static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrRead(PRTLDRREADER pReader, void *pvBuf, size_t cb, RTFOFF off)
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| 244 | {
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| 245 | PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
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| 246 | Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
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[53035] | 247 | NTSTATUS rcNt;
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[51770] | 248 |
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[53035] | 249 | /* Check for type overflow (paranoia). */
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[51770] | 250 | if ((ULONG)cb != cb)
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| 251 | return VERR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
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| 252 |
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[53035] | 253 | #ifdef IN_RING3
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| 254 | /* Make sure the event semaphore is reset (normally we don't use one). */
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| 255 | if (pNtViRdr->hEvent)
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[51770] | 256 | {
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[53035] | 257 | rcNt = NtClearEvent(pNtViRdr->hEvent);
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| 258 | if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
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| 259 | return RTErrConvertFromNtStatus(rcNt);
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| 260 | }
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| 261 | #endif
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[51770] | 262 |
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[53035] | 263 | /* Perform the read. */
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| 264 | LARGE_INTEGER offNt;
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| 265 | offNt.QuadPart = off;
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| 266 |
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| 267 | IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
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| 268 | rcNt = NtReadFile(pNtViRdr->hFile,
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| 269 | pNtViRdr->hEvent,
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| 270 | NULL /*ApcRoutine*/,
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| 271 | NULL /*ApcContext*/,
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| 272 | &Ios,
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| 273 | pvBuf,
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| 274 | (ULONG)cb,
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| 275 | &offNt,
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| 276 | NULL);
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| 277 |
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| 278 | #ifdef IN_RING0
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| 279 | /* In ring-0 the handles shall be synchronized and not alertable. */
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| 280 | AssertMsg(rcNt == STATUS_SUCCESS || !NT_SUCCESS(rcNt), ("%#x\n", rcNt));
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| 281 | #else
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| 282 | /* In ring-3 we like our handles synchronized and non-alertable, but we
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| 283 | sometimes have to take what we can get. So, deal with pending I/O as
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| 284 | best we can. */
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| 285 | if (rcNt == STATUS_PENDING)
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| 286 | rcNt = NtWaitForSingleObject(pNtViRdr->hEvent ? pNtViRdr->hEvent : pNtViRdr->hFile, FALSE /*Alertable*/, NULL);
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[51770] | 287 | #endif
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[53035] | 288 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
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| 289 | rcNt = Ios.Status;
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| 290 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
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| 291 | {
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| 292 | /* We require the caller to not read beyond the end of the file since
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| 293 | we don't have any way to communicate that we've read less that
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| 294 | requested. */
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| 295 | if (Ios.Information == cb)
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[51770] | 296 | {
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[53035] | 297 | pNtViRdr->off = off + cb; /* (just for show) */
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| 298 | return VINF_SUCCESS;
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[51770] | 299 | }
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| 300 | #ifdef IN_RING3
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[53035] | 301 | supR3HardenedError(VERR_READ_ERROR, false,
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| 302 | "supHardNtViRdrRead: Only got %#zx bytes when requesting %#zx bytes at %#llx in '%s'.\n",
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| 303 | Ios.Information, off, cb, pNtViRdr->szFilename);
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[51770] | 304 | #endif
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| 305 | }
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[53035] | 306 | pNtViRdr->off = -1;
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| 307 | return VERR_READ_ERROR;
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[51770] | 308 | }
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| 309 |
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| 310 |
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| 311 | /** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnTell */
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| 312 | static DECLCALLBACK(RTFOFF) supHardNtViRdrTell(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
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| 313 | {
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| 314 | PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
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| 315 | Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
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| 316 | return pNtViRdr->off;
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| 317 | }
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| 318 |
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| 319 |
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| 320 | /** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnSize */
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[77972] | 321 | static DECLCALLBACK(uint64_t) supHardNtViRdrSize(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
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[51770] | 322 | {
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| 323 | PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
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| 324 | Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
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| 325 | return pNtViRdr->cbFile;
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| 326 | }
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| 327 |
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| 328 |
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| 329 | /** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnLogName */
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| 330 | static DECLCALLBACK(const char *) supHardNtViRdrLogName(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
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| 331 | {
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| 332 | PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
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| 333 | return pNtViRdr->szFilename;
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| 334 | }
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| 335 |
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| 336 |
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| 337 | /** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnMap */
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| 338 | static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrMap(PRTLDRREADER pReader, const void **ppvBits)
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| 339 | {
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[62677] | 340 | RT_NOREF2(pReader, ppvBits);
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[51770] | 341 | return VERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
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| 342 | }
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| 343 |
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| 344 |
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| 345 | /** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnUnmap */
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| 346 | static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrUnmap(PRTLDRREADER pReader, const void *pvBits)
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| 347 | {
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[62677] | 348 | RT_NOREF2(pReader, pvBits);
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[51770] | 349 | return VERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
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| 350 | }
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| 351 |
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| 352 |
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| 353 | /** @copydoc RTLDRREADER::pfnDestroy */
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| 354 | static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViRdrDestroy(PRTLDRREADER pReader)
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| 355 | {
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| 356 | PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pReader;
|
---|
| 357 | Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
|
---|
| 358 |
|
---|
| 359 | pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic = ~RTLDRREADER_MAGIC;
|
---|
| 360 | pNtViRdr->hFile = NULL;
|
---|
[53035] | 361 | #ifdef IN_RING3
|
---|
| 362 | if (pNtViRdr->hEvent)
|
---|
| 363 | {
|
---|
| 364 | NtClose(pNtViRdr->hEvent);
|
---|
| 365 | pNtViRdr->hEvent = NULL;
|
---|
| 366 | }
|
---|
| 367 | #endif
|
---|
[51770] | 368 | RTMemFree(pNtViRdr);
|
---|
| 369 | return VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 370 | }
|
---|
| 371 |
|
---|
| 372 |
|
---|
| 373 | /**
|
---|
| 374 | * Creates a loader reader instance for the given NT file handle.
|
---|
| 375 | *
|
---|
| 376 | * @returns iprt status code.
|
---|
| 377 | * @param hFile Native NT file handle.
|
---|
| 378 | * @param pwszName Optional file name.
|
---|
| 379 | * @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
|
---|
| 380 | * @param ppNtViRdr Where to store the reader instance on success.
|
---|
| 381 | */
|
---|
[85127] | 382 | DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardNtViRdrCreate(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PSUPHNTVIRDR *ppNtViRdr)
|
---|
[51770] | 383 | {
|
---|
| 384 | /*
|
---|
| 385 | * Try determine the size of the file.
|
---|
| 386 | */
|
---|
| 387 | IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
|
---|
| 388 | FILE_STANDARD_INFORMATION StdInfo;
|
---|
| 389 | NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &Ios, &StdInfo, sizeof(StdInfo), FileStandardInformation);
|
---|
| 390 | if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) || !NT_SUCCESS(Ios.Status))
|
---|
| 391 | return VERR_LDRVI_FILE_LENGTH_ERROR;
|
---|
| 392 |
|
---|
| 393 | /*
|
---|
[53035] | 394 | * Figure the file mode so we can see whether we'll be needing an event
|
---|
| 395 | * semaphore for waiting on reads. This may happen in very unlikely
|
---|
| 396 | * NtCreateSection scenarios.
|
---|
| 397 | */
|
---|
| 398 | #if defined(IN_RING3) || defined(VBOX_STRICT)
|
---|
| 399 | Ios.Status = STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
|
---|
| 400 | ULONG fMode;
|
---|
| 401 | rcNt = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &Ios, &fMode, sizeof(fMode), FileModeInformation);
|
---|
| 402 | if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) || !NT_SUCCESS(Ios.Status))
|
---|
| 403 | return VERR_SUP_VP_FILE_MODE_ERROR;
|
---|
| 404 | #endif
|
---|
| 405 |
|
---|
| 406 | HANDLE hEvent = NULL;
|
---|
| 407 | #ifdef IN_RING3
|
---|
| 408 | if (!(fMode & (FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_ALERT)))
|
---|
| 409 | {
|
---|
| 410 | rcNt = NtCreateEvent(&hEvent, EVENT_ALL_ACCESS, NULL, NotificationEvent, FALSE);
|
---|
| 411 | if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 412 | return VERR_SUP_VP_CREATE_READ_EVT_SEM_FAILED;
|
---|
| 413 | }
|
---|
| 414 | #else
|
---|
| 415 | Assert(fMode & FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT);
|
---|
| 416 | #endif
|
---|
| 417 |
|
---|
| 418 | /*
|
---|
[51770] | 419 | * Calc the file name length and allocate memory for the reader instance.
|
---|
| 420 | */
|
---|
| 421 | size_t cchFilename = 0;
|
---|
| 422 | if (pwszName)
|
---|
| 423 | cchFilename = RTUtf16CalcUtf8Len(pwszName);
|
---|
| 424 |
|
---|
| 425 | int rc = VERR_NO_MEMORY;
|
---|
| 426 | PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)RTMemAllocZ(sizeof(*pNtViRdr) + cchFilename);
|
---|
| 427 | if (!pNtViRdr)
|
---|
[53035] | 428 | {
|
---|
| 429 | #ifdef IN_RING3
|
---|
| 430 | if (hEvent != NULL)
|
---|
| 431 | NtClose(hEvent);
|
---|
| 432 | #endif
|
---|
[51770] | 433 | return VERR_NO_MEMORY;
|
---|
[53035] | 434 | }
|
---|
[51770] | 435 |
|
---|
| 436 | /*
|
---|
| 437 | * Initialize the structure.
|
---|
| 438 | */
|
---|
| 439 | if (cchFilename)
|
---|
| 440 | {
|
---|
| 441 | char *pszName = &pNtViRdr->szFilename[0];
|
---|
| 442 | rc = RTUtf16ToUtf8Ex(pwszName, RTSTR_MAX, &pszName, cchFilename + 1, NULL);
|
---|
| 443 | AssertStmt(RT_SUCCESS(rc), pNtViRdr->szFilename[0] = '\0');
|
---|
| 444 | }
|
---|
| 445 | else
|
---|
| 446 | pNtViRdr->szFilename[0] = '\0';
|
---|
| 447 |
|
---|
| 448 | pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic = RTLDRREADER_MAGIC;
|
---|
| 449 | pNtViRdr->Core.pfnRead = supHardNtViRdrRead;
|
---|
| 450 | pNtViRdr->Core.pfnTell = supHardNtViRdrTell;
|
---|
| 451 | pNtViRdr->Core.pfnSize = supHardNtViRdrSize;
|
---|
| 452 | pNtViRdr->Core.pfnLogName = supHardNtViRdrLogName;
|
---|
| 453 | pNtViRdr->Core.pfnMap = supHardNtViRdrMap;
|
---|
| 454 | pNtViRdr->Core.pfnUnmap = supHardNtViRdrUnmap;
|
---|
| 455 | pNtViRdr->Core.pfnDestroy = supHardNtViRdrDestroy;
|
---|
| 456 | pNtViRdr->hFile = hFile;
|
---|
[53035] | 457 | pNtViRdr->hEvent = hEvent;
|
---|
[51770] | 458 | pNtViRdr->off = 0;
|
---|
[77972] | 459 | pNtViRdr->cbFile = (uint64_t)StdInfo.EndOfFile.QuadPart;
|
---|
[51770] | 460 | pNtViRdr->fFlags = fFlags;
|
---|
| 461 | *ppNtViRdr = pNtViRdr;
|
---|
| 462 | return VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 463 | }
|
---|
| 464 |
|
---|
| 465 |
|
---|
| 466 | /**
|
---|
[52482] | 467 | * Checks if the file is owned by TrustedInstaller (Vista+) or similar.
|
---|
[52365] | 468 | *
|
---|
| 469 | * @returns true if owned by TrustedInstaller of pre-Vista, false if not.
|
---|
| 470 | *
|
---|
| 471 | * @param hFile The handle to the file.
|
---|
| 472 | * @param pwszName The name of the file.
|
---|
| 473 | */
|
---|
[52482] | 474 | static bool supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName)
|
---|
[52365] | 475 | {
|
---|
| 476 | if (g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA)
|
---|
| 477 | return true;
|
---|
| 478 |
|
---|
| 479 | /*
|
---|
| 480 | * Get the ownership information.
|
---|
| 481 | */
|
---|
| 482 | union
|
---|
| 483 | {
|
---|
| 484 | SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_RELATIVE Rel;
|
---|
| 485 | SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR Abs;
|
---|
| 486 | uint8_t abView[256];
|
---|
| 487 | } uBuf;
|
---|
| 488 | ULONG cbActual;
|
---|
| 489 | NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQuerySecurityObject(hFile, OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION, &uBuf.Abs, sizeof(uBuf), &cbActual);
|
---|
| 490 | if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 491 | {
|
---|
| 492 | SUP_DPRINTF(("NtQuerySecurityObject failed with rcNt=%#x on '%ls'\n", rcNt, pwszName));
|
---|
| 493 | return false;
|
---|
| 494 | }
|
---|
| 495 |
|
---|
| 496 | /*
|
---|
| 497 | * Check the owner.
|
---|
[52482] | 498 | *
|
---|
[52484] | 499 | * Initially we wished to only allow TrustedInstaller. But a Windows CAPI
|
---|
[52482] | 500 | * plugin "Program Files\Tumbleweed\Desktop Validator\tmwdcapiclient.dll"
|
---|
| 501 | * turned up owned by the local system user, and we cannot operate without
|
---|
| 502 | * the plugin loaded once it's installed (WinVerityTrust fails).
|
---|
[52487] | 503 | *
|
---|
[52907] | 504 | * We'd like to avoid allowing Builtin\Administrators here since it's the
|
---|
| 505 | * default owner of anything an admin user creates (at least when elevated).
|
---|
| 506 | * Seems windows update or someone ends up installing or modifying system
|
---|
| 507 | * DLL ownership to this group, so for system32 and winsxs it's unavoidable.
|
---|
| 508 | * And, not surprise, a bunch of products, including AV, firewalls and similar
|
---|
| 509 | * ends up with their files installed with this group as owner. For instance
|
---|
| 510 | * if we wish to have NAT continue working, we need to allow this.
|
---|
| 511 | *
|
---|
| 512 | * Hopefully, we can limit the allowed files to these owners though, so
|
---|
| 513 | * we won't be subject to ordinary (non-admin, or not elevated) users
|
---|
| 514 | * downloading or be tricked into putting evil DLLs around the place...
|
---|
[52365] | 515 | */
|
---|
| 516 | PSID pOwner = uBuf.Rel.Control & SE_SELF_RELATIVE ? &uBuf.abView[uBuf.Rel.Owner] : uBuf.Abs.Owner;
|
---|
| 517 | Assert((uintptr_t)pOwner - (uintptr_t)&uBuf < sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(SID));
|
---|
| 518 | if (RtlEqualSid(pOwner, &g_TrustedInstallerSid))
|
---|
| 519 | return true;
|
---|
[52482] | 520 | if (RtlEqualSid(pOwner, &g_LocalSystemSid))
|
---|
| 521 | return true;
|
---|
[52907] | 522 | if (RtlEqualSid(pOwner, &g_AdminsGroupSid))
|
---|
| 523 | {
|
---|
| 524 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Owner is administrators group.\n", pwszName));
|
---|
| 525 | return true;
|
---|
| 526 | }
|
---|
[52365] | 527 |
|
---|
| 528 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Owner is not trusted installer (%.*Rhxs)\n",
|
---|
| 529 | pwszName, ((uint8_t *)pOwner)[1] /*SubAuthorityCount*/ * sizeof(ULONG) + 8, pOwner));
|
---|
[62677] | 530 | RT_NOREF1(pwszName);
|
---|
[52365] | 531 | return false;
|
---|
| 532 | }
|
---|
| 533 |
|
---|
| 534 |
|
---|
| 535 | /**
|
---|
[51770] | 536 | * Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII path compare.
|
---|
| 537 | *
|
---|
| 538 | * @returns true if equal, false if not.
|
---|
[52627] | 539 | * @param pawcLeft The UTF-16 path string, not necessarily null
|
---|
| 540 | * terminated.
|
---|
| 541 | * @param cwcLeft The number of chars in the left string,
|
---|
| 542 | * RTSTR_MAX if unknown but terminated.
|
---|
[51770] | 543 | * @param pszRight The ascii string.
|
---|
| 544 | */
|
---|
[85127] | 545 | DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUtf16PathIsEqualEx(PCRTUTF16 pawcLeft, size_t cwcLeft, const char *pszRight)
|
---|
[51770] | 546 | {
|
---|
| 547 | for (;;)
|
---|
| 548 | {
|
---|
[52627] | 549 | RTUTF16 wc;
|
---|
| 550 | if (cwcLeft-- > 0)
|
---|
| 551 | wc =*pawcLeft++;
|
---|
| 552 | else
|
---|
| 553 | wc = 0;
|
---|
[51770] | 554 | uint8_t b = *pszRight++;
|
---|
| 555 | if (b != wc)
|
---|
| 556 | {
|
---|
| 557 | if (wc >= 0x80)
|
---|
| 558 | return false;
|
---|
| 559 | wc = RT_C_TO_LOWER(wc);
|
---|
| 560 | if (wc != b)
|
---|
| 561 | {
|
---|
| 562 | b = RT_C_TO_LOWER(b);
|
---|
| 563 | if (wc != b)
|
---|
| 564 | {
|
---|
| 565 | if (wc == '/')
|
---|
| 566 | wc = '\\';
|
---|
| 567 | if (b == '/')
|
---|
| 568 | b = '\\';
|
---|
| 569 | if (wc != b)
|
---|
| 570 | return false;
|
---|
| 571 | }
|
---|
| 572 | }
|
---|
| 573 | }
|
---|
| 574 | if (!b)
|
---|
| 575 | return true;
|
---|
| 576 | }
|
---|
| 577 | }
|
---|
| 578 |
|
---|
| 579 |
|
---|
| 580 | /**
|
---|
[52627] | 581 | * Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII path compare.
|
---|
| 582 | *
|
---|
| 583 | * @returns true if equal, false if not.
|
---|
| 584 | * @param pwszLeft The UTF-16 path string.
|
---|
| 585 | * @param pszRight The ascii string.
|
---|
| 586 | */
|
---|
| 587 | static bool supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, const char *pszRight)
|
---|
| 588 | {
|
---|
| 589 | return supHardViUtf16PathIsEqualEx(pwszLeft, RTSTR_MAX, pszRight);
|
---|
| 590 | }
|
---|
| 591 |
|
---|
| 592 |
|
---|
[62677] | 593 | #if 0 /* unused */
|
---|
[52627] | 594 | /**
|
---|
[51770] | 595 | * Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII ends-with path predicate.
|
---|
| 596 | *
|
---|
| 597 | * @returns true if equal, false if not.
|
---|
| 598 | * @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
|
---|
| 599 | * @param pszSuffix The ascii suffix string.
|
---|
| 600 | */
|
---|
| 601 | static bool supHardViUtf16PathEndsWith(PCRTUTF16 pwsz, const char *pszSuffix)
|
---|
| 602 | {
|
---|
| 603 | size_t cwc = RTUtf16Len(pwsz);
|
---|
| 604 | size_t cchSuffix = strlen(pszSuffix);
|
---|
| 605 | if (cwc >= cchSuffix)
|
---|
| 606 | return supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz + cwc - cchSuffix, pszSuffix);
|
---|
| 607 | return false;
|
---|
| 608 | }
|
---|
[62677] | 609 | #endif
|
---|
[51770] | 610 |
|
---|
| 611 |
|
---|
| 612 | /**
|
---|
| 613 | * Simple case insensitive UTF-16 / ASCII starts-with path predicate.
|
---|
| 614 | *
|
---|
| 615 | * @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
|
---|
[58339] | 616 | * @param pwszLeft The UTF-16 path string.
|
---|
| 617 | * @param pszRight The ascii prefix string.
|
---|
[51770] | 618 | */
|
---|
[52356] | 619 | static bool supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithAscii(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, const char *pszRight)
|
---|
[51770] | 620 | {
|
---|
| 621 | for (;;)
|
---|
| 622 | {
|
---|
| 623 | RTUTF16 wc = *pwszLeft++;
|
---|
| 624 | uint8_t b = *pszRight++;
|
---|
| 625 | if (b != wc)
|
---|
| 626 | {
|
---|
| 627 | if (!b)
|
---|
| 628 | return true;
|
---|
| 629 | if (wc >= 0x80 || wc == 0)
|
---|
| 630 | return false;
|
---|
| 631 | wc = RT_C_TO_LOWER(wc);
|
---|
| 632 | if (wc != b)
|
---|
| 633 | {
|
---|
| 634 | b = RT_C_TO_LOWER(b);
|
---|
| 635 | if (wc != b)
|
---|
| 636 | {
|
---|
| 637 | if (wc == '/')
|
---|
| 638 | wc = '\\';
|
---|
| 639 | if (b == '/')
|
---|
| 640 | b = '\\';
|
---|
| 641 | if (wc != b)
|
---|
| 642 | return false;
|
---|
| 643 | }
|
---|
| 644 | }
|
---|
| 645 | }
|
---|
| 646 | }
|
---|
| 647 | }
|
---|
| 648 |
|
---|
| 649 |
|
---|
| 650 | /**
|
---|
[52356] | 651 | * Simple case insensitive UNICODE_STRING starts-with path predicate.
|
---|
| 652 | *
|
---|
| 653 | * @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
|
---|
| 654 | * @param pwszLeft The path to check.
|
---|
| 655 | * @param cwcLeft The length of @a pwszLeft
|
---|
| 656 | * @param pwszRight The starts-with path.
|
---|
| 657 | * @param cwcRight The length of @a pwszRight.
|
---|
| 658 | * @param fCheckSlash Check for a slash following the prefix.
|
---|
| 659 | */
|
---|
[85127] | 660 | DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(PCRTUTF16 pwszLeft, uint32_t cwcLeft,
|
---|
| 661 | PCRTUTF16 pwszRight, uint32_t cwcRight, bool fCheckSlash)
|
---|
[52356] | 662 | {
|
---|
[52365] | 663 | if (cwcLeft < cwcRight || !cwcRight || !pwszRight)
|
---|
[52356] | 664 | return false;
|
---|
| 665 |
|
---|
| 666 | /* See if we can get away with a case sensitive compare first. */
|
---|
[52376] | 667 | if (memcmp(pwszLeft, pwszRight, cwcRight * sizeof(RTUTF16)) == 0)
|
---|
[52356] | 668 | pwszLeft += cwcRight;
|
---|
| 669 | else
|
---|
| 670 | {
|
---|
| 671 | /* No luck, do a slow case insensitive comapre. */
|
---|
| 672 | uint32_t cLeft = cwcRight;
|
---|
| 673 | while (cLeft-- > 0)
|
---|
| 674 | {
|
---|
| 675 | RTUTF16 wcLeft = *pwszLeft++;
|
---|
| 676 | RTUTF16 wcRight = *pwszRight++;
|
---|
| 677 | if (wcLeft != wcRight)
|
---|
| 678 | {
|
---|
| 679 | wcLeft = wcLeft < 0x80 ? wcLeft == '/' ? '\\' : RT_C_TO_LOWER(wcLeft) : wcLeft;
|
---|
| 680 | wcRight = wcRight < 0x80 ? wcRight == '/' ? '\\' : RT_C_TO_LOWER(wcRight) : wcRight;
|
---|
| 681 | if (wcLeft != wcRight)
|
---|
| 682 | return false;
|
---|
| 683 | }
|
---|
| 684 | }
|
---|
| 685 | }
|
---|
| 686 |
|
---|
| 687 | /* Check for slash following the prefix, if request. */
|
---|
| 688 | if ( !fCheckSlash
|
---|
| 689 | || *pwszLeft == '\\'
|
---|
| 690 | || *pwszLeft == '/')
|
---|
| 691 | return true;
|
---|
| 692 | return false;
|
---|
| 693 | }
|
---|
| 694 |
|
---|
| 695 |
|
---|
| 696 | /**
|
---|
| 697 | * Simple case insensitive UNICODE_STRING starts-with path predicate.
|
---|
| 698 | *
|
---|
| 699 | * @returns true if starts with given string, false if not.
|
---|
| 700 | * @param pUniStrLeft The path to check.
|
---|
| 701 | * @param pUniStrRight The starts-with path.
|
---|
| 702 | * @param fCheckSlash Check for a slash following the prefix.
|
---|
| 703 | */
|
---|
[85127] | 704 | DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViUniStrPathStartsWithUniStr(UNICODE_STRING const *pUniStrLeft,
|
---|
| 705 | UNICODE_STRING const *pUniStrRight, bool fCheckSlash)
|
---|
[52356] | 706 | {
|
---|
| 707 | return supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pUniStrLeft->Buffer, pUniStrLeft->Length / sizeof(WCHAR),
|
---|
| 708 | pUniStrRight->Buffer, pUniStrRight->Length / sizeof(WCHAR), fCheckSlash);
|
---|
| 709 | }
|
---|
| 710 |
|
---|
| 711 |
|
---|
[62677] | 712 | #ifndef IN_RING0
|
---|
[52356] | 713 | /**
|
---|
[51770] | 714 | * Counts slashes in the given UTF-8 path string.
|
---|
| 715 | *
|
---|
| 716 | * @returns Number of slashes.
|
---|
| 717 | * @param pwsz The UTF-16 path string.
|
---|
| 718 | */
|
---|
| 719 | static uint32_t supHardViUtf16PathCountSlashes(PCRTUTF16 pwsz)
|
---|
| 720 | {
|
---|
| 721 | uint32_t cSlashes = 0;
|
---|
| 722 | RTUTF16 wc;
|
---|
| 723 | while ((wc = *pwsz++) != '\0')
|
---|
| 724 | if (wc == '/' || wc == '\\')
|
---|
| 725 | cSlashes++;
|
---|
| 726 | return cSlashes;
|
---|
| 727 | }
|
---|
[62677] | 728 | #endif
|
---|
[51770] | 729 |
|
---|
| 730 |
|
---|
[52030] | 731 | #ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE
|
---|
[51770] | 732 | /**
|
---|
[52030] | 733 | * Checks if the path goes into %windir%\apppatch\.
|
---|
| 734 | *
|
---|
| 735 | * @returns true if apppatch, false if not.
|
---|
| 736 | * @param pwszPath The path to examine.
|
---|
| 737 | */
|
---|
[85127] | 738 | DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardViIsAppPatchDir(PCRTUTF16 pwszPath, uint32_t cwcName)
|
---|
[52030] | 739 | {
|
---|
| 740 | uint32_t cwcWinDir = (g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length - sizeof(L"System32")) / sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
| 741 |
|
---|
| 742 | if (cwcName <= cwcWinDir + sizeof("AppPatch"))
|
---|
| 743 | return false;
|
---|
| 744 |
|
---|
| 745 | if (memcmp(pwszPath, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcWinDir * sizeof(WCHAR)))
|
---|
| 746 | return false;
|
---|
| 747 |
|
---|
[52356] | 748 | if (!supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithAscii(&pwszPath[cwcWinDir], "\\AppPatch\\"))
|
---|
[52030] | 749 | return false;
|
---|
| 750 |
|
---|
| 751 | return g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_NT_VER_VISTA;
|
---|
| 752 | }
|
---|
| 753 | #else
|
---|
| 754 | # error should not get here..
|
---|
| 755 | #endif
|
---|
| 756 |
|
---|
| 757 |
|
---|
| 758 |
|
---|
| 759 | /**
|
---|
[51770] | 760 | * Checks if the unsigned DLL is fine or not.
|
---|
| 761 | *
|
---|
| 762 | * @returns VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED or @a rc.
|
---|
| 763 | * @param hLdrMod The loader module handle.
|
---|
| 764 | * @param pwszName The NT name of the DLL/EXE.
|
---|
| 765 | * @param fFlags Flags.
|
---|
[52365] | 766 | * @param hFile The file handle.
|
---|
[51770] | 767 | * @param rc The status code..
|
---|
| 768 | */
|
---|
[52365] | 769 | static int supHardNtViCheckIfNotSignedOk(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, HANDLE hFile, int rc)
|
---|
[51770] | 770 | {
|
---|
[62677] | 771 | RT_NOREF1(hLdrMod);
|
---|
| 772 |
|
---|
[51770] | 773 | if (fFlags & (SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT | SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING))
|
---|
| 774 | return rc;
|
---|
| 775 |
|
---|
| 776 | /*
|
---|
| 777 | * Version macros.
|
---|
| 778 | */
|
---|
| 779 | uint32_t const uNtVer = g_uNtVerCombined;
|
---|
| 780 | #define IS_XP() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 1) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 2) )
|
---|
| 781 | #define IS_W2K3() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 2) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(5, 3) )
|
---|
| 782 | #define IS_VISTA() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 1) )
|
---|
| 783 | #define IS_W70() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 1) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2) )
|
---|
| 784 | #define IS_W80() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 3) )
|
---|
| 785 | #define IS_W81() ( uNtVer >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 3) && uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) )
|
---|
| 786 |
|
---|
| 787 | /*
|
---|
| 788 | * The System32 directory.
|
---|
| 789 | *
|
---|
| 790 | * System32 is full of unsigned DLLs shipped by microsoft, graphics
|
---|
| 791 | * hardware vendors, input device/method vendors and whatnot else that
|
---|
| 792 | * actually needs to be loaded into a process for it to work correctly.
|
---|
| 793 | * We have to ASSUME that anything our process attempts to load from
|
---|
| 794 | * System32 is trustworthy and that the Windows system with the help of
|
---|
| 795 | * anti-virus software make sure there is nothing evil lurking in System32
|
---|
| 796 | * or being loaded from it.
|
---|
| 797 | *
|
---|
| 798 | * A small measure of protection is to list DLLs we know should be signed
|
---|
| 799 | * and decline loading unsigned versions of them, assuming they have been
|
---|
| 800 | * replaced by an adversary with evil intentions.
|
---|
| 801 | */
|
---|
| 802 | PCRTUTF16 pwsz;
|
---|
| 803 | uint32_t cwcName = (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName);
|
---|
| 804 | uint32_t cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
[52356] | 805 | if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /*fCheckSlash*/))
|
---|
[51770] | 806 | {
|
---|
| 807 | pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
|
---|
| 808 |
|
---|
[52453] | 809 | /* Must be owned by trusted installer. (This test is superfuous, thus no relaxation here.) */
|
---|
[104384] | 810 | if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OR_SIMILAR_OWNER)
|
---|
[52482] | 811 | && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
|
---|
[52365] | 812 | return rc;
|
---|
| 813 |
|
---|
[51770] | 814 | /* Core DLLs. */
|
---|
| 815 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "ntdll.dll"))
|
---|
| 816 | return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
|
---|
| 817 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernel32.dll"))
|
---|
| 818 | return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
|
---|
| 819 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernelbase.dll"))
|
---|
| 820 | return IS_W80() || IS_W70() ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
|
---|
| 821 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "apisetschema.dll"))
|
---|
| 822 | return IS_W70() ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
|
---|
| 823 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "apphelp.dll"))
|
---|
[57165] | 824 | return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED; /* So far, never signed... */
|
---|
[52529] | 825 | #ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_VERIFIER_DLL
|
---|
| 826 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "verifier.dll"))
|
---|
| 827 | return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
|
---|
| 828 | #endif
|
---|
[52030] | 829 | #ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE
|
---|
| 830 | if (uNtVer >= SUP_NT_VER_W70) /* hard limit: user32.dll is unwanted prior to w7. */
|
---|
| 831 | {
|
---|
| 832 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "sfc.dll"))
|
---|
| 833 | return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
|
---|
| 834 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "sfc_os.dll"))
|
---|
| 835 | return uNtVer < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 4) ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
|
---|
| 836 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "user32.dll"))
|
---|
| 837 | return uNtVer < SUP_NT_VER_W81 ? VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED : rc;
|
---|
| 838 | }
|
---|
| 839 | #endif
|
---|
[51770] | 840 |
|
---|
| 841 | #ifndef IN_RING0
|
---|
| 842 | /* Check that this DLL isn't supposed to be signed on this windows
|
---|
| 843 | version. If it should, it's likely to be a fake. */
|
---|
| 844 | /** @todo list of signed dlls for various windows versions. */
|
---|
| 845 | return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
| 846 | #else
|
---|
| 847 | return rc;
|
---|
[52365] | 848 | #endif /* IN_RING0 */
|
---|
[51770] | 849 | }
|
---|
| 850 |
|
---|
[52404] | 851 |
|
---|
[51770] | 852 | #ifndef IN_RING0
|
---|
| 853 | /*
|
---|
| 854 | * The WinSxS white list.
|
---|
| 855 | *
|
---|
| 856 | * Just like with System32 there are potentially a number of DLLs that
|
---|
[52365] | 857 | * could be required from WinSxS.
|
---|
[51770] | 858 | */
|
---|
| 859 | cwcOther = g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
[52356] | 860 | if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /*fCheckSlash*/))
|
---|
[51770] | 861 | {
|
---|
| 862 | pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
|
---|
| 863 | cwcName -= cwcOther + 1;
|
---|
| 864 |
|
---|
| 865 | /* The WinSxS layout means everything worth loading is exactly one level down. */
|
---|
| 866 | uint32_t cSlashes = supHardViUtf16PathCountSlashes(pwsz);
|
---|
| 867 | if (cSlashes != 1)
|
---|
| 868 | return rc;
|
---|
| 869 |
|
---|
[52404] | 870 | /* Must be owned by trusted installer. */
|
---|
[104384] | 871 | if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OR_SIMILAR_OWNER)
|
---|
[52482] | 872 | && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
|
---|
[52404] | 873 | return rc;
|
---|
| 874 | return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
[51770] | 875 | }
|
---|
[52365] | 876 | #endif /* !IN_RING0 */
|
---|
[51770] | 877 |
|
---|
[52404] | 878 |
|
---|
[52030] | 879 | #ifdef VBOX_PERMIT_MORE
|
---|
| 880 | /*
|
---|
| 881 | * AppPatch whitelist.
|
---|
| 882 | */
|
---|
| 883 | if (supHardViIsAppPatchDir(pwszName, cwcName))
|
---|
| 884 | {
|
---|
| 885 | cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR); /* ASSUMES System32 is called System32. */
|
---|
| 886 | pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
|
---|
| 887 |
|
---|
[104384] | 888 | if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OR_SIMILAR_OWNER)
|
---|
[52482] | 889 | && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
|
---|
[52365] | 890 | return rc;
|
---|
| 891 |
|
---|
[52404] | 892 | # ifndef VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE
|
---|
[52030] | 893 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "acres.dll"))
|
---|
| 894 | return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
| 895 |
|
---|
[52404] | 896 | # ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
|
---|
[52030] | 897 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "AppPatch64\\AcGenral.dll"))
|
---|
| 898 | return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
[52404] | 899 | # elif defined(RT_ARCH_X86)
|
---|
[52030] | 900 | if (supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "AcGenral.dll"))
|
---|
| 901 | return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
[52404] | 902 | # endif
|
---|
| 903 | # endif /* !VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE */
|
---|
[52030] | 904 |
|
---|
[52404] | 905 | # ifdef IN_RING0
|
---|
| 906 | return rc;
|
---|
| 907 | # else
|
---|
[52365] | 908 | return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
| 909 | # endif
|
---|
[52030] | 910 | }
|
---|
[52365] | 911 | #endif /* VBOX_PERMIT_MORE */
|
---|
[52030] | 912 |
|
---|
[52404] | 913 |
|
---|
| 914 | #ifndef IN_RING0
|
---|
| 915 | # if defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
|
---|
[52365] | 916 | /*
|
---|
| 917 | * Program files and common files.
|
---|
| 918 | * Permit anything that's signed and correctly installed.
|
---|
| 919 | */
|
---|
| 920 | if ( supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
|
---|
| 921 | g_ProgramFilesNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_ProgramFilesNtPath.UniStr.Length,
|
---|
| 922 | true /*fCheckSlash*/)
|
---|
| 923 | || supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
|
---|
| 924 | g_CommonFilesNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_CommonFilesNtPath.UniStr.Length,
|
---|
| 925 | true /*fCheckSlash*/)
|
---|
| 926 | # ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
|
---|
| 927 | || supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
|
---|
| 928 | g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Length,
|
---|
| 929 | true /*fCheckSlash*/)
|
---|
| 930 | || supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName,
|
---|
| 931 | g_CommonFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_CommonFilesX86NtPath.UniStr.Length,
|
---|
| 932 | true /*fCheckSlash*/)
|
---|
| 933 | # endif
|
---|
| 934 | )
|
---|
| 935 | {
|
---|
[104384] | 936 | if ( !(fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OR_SIMILAR_OWNER)
|
---|
[52482] | 937 | && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
|
---|
[52404] | 938 | return rc;
|
---|
| 939 | return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
[52365] | 940 | }
|
---|
| 941 |
|
---|
[52404] | 942 | # elif defined(VBOX_PERMIT_MORE) && defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
|
---|
| 943 | /*
|
---|
| 944 | * Anything that's owned by the trusted installer.
|
---|
| 945 | */
|
---|
[104384] | 946 | if ( (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OR_SIMILAR_OWNER)
|
---|
[52482] | 947 | || supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(hFile, pwszName))
|
---|
[52404] | 948 | return VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
| 949 |
|
---|
| 950 | # endif
|
---|
| 951 | #endif /* !IN_RING0 */
|
---|
| 952 |
|
---|
| 953 | /*
|
---|
| 954 | * Not permitted.
|
---|
| 955 | */
|
---|
[51770] | 956 | return rc;
|
---|
| 957 | }
|
---|
| 958 |
|
---|
| 959 |
|
---|
| 960 | /**
|
---|
[57501] | 961 | * @callback_method_impl{FNRTDUMPPRINTFV, Formats into RTERRINFO. }
|
---|
| 962 | */
|
---|
| 963 | static DECLCALLBACK(void) supHardNtViAsn1DumpToErrInfo(void *pvUser, const char *pszFormat, va_list va)
|
---|
| 964 | {
|
---|
| 965 | PRTERRINFO pErrInfo = (PRTERRINFO)pvUser;
|
---|
| 966 | RTErrInfoAddV(pErrInfo, pErrInfo->rc, pszFormat, va);
|
---|
| 967 | }
|
---|
| 968 |
|
---|
| 969 |
|
---|
| 970 | /**
|
---|
[86610] | 971 | * Attempts to locate a root certificate in the specified store.
|
---|
| 972 | *
|
---|
| 973 | * @returns IPRT status code.
|
---|
| 974 | * @retval VINF_SUCCESS if found.
|
---|
| 975 | * @retval VWRN_NOT_FOUND if not found.
|
---|
| 976 | *
|
---|
| 977 | * @param hRootStore The root certificate store to search.
|
---|
| 978 | * @param pSubject The root certificate subject.
|
---|
| 979 | * @param pPublicKeyInfo The public key of the root certificate to find.
|
---|
| 980 | */
|
---|
| 981 | static int supHardNtViCertVerifyFindRootCert(RTCRSTORE hRootStore, PCRTCRX509NAME pSubject,
|
---|
| 982 | PCRTCRX509SUBJECTPUBLICKEYINFO pPublicKeyInfo)
|
---|
| 983 | {
|
---|
| 984 | RTCRSTORECERTSEARCH Search;
|
---|
| 985 | int rc = RTCrStoreCertFindBySubjectOrAltSubjectByRfc5280(hRootStore, pSubject, &Search);
|
---|
| 986 | AssertRCReturn(rc, rc);
|
---|
| 987 |
|
---|
| 988 | rc = VWRN_NOT_FOUND;
|
---|
| 989 | PCRTCRCERTCTX pCertCtx;
|
---|
| 990 | while ((pCertCtx = RTCrStoreCertSearchNext(hRootStore, &Search)) != NULL)
|
---|
| 991 | {
|
---|
| 992 | PCRTCRX509SUBJECTPUBLICKEYINFO pCertPubKeyInfo = NULL;
|
---|
| 993 | if (pCertCtx->pCert)
|
---|
| 994 | pCertPubKeyInfo = &pCertCtx->pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo;
|
---|
| 995 | else if (pCertCtx->pTaInfo)
|
---|
| 996 | pCertPubKeyInfo = &pCertCtx->pTaInfo->PubKey;
|
---|
| 997 | else
|
---|
| 998 | pCertPubKeyInfo = NULL;
|
---|
| 999 | if ( pCertPubKeyInfo
|
---|
| 1000 | && RTCrX509SubjectPublicKeyInfo_Compare(pCertPubKeyInfo, pPublicKeyInfo) == 0)
|
---|
| 1001 | {
|
---|
| 1002 | RTCrCertCtxRelease(pCertCtx);
|
---|
| 1003 | rc = VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 1004 | break;
|
---|
| 1005 | }
|
---|
| 1006 | RTCrCertCtxRelease(pCertCtx);
|
---|
| 1007 | }
|
---|
| 1008 |
|
---|
| 1009 | int rc2 = RTCrStoreCertSearchDestroy(hRootStore, &Search);
|
---|
| 1010 | AssertRC(rc2);
|
---|
| 1011 | return rc;
|
---|
| 1012 | }
|
---|
| 1013 |
|
---|
| 1014 |
|
---|
| 1015 | /**
|
---|
[57501] | 1016 | * @callback_method_impl{FNRTCRPKCS7VERIFYCERTCALLBACK,
|
---|
[51770] | 1017 | * Standard code signing. Use this for Microsoft SPC.}
|
---|
| 1018 | */
|
---|
| 1019 | static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViCertVerifyCallback(PCRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert, RTCRX509CERTPATHS hCertPaths,
|
---|
[52537] | 1020 | uint32_t fFlags, void *pvUser, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
|
---|
[51770] | 1021 | {
|
---|
| 1022 | PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pvUser;
|
---|
| 1023 | Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
|
---|
| 1024 |
|
---|
| 1025 | /*
|
---|
| 1026 | * If there is no certificate path build & validator associated with this
|
---|
| 1027 | * callback, it must be because of the build certificate. We trust the
|
---|
| 1028 | * build certificate without any second thoughts.
|
---|
| 1029 | */
|
---|
[84398] | 1030 | if (RTCrX509Certificate_Compare(pCert, &g_BuildX509Cert) == 0)
|
---|
[51770] | 1031 | {
|
---|
[84398] | 1032 | #ifdef VBOX_STRICT
|
---|
| 1033 | Assert(RTCrX509CertPathsGetPathCount(hCertPaths) == 1);
|
---|
| 1034 | bool fTrusted = false;
|
---|
| 1035 | uint32_t cNodes = UINT32_MAX;
|
---|
| 1036 | int rcVerify = -1;
|
---|
| 1037 | int rc = RTCrX509CertPathsQueryPathInfo(hCertPaths, 0, &fTrusted, &cNodes, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &rcVerify);
|
---|
| 1038 | AssertRC(rc); AssertRC(rcVerify); Assert(fTrusted); Assert(cNodes == 1);
|
---|
| 1039 | #endif
|
---|
| 1040 | return VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
[51770] | 1041 | }
|
---|
| 1042 |
|
---|
| 1043 | /*
|
---|
| 1044 | * Standard code signing capabilites required.
|
---|
| 1045 | */
|
---|
[52537] | 1046 | int rc = RTCrPkcs7VerifyCertCallbackCodeSigning(pCert, hCertPaths, fFlags, NULL, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 1047 | if ( RT_SUCCESS(rc)
|
---|
| 1048 | && (fFlags & RTCRPKCS7VCC_F_SIGNED_DATA))
|
---|
[51770] | 1049 | {
|
---|
| 1050 | /*
|
---|
[86610] | 1051 | * For kernel code signing there are two options for a valid certificate path:
|
---|
| 1052 | * 1. Anchored by the microsoft kernel signing root certificate (g_hNtKernelRootStore).
|
---|
| 1053 | * 2. Anchored by an SPC root and signing entity including a 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.5 (WHQL)
|
---|
| 1054 | * or 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.5.1 (WHQL attestation) extended usage key.
|
---|
[51770] | 1055 | */
|
---|
| 1056 | if (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING)
|
---|
| 1057 | {
|
---|
| 1058 | uint32_t cPaths = RTCrX509CertPathsGetPathCount(hCertPaths);
|
---|
| 1059 | uint32_t cFound = 0;
|
---|
| 1060 | uint32_t cValid = 0;
|
---|
| 1061 | for (uint32_t iPath = 0; iPath < cPaths; iPath++)
|
---|
| 1062 | {
|
---|
| 1063 | bool fTrusted;
|
---|
| 1064 | PCRTCRX509NAME pSubject;
|
---|
| 1065 | PCRTCRX509SUBJECTPUBLICKEYINFO pPublicKeyInfo;
|
---|
| 1066 | int rcVerify;
|
---|
| 1067 | rc = RTCrX509CertPathsQueryPathInfo(hCertPaths, iPath, &fTrusted, NULL /*pcNodes*/, &pSubject, &pPublicKeyInfo,
|
---|
| 1068 | NULL, NULL /*pCertCtx*/, &rcVerify);
|
---|
| 1069 | AssertRCBreak(rc);
|
---|
| 1070 |
|
---|
| 1071 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rcVerify))
|
---|
| 1072 | {
|
---|
| 1073 | Assert(fTrusted);
|
---|
| 1074 | cValid++;
|
---|
| 1075 |
|
---|
| 1076 | /*
|
---|
[86610] | 1077 | * 1. Search the kernel signing root store for a matching anchor.
|
---|
[51770] | 1078 | */
|
---|
[86610] | 1079 | rc = supHardNtViCertVerifyFindRootCert(g_hNtKernelRootStore, pSubject, pPublicKeyInfo);
|
---|
| 1080 | if (rc == VINF_SUCCESS)
|
---|
| 1081 | cFound++;
|
---|
| 1082 | /*
|
---|
| 1083 | * 2. Check for WHQL EKU and make sure it has a SPC root.
|
---|
| 1084 | */
|
---|
| 1085 | else if ( rc == VWRN_NOT_FOUND
|
---|
| 1086 | && ( pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.fExtKeyUsage
|
---|
| 1087 | & (RTCRX509CERT_EKU_F_MS_ATTEST_WHQL_CRYPTO | RTCRX509CERT_EKU_F_MS_WHQL_CRYPTO)))
|
---|
[51770] | 1088 | {
|
---|
[86610] | 1089 | rc = supHardNtViCertVerifyFindRootCert(g_hSpcRootStore, pSubject, pPublicKeyInfo);
|
---|
| 1090 | if (rc == VINF_SUCCESS)
|
---|
[51770] | 1091 | cFound++;
|
---|
| 1092 | }
|
---|
[86610] | 1093 | AssertRCBreak(rc);
|
---|
[51770] | 1094 | }
|
---|
| 1095 | }
|
---|
| 1096 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && cFound == 0)
|
---|
[86610] | 1097 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_VALID_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNATURE,
|
---|
| 1098 | "Signature #%u/%u: Not valid kernel code signature.",
|
---|
| 1099 | pNtViRdr->iCurSignature + 1, pNtViRdr->cTotalSignatures);
|
---|
| 1100 |
|
---|
| 1101 |
|
---|
[51818] | 1102 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && cValid < 2 && g_fHaveOtherRoots)
|
---|
[51770] | 1103 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_UNEXPECTED_VALID_PATH_COUNT,
|
---|
[86610] | 1104 | "Signature #%u/%u: Expected at least %u valid paths, not %u.",
|
---|
| 1105 | pNtViRdr->iCurSignature + 1, pNtViRdr->cTotalSignatures, 2, cValid);
|
---|
| 1106 | if (rc == VWRN_NOT_FOUND)
|
---|
| 1107 | rc = VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
[51770] | 1108 | }
|
---|
| 1109 | }
|
---|
| 1110 |
|
---|
| 1111 | /*
|
---|
| 1112 | * More requirements? NT5 build lab?
|
---|
| 1113 | */
|
---|
| 1114 |
|
---|
| 1115 | return rc;
|
---|
| 1116 | }
|
---|
| 1117 |
|
---|
| 1118 |
|
---|
[86549] | 1119 | /**
|
---|
| 1120 | * RTTimeNow equivaltent that handles ring-3 where we cannot use it.
|
---|
| 1121 | *
|
---|
| 1122 | * @returns pNow
|
---|
| 1123 | * @param pNow Where to return the current time.
|
---|
| 1124 | */
|
---|
| 1125 | static PRTTIMESPEC supHardNtTimeNow(PRTTIMESPEC pNow)
|
---|
[51770] | 1126 | {
|
---|
[86549] | 1127 | #ifdef IN_RING3
|
---|
| 1128 | /*
|
---|
| 1129 | * Just read system time.
|
---|
| 1130 | */
|
---|
| 1131 | KUSER_SHARED_DATA volatile *pUserSharedData = (KUSER_SHARED_DATA volatile *)MM_SHARED_USER_DATA_VA;
|
---|
| 1132 | # ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
|
---|
| 1133 | uint64_t uRet = *(uint64_t volatile *)&pUserSharedData->SystemTime; /* This is what KeQuerySystemTime does (missaligned). */
|
---|
| 1134 | return RTTimeSpecSetNtTime(pNow, uRet);
|
---|
| 1135 | # else
|
---|
[62677] | 1136 |
|
---|
[86549] | 1137 | LARGE_INTEGER NtTime;
|
---|
| 1138 | do
|
---|
| 1139 | {
|
---|
| 1140 | NtTime.HighPart = pUserSharedData->SystemTime.High1Time;
|
---|
| 1141 | NtTime.LowPart = pUserSharedData->SystemTime.LowPart;
|
---|
| 1142 | } while (pUserSharedData->SystemTime.High2Time != NtTime.HighPart);
|
---|
| 1143 | return RTTimeSpecSetNtTime(pNow, NtTime.QuadPart);
|
---|
| 1144 | # endif
|
---|
| 1145 | #else /* IN_RING0 */
|
---|
| 1146 | return RTTimeNow(pNow);
|
---|
| 1147 | #endif /* IN_RING0 */
|
---|
| 1148 | }
|
---|
| 1149 |
|
---|
| 1150 |
|
---|
| 1151 | /**
|
---|
| 1152 | * @callback_method_impl{FNRTLDRVALIDATESIGNEDDATA}
|
---|
| 1153 | */
|
---|
| 1154 | static DECLCALLBACK(int) supHardNtViCallback(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTLDRSIGNATUREINFO pInfo, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, void *pvUser)
|
---|
| 1155 | {
|
---|
| 1156 | RT_NOREF(hLdrMod);
|
---|
| 1157 |
|
---|
[51770] | 1158 | /*
|
---|
| 1159 | * Check out the input.
|
---|
| 1160 | */
|
---|
| 1161 | PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr = (PSUPHNTVIRDR)pvUser;
|
---|
| 1162 | Assert(pNtViRdr->Core.uMagic == RTLDRREADER_MAGIC);
|
---|
[86549] | 1163 | pNtViRdr->cTotalSignatures = pInfo->cSignatures;
|
---|
[86610] | 1164 | pNtViRdr->iCurSignature = pInfo->iSignature;
|
---|
[51770] | 1165 |
|
---|
[86549] | 1166 | AssertReturn(pInfo->enmType == RTLDRSIGNATURETYPE_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
|
---|
| 1167 | AssertReturn(!pInfo->pvExternalData, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
|
---|
| 1168 | AssertReturn(pInfo->cbSignature == sizeof(RTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO), VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
|
---|
| 1169 | PCRTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO pContentInfo = (PCRTCRPKCS7CONTENTINFO)pInfo->pvSignature;
|
---|
[51770] | 1170 | AssertReturn(RTCrPkcs7ContentInfo_IsSignedData(pContentInfo), VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
|
---|
| 1171 | AssertReturn(pContentInfo->u.pSignedData->SignerInfos.cItems == 1, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_5);
|
---|
[64883] | 1172 | PCRTCRPKCS7SIGNERINFO pSignerInfo = pContentInfo->u.pSignedData->SignerInfos.papItems[0];
|
---|
[51770] | 1173 |
|
---|
[74760] | 1174 |
|
---|
[51770] | 1175 | /*
|
---|
| 1176 | * If special certificate requirements, check them out before validating
|
---|
[86549] | 1177 | * the signature. These only apply to the first signature (for now).
|
---|
[51770] | 1178 | */
|
---|
[86549] | 1179 | if ( (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT)
|
---|
| 1180 | && pInfo->iSignature == 0)
|
---|
[51770] | 1181 | {
|
---|
| 1182 | if (!RTCrX509Certificate_MatchIssuerAndSerialNumber(&g_BuildX509Cert,
|
---|
| 1183 | &pSignerInfo->IssuerAndSerialNumber.Name,
|
---|
| 1184 | &pSignerInfo->IssuerAndSerialNumber.SerialNumber))
|
---|
[77820] | 1185 | return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_SIGNED_WITH_BUILD_CERT,
|
---|
[86610] | 1186 | "Signature #%u/%u: Not signed with the build certificate (serial %.*Rhxs, expected %.*Rhxs)",
|
---|
| 1187 | pInfo->iSignature + 1, pInfo->cSignatures,
|
---|
[77820] | 1188 | pSignerInfo->IssuerAndSerialNumber.SerialNumber.Asn1Core.cb,
|
---|
| 1189 | pSignerInfo->IssuerAndSerialNumber.SerialNumber.Asn1Core.uData.pv,
|
---|
| 1190 | g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.SerialNumber.Asn1Core.cb,
|
---|
| 1191 | g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.SerialNumber.Asn1Core.uData.pv);
|
---|
[51770] | 1192 | }
|
---|
| 1193 |
|
---|
| 1194 | /*
|
---|
[86549] | 1195 | * We instruction the verifier to use the signing time counter signature
|
---|
| 1196 | * when present, but provides the linker time then the current time as
|
---|
| 1197 | * fallbacks should the timestamp be missing or unusable.
|
---|
| 1198 | *
|
---|
| 1199 | * Update: Save the first timestamp we validate with build cert and
|
---|
| 1200 | * use this as a minimum timestamp for further build cert
|
---|
| 1201 | * validations. This works around issues with old DLLs that
|
---|
| 1202 | * we sign against with our certificate (crt, sdl, qt).
|
---|
| 1203 | *
|
---|
| 1204 | * Update: If the validation fails, retry with the current timestamp. This
|
---|
| 1205 | * is a workaround for NTDLL.DLL in build 14971 having a weird
|
---|
| 1206 | * timestamp: 0xDF1E957E (Sat Aug 14 14:05:18 2088).
|
---|
[51770] | 1207 | */
|
---|
[52537] | 1208 | uint32_t fFlags = RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_ALWAYS_USE_SIGNING_TIME_IF_PRESENT
|
---|
[52600] | 1209 | | RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_ALWAYS_USE_MS_TIMESTAMP_IF_PRESENT
|
---|
[52537] | 1210 | | RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_COUNTER_SIGNATURE_SIGNING_TIME_ONLY;
|
---|
[86549] | 1211 |
|
---|
| 1212 | /* In ring-0 we don't have all the necessary timestamp server root certificate
|
---|
| 1213 | * info, so we have to allow using counter signatures unverified there.
|
---|
| 1214 | * Ditto for the early period of ring-3 hardened stub execution. */
|
---|
[52541] | 1215 | #ifndef IN_RING0
|
---|
| 1216 | if (!g_fHaveOtherRoots)
|
---|
[52537] | 1217 | #endif
|
---|
[52600] | 1218 | fFlags |= RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_USE_SIGNING_TIME_UNVERIFIED | RTCRPKCS7VERIFY_SD_F_USE_MS_TIMESTAMP_UNVERIFIED;
|
---|
[51770] | 1219 |
|
---|
[86549] | 1220 | /* Fallback timestamps to try: */
|
---|
| 1221 | struct { RTTIMESPEC TimeSpec; const char *pszDesc; } aTimes[2];
|
---|
| 1222 | unsigned cTimes = 0;
|
---|
[51770] | 1223 |
|
---|
[86549] | 1224 | /* 1. The linking timestamp: */
|
---|
| 1225 | uint64_t uTimestamp = 0;
|
---|
| 1226 | int rc = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_TIMESTAMP_SECONDS, &uTimestamp, sizeof(uTimestamp));
|
---|
| 1227 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1228 | {
|
---|
| 1229 | #ifdef IN_RING3 /* Hack alert! (see above) */
|
---|
| 1230 | if ( (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNING)
|
---|
| 1231 | && (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE_ENFORCEMENT)
|
---|
| 1232 | && uTimestamp < g_uBuildTimestampHack)
|
---|
| 1233 | uTimestamp = g_uBuildTimestampHack;
|
---|
| 1234 | #endif
|
---|
| 1235 | RTTimeSpecSetSeconds(&aTimes[0].TimeSpec, uTimestamp);
|
---|
| 1236 | aTimes[0].pszDesc = "link";
|
---|
| 1237 | cTimes++;
|
---|
| 1238 | }
|
---|
| 1239 | else
|
---|
| 1240 | SUP_DPRINTF(("RTLdrQueryProp/RTLDRPROP_TIMESTAMP_SECONDS failed on %s: %Rrc", pNtViRdr->szFilename, rc));
|
---|
[64731] | 1241 |
|
---|
[86549] | 1242 | /* 2. Current time. */
|
---|
| 1243 | supHardNtTimeNow(&aTimes[cTimes].TimeSpec);
|
---|
| 1244 | aTimes[cTimes].pszDesc = "now";
|
---|
| 1245 | cTimes++;
|
---|
| 1246 |
|
---|
| 1247 | /* Make the verfication attempts. */
|
---|
| 1248 | for (unsigned i = 0; ; i++)
|
---|
[64731] | 1249 | {
|
---|
[86549] | 1250 | Assert(i < cTimes);
|
---|
| 1251 | rc = RTCrPkcs7VerifySignedData(pContentInfo, fFlags, g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore, g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore,
|
---|
| 1252 | &aTimes[i].TimeSpec, supHardNtViCertVerifyCallback, pNtViRdr, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 1253 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1254 | {
|
---|
| 1255 | if (rc != VINF_SUCCESS)
|
---|
| 1256 | {
|
---|
[86610] | 1257 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: Signature #%u/%u: info status: %d\n", pNtViRdr->szFilename, pInfo->iSignature + 1, pInfo->cSignatures, rc));
|
---|
[86549] | 1258 | if (pNtViRdr->rcLastSignatureFailure == VINF_SUCCESS)
|
---|
| 1259 | pNtViRdr->rcLastSignatureFailure = rc;
|
---|
| 1260 | }
|
---|
| 1261 | pNtViRdr->cOkaySignatures++;
|
---|
| 1262 |
|
---|
| 1263 | #ifdef IN_RING3 /* Hack alert! (see above) */
|
---|
| 1264 | if ((pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT) && g_uBuildTimestampHack == 0 && cTimes > 1)
|
---|
| 1265 | g_uBuildTimestampHack = uTimestamp;
|
---|
| 1266 | #endif
|
---|
| 1267 | return VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 1268 | }
|
---|
| 1269 |
|
---|
| 1270 | if (rc == VERR_CR_X509_CPV_NOT_VALID_AT_TIME && i + 1 < cTimes)
|
---|
| 1271 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: Signature #%u/%u: VERR_CR_X509_CPV_NOT_VALID_AT_TIME for %#RX64; retrying against current time: %#RX64.\n",
|
---|
[86610] | 1272 | pNtViRdr->szFilename, pInfo->iSignature + 1, pInfo->cSignatures,
|
---|
[86549] | 1273 | RTTimeSpecGetSeconds(&aTimes[0].TimeSpec), RTTimeSpecGetSeconds(&aTimes[1].TimeSpec)));
|
---|
| 1274 | else
|
---|
| 1275 | {
|
---|
| 1276 | /* There are a couple of failures we can tollerate if there are more than
|
---|
| 1277 | one signature and one of them works out fine. The RTLdrVerifySignature
|
---|
| 1278 | caller will have to check the failure counts though to make sure
|
---|
[90150] | 1279 | something succeeded.
|
---|
| 1280 |
|
---|
| 1281 | VERR_CR_PKCS7_KEY_USAGE_MISMATCH: Nvidia 391.35 nvldumpx.dll has an misconfigured
|
---|
| 1282 | certificate "CN=NVIDIA Corporation PE Sign v2016" without valid Key Usage. It is
|
---|
| 1283 | rooted by "CN=NVIDIA Subordinate CA 2016 v2,DC=nvidia,DC=com", so homebrewn.
|
---|
| 1284 | Sysinternals' sigcheck util ignores it, while MS sigtool doesn't trust the root.
|
---|
| 1285 | It's possible we're being too strict, but well, it's the only case so far, so no
|
---|
| 1286 | need to relax the Key Usage restrictions just for a certificate w/o a trusted root.
|
---|
[91984] | 1287 |
|
---|
| 1288 | VERR_CR_X509_CPV_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION: Intel 27.20.100.9126 igdumdim64.dll
|
---|
| 1289 | has three signatures, the first is signed with a certificate (C=US,ST=CA,
|
---|
| 1290 | L=Santa Clara,O=Intel Corporation,CN=IntelGraphicsPE2021) that has a critical
|
---|
| 1291 | subject key identifier. This used to trip up the path validator. However, the
|
---|
| 1292 | other two signatures are from microsoft and checks out fine. So, in future
|
---|
| 1293 | situations like this it would be nice to simply continue with the next signature.
|
---|
| 1294 | See bugref{10130} for details.
|
---|
| 1295 |
|
---|
| 1296 | VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_VALID_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNATURE: Is related to the above intel problem,
|
---|
| 1297 | but this is what we get if suppressing the unknown critical subjectKeyIdentifier
|
---|
| 1298 | in IPRT. We don't need all signatures to be valid kernel signatures, we should be
|
---|
| 1299 | happy with just one and ignore any additional signatures as long as they don't look
|
---|
| 1300 | like they've been compromised. Thus continue with this status too. */
|
---|
[86549] | 1301 | pNtViRdr->rcLastSignatureFailure = rc;
|
---|
| 1302 | if ( rc == VERR_CR_X509_CPV_NOT_VALID_AT_TIME
|
---|
[90150] | 1303 | || rc == VERR_CR_X509_CPV_NO_TRUSTED_PATHS
|
---|
[91984] | 1304 | || rc == VERR_CR_PKCS7_KEY_USAGE_MISMATCH
|
---|
| 1305 | || rc == VERR_CR_X509_CPV_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
|
---|
| 1306 | || rc == VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_VALID_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNATURE)
|
---|
[86549] | 1307 | {
|
---|
[86610] | 1308 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: Signature #%u/%u: %s (%d) w/ timestamp=%#RX64/%s.\n", pNtViRdr->szFilename, pInfo->iSignature + 1, pInfo->cSignatures,
|
---|
[91984] | 1309 | rc == VERR_CR_X509_CPV_NOT_VALID_AT_TIME ? "VERR_CR_X509_CPV_NOT_VALID_AT_TIME"
|
---|
| 1310 | : rc == VERR_CR_X509_CPV_NO_TRUSTED_PATHS ? "VERR_CR_X509_CPV_NO_TRUSTED_PATHS"
|
---|
| 1311 | : rc == VERR_CR_PKCS7_KEY_USAGE_MISMATCH ? "VERR_CR_PKCS7_KEY_USAGE_MISMATCH"
|
---|
| 1312 | : rc == VERR_CR_X509_CPV_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION ? "VERR_CR_X509_CPV_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION"
|
---|
| 1313 | : "VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_VALID_KERNEL_CODE_SIGNATURE",
|
---|
| 1314 | rc, RTTimeSpecGetSeconds(&aTimes[i].TimeSpec), aTimes[i].pszDesc));
|
---|
[86549] | 1315 |
|
---|
| 1316 | /* This leniency is not applicable to build certificate requirements (signature #1 only). */
|
---|
| 1317 | if ( !(pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_BUILD_CERT)
|
---|
| 1318 | || pInfo->iSignature != 0)
|
---|
| 1319 | {
|
---|
| 1320 | pNtViRdr->cNokSignatures++;
|
---|
| 1321 | rc = VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 1322 | }
|
---|
| 1323 | }
|
---|
| 1324 | else
|
---|
[86610] | 1325 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: Signature #%u/%u: %Rrc w/ timestamp=%#RX64/%s.\n", pNtViRdr->szFilename, pInfo->iSignature + 1, pInfo->cSignatures,
|
---|
[86549] | 1326 | rc, RTTimeSpecGetSeconds(&aTimes[i].TimeSpec), aTimes[i].pszDesc));
|
---|
| 1327 | return rc;
|
---|
| 1328 | }
|
---|
| 1329 | }
|
---|
[64731] | 1330 | }
|
---|
| 1331 |
|
---|
| 1332 |
|
---|
| 1333 | /**
|
---|
[52204] | 1334 | * Verifies the given loader image.
|
---|
| 1335 | *
|
---|
| 1336 | * @returns IPRT status code.
|
---|
[52403] | 1337 | * @param hLdrMod File handle to the executable file.
|
---|
| 1338 | * @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
|
---|
| 1339 | * dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
|
---|
| 1340 | * error/logging.
|
---|
| 1341 | * @param pNtViRdr The reader instance /w flags.
|
---|
[52634] | 1342 | * @param fAvoidWinVerifyTrust Whether to avoid WinVerifyTrust because of
|
---|
| 1343 | * deadlock or other loader related dangers.
|
---|
[52403] | 1344 | * @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was used.
|
---|
| 1345 | * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
|
---|
[52204] | 1346 | */
|
---|
[85127] | 1347 | DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod(RTLDRMOD hLdrMod, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr,
|
---|
| 1348 | bool fAvoidWinVerifyTrust, bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
|
---|
[52204] | 1349 | {
|
---|
[52403] | 1350 | if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
|
---|
| 1351 | *pfWinVerifyTrust = false;
|
---|
| 1352 |
|
---|
[52204] | 1353 | #ifdef IN_RING3
|
---|
| 1354 | /* Check that the caller has performed the necessary library initialization. */
|
---|
| 1355 | if (!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert))
|
---|
| 1356 | return RTErrInfoSet(pErrInfo, VERR_WRONG_ORDER,
|
---|
| 1357 | "supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier was not called.");
|
---|
| 1358 | #endif
|
---|
| 1359 |
|
---|
| 1360 | /*
|
---|
[52365] | 1361 | * Check the trusted installer bit first, if requested as it's somewhat
|
---|
[52484] | 1362 | * cheaper than the rest.
|
---|
| 1363 | *
|
---|
[52690] | 1364 | * We relax this for system32 and a little for WinSxS, like we used to, as
|
---|
| 1365 | * there are apparently some systems out there where the user, admin, or
|
---|
| 1366 | * someone has changed the ownership of core windows DLLs like user32.dll
|
---|
| 1367 | * and comctl32.dll. Since we need user32.dll and will be checking it's
|
---|
| 1368 | * digital signature, it's reasonably safe to let this thru. (The report
|
---|
| 1369 | * was of SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS
|
---|
[52482] | 1370 | * owning user32.dll, see public ticket 13187, VBoxStartup.3.log.)
|
---|
[52484] | 1371 | *
|
---|
| 1372 | * We've also had problems with graphics driver components like ig75icd64.dll
|
---|
| 1373 | * and atig6pxx.dll not being owned by TrustedInstaller, with the result
|
---|
| 1374 | * that 3D got broken (mod by zero issue in test build 5). These were also
|
---|
| 1375 | * SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS.
|
---|
[52690] | 1376 | *
|
---|
| 1377 | * In one report by 'thor' the WinSxS resident comctl32.dll was owned by
|
---|
| 1378 | * SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS (with 4.3.16).
|
---|
[52365] | 1379 | */
|
---|
[58157] | 1380 | /** @todo Since we're now allowing Builtin\\Administrators after all, perhaps we
|
---|
[52907] | 1381 | * could drop these system32 + winsxs hacks?? */
|
---|
[104384] | 1382 | if ( (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_OR_SIMILAR_OWNER)
|
---|
[52482] | 1383 | && !supHardNtViCheckIsOwnedByTrustedInstallerOrSimilar(pNtViRdr->hFile, pwszName))
|
---|
[52453] | 1384 | {
|
---|
[52690] | 1385 | if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName),
|
---|
| 1386 | g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR),
|
---|
| 1387 | true /*fCheckSlash*/))
|
---|
| 1388 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Relaxing the TrustedInstaller requirement for this DLL (it's in system32).\n", pwszName));
|
---|
| 1389 | else if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName),
|
---|
| 1390 | g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR),
|
---|
| 1391 | true /*fCheckSlash*/))
|
---|
| 1392 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%ls: Relaxing the TrustedInstaller requirement for this DLL (it's in WinSxS).\n", pwszName));
|
---|
| 1393 | else
|
---|
[52453] | 1394 | return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_NOT_OWNED_BY_TRUSTED_INSTALLER,
|
---|
| 1395 | "supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: TrustedInstaller is not the owner of '%ls'.", pwszName);
|
---|
| 1396 | }
|
---|
[52365] | 1397 |
|
---|
| 1398 | /*
|
---|
[52204] | 1399 | * Verify it.
|
---|
| 1400 | *
|
---|
| 1401 | * The PKCS #7 SignedData signature is checked in the callback. Any
|
---|
| 1402 | * signing certificate restrictions are also enforced there.
|
---|
| 1403 | */
|
---|
[86549] | 1404 | pNtViRdr->cOkaySignatures = 0;
|
---|
| 1405 | pNtViRdr->cNokSignatures = 0;
|
---|
| 1406 | pNtViRdr->cTotalSignatures = 0;
|
---|
| 1407 | pNtViRdr->rcLastSignatureFailure = VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 1408 | int rc = RTLdrVerifySignature(hLdrMod, supHardNtViCallback, pNtViRdr, pErrInfo);
|
---|
[52204] | 1409 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1410 | {
|
---|
[86549] | 1411 | Assert(pNtViRdr->cOkaySignatures + pNtViRdr->cNokSignatures == pNtViRdr->cTotalSignatures);
|
---|
| 1412 | if ( !pNtViRdr->cOkaySignatures
|
---|
| 1413 | || pNtViRdr->cOkaySignatures + pNtViRdr->cNokSignatures < pNtViRdr->cTotalSignatures /* paranoia */)
|
---|
[64731] | 1414 | {
|
---|
[86549] | 1415 | rc = pNtViRdr->rcLastSignatureFailure;
|
---|
| 1416 | AssertStmt(RT_FAILURE_NP(rc), rc = VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_3);
|
---|
[64731] | 1417 | }
|
---|
[86549] | 1418 | else if (rc == VINF_SUCCESS && RT_SUCCESS(pNtViRdr->rcLastSignatureFailure))
|
---|
| 1419 | rc = pNtViRdr->rcLastSignatureFailure;
|
---|
| 1420 | }
|
---|
[64731] | 1421 |
|
---|
[86549] | 1422 | /*
|
---|
| 1423 | * Microsoft doesn't sign a whole bunch of DLLs, so we have to
|
---|
| 1424 | * ASSUME that a bunch of system DLLs are fine.
|
---|
| 1425 | */
|
---|
| 1426 | if (rc == VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
|
---|
| 1427 | rc = supHardNtViCheckIfNotSignedOk(hLdrMod, pwszName, pNtViRdr->fFlags, pNtViRdr->hFile, rc);
|
---|
| 1428 | if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
|
---|
| 1429 | RTErrInfoAddF(pErrInfo, rc, ": %ls", pwszName);
|
---|
[52204] | 1430 |
|
---|
[86549] | 1431 | /*
|
---|
| 1432 | * Check for the signature checking enforcement, if requested to do so.
|
---|
| 1433 | */
|
---|
| 1434 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc) && (pNtViRdr->fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_REQUIRE_SIGNATURE_ENFORCEMENT))
|
---|
| 1435 | {
|
---|
| 1436 | bool fEnforced = false;
|
---|
| 1437 | int rc2 = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_ENFORCED, &fEnforced, sizeof(fEnforced));
|
---|
| 1438 | if (RT_FAILURE(rc2))
|
---|
| 1439 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc2, "Querying RTLDRPROP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_ENFORCED failed on %ls: %Rrc.",
|
---|
| 1440 | pwszName, rc2);
|
---|
| 1441 | else if (!fEnforced)
|
---|
| 1442 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SIGNATURE_CHECKS_NOT_ENFORCED,
|
---|
| 1443 | "The image '%ls' was not linked with /IntegrityCheck.", pwszName);
|
---|
[52204] | 1444 | }
|
---|
| 1445 |
|
---|
| 1446 | #ifdef IN_RING3
|
---|
[52406] | 1447 | /*
|
---|
| 1448 | * Pass it thru WinVerifyTrust when possible.
|
---|
| 1449 | */
|
---|
[52634] | 1450 | if (!fAvoidWinVerifyTrust)
|
---|
| 1451 | rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageTrust(pNtViRdr->hFile, pwszName, pNtViRdr->fFlags, rc, pfWinVerifyTrust, pErrInfo);
|
---|
[62677] | 1452 | #else
|
---|
| 1453 | RT_NOREF1(fAvoidWinVerifyTrust);
|
---|
[52406] | 1454 | #endif
|
---|
[52356] | 1455 |
|
---|
[66525] | 1456 | /*
|
---|
| 1457 | * Check for blacklisted DLLs, both internal name and filename.
|
---|
| 1458 | */
|
---|
| 1459 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1460 | {
|
---|
| 1461 | size_t const cwcName = RTUtf16Len(pwszName);
|
---|
| 1462 | char szIntName[64];
|
---|
| 1463 | int rc2 = RTLdrQueryProp(hLdrMod, RTLDRPROP_INTERNAL_NAME, szIntName, sizeof(szIntName));
|
---|
| 1464 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc2))
|
---|
| 1465 | {
|
---|
| 1466 | size_t const cchIntName = strlen(szIntName);
|
---|
| 1467 | for (unsigned i = 0; g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].psz != NULL; i++)
|
---|
| 1468 | if ( cchIntName == g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].cch
|
---|
| 1469 | && RTStrICmpAscii(szIntName, g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].psz) == 0)
|
---|
| 1470 | {
|
---|
| 1471 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_UNDESIRABLE_MODULE,
|
---|
| 1472 | "The image '%ls' is listed as undesirable.", pwszName);
|
---|
| 1473 | break;
|
---|
| 1474 | }
|
---|
| 1475 | }
|
---|
| 1476 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1477 | {
|
---|
| 1478 | for (unsigned i = 0; g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].psz != NULL; i++)
|
---|
| 1479 | if (cwcName >= g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].cch)
|
---|
| 1480 | {
|
---|
| 1481 | PCRTUTF16 pwszTmp = &pwszName[cwcName - g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].cch];
|
---|
| 1482 | if ( ( cwcName == g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].cch
|
---|
| 1483 | || pwszTmp[-1] == '\\'
|
---|
| 1484 | || pwszTmp[-1] == '/')
|
---|
| 1485 | && RTUtf16ICmpAscii(pwszTmp, g_aSupNtViBlacklistedDlls[i].psz) == 0)
|
---|
| 1486 | {
|
---|
| 1487 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_UNDESIRABLE_MODULE,
|
---|
| 1488 | "The image '%ls' is listed as undesirable.", pwszName);
|
---|
| 1489 | break;
|
---|
| 1490 | }
|
---|
| 1491 | }
|
---|
| 1492 | }
|
---|
| 1493 | }
|
---|
| 1494 |
|
---|
[52403] | 1495 | #ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
|
---|
| 1496 | /*
|
---|
| 1497 | * Hook for the LdrLoadDll code to schedule scanning of imports.
|
---|
| 1498 | */
|
---|
| 1499 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1500 | supR3HardenedWinVerifyCacheScheduleImports(hLdrMod, pwszName);
|
---|
| 1501 | #endif
|
---|
| 1502 |
|
---|
[52356] | 1503 | return rc;
|
---|
[52204] | 1504 | }
|
---|
| 1505 |
|
---|
| 1506 |
|
---|
| 1507 | /**
|
---|
[51770] | 1508 | * Verifies the given executable image.
|
---|
| 1509 | *
|
---|
| 1510 | * @returns IPRT status code.
|
---|
[52403] | 1511 | * @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
|
---|
| 1512 | * @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
|
---|
| 1513 | * dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
|
---|
| 1514 | * error/logging.
|
---|
| 1515 | * @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
|
---|
[52634] | 1516 | * @param fAvoidWinVerifyTrust Whether to avoid WinVerifyTrust because of
|
---|
| 1517 | * deadlock or other loader related dangers.
|
---|
[52403] | 1518 | * @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was used.
|
---|
| 1519 | * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
|
---|
[51770] | 1520 | */
|
---|
[85127] | 1521 | DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags,
|
---|
| 1522 | bool fAvoidWinVerifyTrust, bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
|
---|
[51770] | 1523 | {
|
---|
| 1524 | /*
|
---|
| 1525 | * Create a reader instance.
|
---|
| 1526 | */
|
---|
| 1527 | PSUPHNTVIRDR pNtViRdr;
|
---|
| 1528 | int rc = supHardNtViRdrCreate(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, &pNtViRdr);
|
---|
| 1529 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1530 | {
|
---|
| 1531 | /*
|
---|
| 1532 | * Open the image.
|
---|
| 1533 | */
|
---|
[53820] | 1534 | RTLDRMOD hLdrMod;
|
---|
| 1535 | RTLDRARCH enmArch = fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_RC_IMAGE ? RTLDRARCH_X86_32 : RTLDRARCH_HOST;
|
---|
| 1536 | uint32_t fLdrFlags = RTLDR_O_FOR_VALIDATION | RTLDR_O_IGNORE_ARCH_IF_NO_CODE;
|
---|
[53220] | 1537 | if (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_IGNORE_ARCHITECTURE)
|
---|
[53820] | 1538 | fLdrFlags |= RTLDR_O_IGNORE_ARCH_IF_NO_CODE;
|
---|
| 1539 | rc = RTLdrOpenWithReader(&pNtViRdr->Core, fLdrFlags, enmArch, &hLdrMod, pErrInfo);
|
---|
[51770] | 1540 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1541 | {
|
---|
| 1542 | /*
|
---|
| 1543 | * Verify it.
|
---|
| 1544 | */
|
---|
[52634] | 1545 | rc = supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod(hLdrMod, pwszName, pNtViRdr, fAvoidWinVerifyTrust, pfWinVerifyTrust, pErrInfo);
|
---|
[52204] | 1546 | int rc2 = RTLdrClose(hLdrMod); AssertRC(rc2);
|
---|
[51770] | 1547 | }
|
---|
| 1548 | else
|
---|
| 1549 | supHardNtViRdrDestroy(&pNtViRdr->Core);
|
---|
| 1550 | }
|
---|
[52403] | 1551 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle: -> %d (%ls)%s\n",
|
---|
[57165] | 1552 | rc, pwszName, pfWinVerifyTrust && *pfWinVerifyTrust ? " WinVerifyTrust" : ""));
|
---|
[51770] | 1553 | return rc;
|
---|
| 1554 | }
|
---|
| 1555 |
|
---|
| 1556 |
|
---|
| 1557 | #ifdef IN_RING3
|
---|
| 1558 | /**
|
---|
| 1559 | * supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle version without the name.
|
---|
| 1560 | *
|
---|
| 1561 | * The name is derived from the handle.
|
---|
| 1562 | *
|
---|
| 1563 | * @returns IPRT status code.
|
---|
| 1564 | * @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
|
---|
| 1565 | * @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
|
---|
| 1566 | * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
|
---|
| 1567 | */
|
---|
[85127] | 1568 | DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandleNoName(HANDLE hFile, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
|
---|
[51770] | 1569 | {
|
---|
| 1570 | /*
|
---|
| 1571 | * Determine the NT name and call the verification function.
|
---|
| 1572 | */
|
---|
| 1573 | union
|
---|
| 1574 | {
|
---|
| 1575 | UNICODE_STRING UniStr;
|
---|
| 1576 | uint8_t abBuffer[(MAX_PATH + 8 + 1) * 2];
|
---|
| 1577 | } uBuf;
|
---|
| 1578 |
|
---|
| 1579 | ULONG cbIgn;
|
---|
| 1580 | NTSTATUS rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile,
|
---|
| 1581 | ObjectNameInformation,
|
---|
| 1582 | &uBuf,
|
---|
| 1583 | sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(WCHAR),
|
---|
| 1584 | &cbIgn);
|
---|
| 1585 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1586 | uBuf.UniStr.Buffer[uBuf.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
|
---|
| 1587 | else
|
---|
| 1588 | uBuf.UniStr.Buffer = (WCHAR *)L"TODO3";
|
---|
| 1589 |
|
---|
[52634] | 1590 | return supHardenedWinVerifyImageByHandle(hFile, uBuf.UniStr.Buffer, fFlags, false /*fAvoidWinVerifyTrust*/,
|
---|
| 1591 | NULL /*pfWinVerifyTrust*/, pErrInfo);
|
---|
[51770] | 1592 | }
|
---|
| 1593 | #endif /* IN_RING3 */
|
---|
| 1594 |
|
---|
| 1595 |
|
---|
| 1596 | /**
|
---|
| 1597 | * Retrieves the full official path to the system root or one of it's sub
|
---|
| 1598 | * directories.
|
---|
| 1599 | *
|
---|
| 1600 | * This code is also used by the support driver.
|
---|
| 1601 | *
|
---|
| 1602 | * @returns VBox status code.
|
---|
| 1603 | * @param pvBuf The output buffer. This will contain a
|
---|
| 1604 | * UNICODE_STRING followed (at the kernel's
|
---|
| 1605 | * discretion) the string buffer.
|
---|
| 1606 | * @param cbBuf The size of the buffer @a pvBuf points to.
|
---|
| 1607 | * @param enmDir Which directory under the system root we're
|
---|
| 1608 | * interested in.
|
---|
| 1609 | * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
|
---|
| 1610 | */
|
---|
[85127] | 1611 | DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(void *pvBuf, uint32_t cbBuf, SUPHARDNTSYSROOTDIR enmDir, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
|
---|
[51770] | 1612 | {
|
---|
| 1613 | HANDLE hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
|
---|
| 1614 | IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
|
---|
| 1615 |
|
---|
| 1616 | UNICODE_STRING NtName;
|
---|
| 1617 | switch (enmDir)
|
---|
| 1618 | {
|
---|
| 1619 | case kSupHardNtSysRootDir_System32:
|
---|
| 1620 | {
|
---|
| 1621 | static const WCHAR s_wszNameSystem32[] = L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\";
|
---|
| 1622 | NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)s_wszNameSystem32;
|
---|
| 1623 | NtName.Length = sizeof(s_wszNameSystem32) - sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
| 1624 | NtName.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_wszNameSystem32);
|
---|
| 1625 | break;
|
---|
| 1626 | }
|
---|
| 1627 | case kSupHardNtSysRootDir_WinSxS:
|
---|
| 1628 | {
|
---|
| 1629 | static const WCHAR s_wszNameWinSxS[] = L"\\SystemRoot\\WinSxS\\";
|
---|
| 1630 | NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)s_wszNameWinSxS;
|
---|
| 1631 | NtName.Length = sizeof(s_wszNameWinSxS) - sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
| 1632 | NtName.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_wszNameWinSxS);
|
---|
| 1633 | break;
|
---|
| 1634 | }
|
---|
| 1635 | default:
|
---|
| 1636 | AssertFailed();
|
---|
| 1637 | return VERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
---|
| 1638 | }
|
---|
| 1639 |
|
---|
| 1640 | OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
|
---|
| 1641 | InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/);
|
---|
| 1642 |
|
---|
| 1643 | NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile,
|
---|
| 1644 | FILE_READ_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE,
|
---|
| 1645 | &ObjAttr,
|
---|
| 1646 | &Ios,
|
---|
| 1647 | NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
|
---|
| 1648 | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
|
---|
| 1649 | FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
|
---|
| 1650 | FILE_OPEN,
|
---|
| 1651 | FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
|
---|
| 1652 | NULL /*EaBuffer*/,
|
---|
| 1653 | 0 /*EaLength*/);
|
---|
| 1654 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1655 | rcNt = Ios.Status;
|
---|
| 1656 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1657 | {
|
---|
| 1658 | ULONG cbIgn;
|
---|
| 1659 | rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile,
|
---|
| 1660 | ObjectNameInformation,
|
---|
| 1661 | pvBuf,
|
---|
| 1662 | cbBuf - sizeof(WCHAR),
|
---|
| 1663 | &cbIgn);
|
---|
| 1664 | NtClose(hFile);
|
---|
| 1665 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1666 | {
|
---|
| 1667 | PUNICODE_STRING pUniStr = (PUNICODE_STRING)pvBuf;
|
---|
| 1668 | if (pUniStr->Length > 0)
|
---|
| 1669 | {
|
---|
| 1670 | /* Make sure it's terminated so it can safely be printed.*/
|
---|
| 1671 | pUniStr->Buffer[pUniStr->Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
|
---|
| 1672 | return VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 1673 | }
|
---|
| 1674 |
|
---|
| 1675 | return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH,
|
---|
| 1676 | "NtQueryObject returned an empty path for '%ls'", NtName.Buffer);
|
---|
| 1677 | }
|
---|
| 1678 | return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH, "NtQueryObject failed on '%ls' dir: %#x", NtName.Buffer, rcNt);
|
---|
| 1679 | }
|
---|
| 1680 | return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_SYSTEM32_PATH, "Failure to open '%ls': %#x", NtName.Buffer, rcNt);
|
---|
| 1681 | }
|
---|
| 1682 |
|
---|
| 1683 |
|
---|
| 1684 | /**
|
---|
| 1685 | * Initialize one certificate entry.
|
---|
| 1686 | *
|
---|
| 1687 | * @returns VBox status code.
|
---|
| 1688 | * @param pCert The X.509 certificate representation to init.
|
---|
| 1689 | * @param pabCert The raw DER encoded certificate.
|
---|
| 1690 | * @param cbCert The size of the raw certificate.
|
---|
| 1691 | * @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
|
---|
| 1692 | * @param pszErrorTag Error tag.
|
---|
| 1693 | */
|
---|
| 1694 | static int supHardNtViCertInit(PRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert, unsigned char const *pabCert, unsigned cbCert,
|
---|
| 1695 | PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, const char *pszErrorTag)
|
---|
| 1696 | {
|
---|
| 1697 | AssertReturn(cbCert > 16 && cbCert < _128K,
|
---|
| 1698 | RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_INTERNAL_ERROR_3, "%s: cbCert=%#x out of range", pszErrorTag, cbCert));
|
---|
| 1699 | AssertReturn(!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(pCert),
|
---|
| 1700 | RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_WRONG_ORDER, "%s: Certificate already decoded?", pszErrorTag));
|
---|
| 1701 |
|
---|
| 1702 | RTASN1CURSORPRIMARY PrimaryCursor;
|
---|
| 1703 | RTAsn1CursorInitPrimary(&PrimaryCursor, pabCert, cbCert, pErrInfo, &g_RTAsn1DefaultAllocator, RTASN1CURSOR_FLAGS_DER, NULL);
|
---|
| 1704 | int rc = RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1(&PrimaryCursor.Cursor, 0, pCert, pszErrorTag);
|
---|
| 1705 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1706 | rc = RTCrX509Certificate_CheckSanity(pCert, 0, pErrInfo, pszErrorTag);
|
---|
| 1707 | return rc;
|
---|
| 1708 | }
|
---|
| 1709 |
|
---|
| 1710 |
|
---|
| 1711 | static int supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(RTCRSTORE hStore, PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts, unsigned cCerts, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
|
---|
| 1712 | {
|
---|
| 1713 | for (uint32_t i = 0; i < cCerts; i++)
|
---|
| 1714 | {
|
---|
| 1715 | int rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(hStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_TAF_DER, paCerts[i].pch, paCerts[i].cb, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 1716 | if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
|
---|
| 1717 | return rc;
|
---|
| 1718 | }
|
---|
| 1719 | return VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 1720 | }
|
---|
| 1721 |
|
---|
| 1722 |
|
---|
| 1723 | /**
|
---|
| 1724 | * Initialize a certificate table.
|
---|
| 1725 | *
|
---|
| 1726 | * @param phStore Where to return the store pointer.
|
---|
| 1727 | * @param paCerts1 Pointer to the first certificate table.
|
---|
| 1728 | * @param cCerts1 Entries in the first certificate table.
|
---|
| 1729 | * @param paCerts2 Pointer to the second certificate table.
|
---|
| 1730 | * @param cCerts2 Entries in the second certificate table.
|
---|
| 1731 | * @param paCerts3 Pointer to the third certificate table.
|
---|
| 1732 | * @param cCerts3 Entries in the third certificate table.
|
---|
| 1733 | * @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
|
---|
| 1734 | * @param pszErrorTag Error tag.
|
---|
| 1735 | */
|
---|
| 1736 | static int supHardNtViCertStoreInit(PRTCRSTORE phStore,
|
---|
| 1737 | PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts1, unsigned cCerts1,
|
---|
| 1738 | PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts2, unsigned cCerts2,
|
---|
| 1739 | PCSUPTAENTRY paCerts3, unsigned cCerts3,
|
---|
| 1740 | PRTERRINFO pErrInfo, const char *pszErrorTag)
|
---|
| 1741 | {
|
---|
| 1742 | AssertReturn(*phStore == NIL_RTCRSTORE, VERR_WRONG_ORDER);
|
---|
[62677] | 1743 | RT_NOREF1(pszErrorTag);
|
---|
[51770] | 1744 |
|
---|
| 1745 | int rc = RTCrStoreCreateInMem(phStore, cCerts1 + cCerts2);
|
---|
| 1746 | if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
|
---|
| 1747 | return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "RTCrStoreCreateMemoryStore failed: %Rrc", rc);
|
---|
| 1748 |
|
---|
| 1749 | rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts1, cCerts1, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 1750 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1751 | rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts2, cCerts2, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 1752 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1753 | rc = supHardNtViCertStoreAddArray(*phStore, paCerts3, cCerts3, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 1754 | return rc;
|
---|
| 1755 | }
|
---|
| 1756 |
|
---|
| 1757 |
|
---|
[52943] | 1758 | #if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
|
---|
[51770] | 1759 | /**
|
---|
[52365] | 1760 | * Initializes the windows paths.
|
---|
| 1761 | */
|
---|
| 1762 | static void supHardenedWinInitImageVerifierWinPaths(void)
|
---|
| 1763 | {
|
---|
| 1764 | /*
|
---|
| 1765 | * Windows paths that we're interested in.
|
---|
| 1766 | */
|
---|
| 1767 | static const struct
|
---|
| 1768 | {
|
---|
| 1769 | SUPSYSROOTDIRBUF *pNtPath;
|
---|
| 1770 | WCHAR const *pwszRegValue;
|
---|
| 1771 | const char *pszLogName;
|
---|
| 1772 | } s_aPaths[] =
|
---|
| 1773 | {
|
---|
| 1774 | { &g_ProgramFilesNtPath, L"ProgramFilesDir", "ProgDir" },
|
---|
| 1775 | { &g_CommonFilesNtPath, L"CommonFilesDir", "ComDir" },
|
---|
| 1776 | # ifdef RT_ARCH_AMD64
|
---|
| 1777 | { &g_ProgramFilesX86NtPath, L"ProgramFilesDir (x86)", "ProgDir32" },
|
---|
| 1778 | { &g_CommonFilesX86NtPath, L"CommonFilesDir (x86)", "ComDir32" },
|
---|
| 1779 | # endif
|
---|
| 1780 | };
|
---|
| 1781 |
|
---|
| 1782 | /*
|
---|
| 1783 | * Open the registry key containing the paths.
|
---|
| 1784 | */
|
---|
| 1785 | UNICODE_STRING NtName = RTNT_CONSTANT_UNISTR(L"\\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion");
|
---|
| 1786 | OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
|
---|
| 1787 | InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/);
|
---|
| 1788 | HANDLE hKey;
|
---|
| 1789 | NTSTATUS rcNt = NtOpenKey(&hKey, KEY_QUERY_VALUE, &ObjAttr);
|
---|
| 1790 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1791 | {
|
---|
| 1792 | /*
|
---|
| 1793 | * Loop over the paths and resolve their NT paths.
|
---|
| 1794 | */
|
---|
| 1795 | for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPaths); i++)
|
---|
| 1796 | {
|
---|
| 1797 | /*
|
---|
| 1798 | * Query the value first.
|
---|
| 1799 | */
|
---|
| 1800 | UNICODE_STRING ValueName;
|
---|
| 1801 | ValueName.Buffer = (WCHAR *)s_aPaths[i].pwszRegValue;
|
---|
| 1802 | ValueName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(s_aPaths[i].pwszRegValue) * sizeof(WCHAR));
|
---|
| 1803 | ValueName.MaximumLength = ValueName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
| 1804 |
|
---|
| 1805 | union
|
---|
| 1806 | {
|
---|
| 1807 | KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION PartialInfo;
|
---|
| 1808 | uint8_t abPadding[sizeof(KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION) + sizeof(WCHAR) * 128];
|
---|
| 1809 | uint64_t uAlign;
|
---|
| 1810 | } uBuf;
|
---|
| 1811 |
|
---|
| 1812 | ULONG cbActual = 0;
|
---|
| 1813 | rcNt = NtQueryValueKey(hKey, &ValueName, KeyValuePartialInformation, &uBuf, sizeof(uBuf) - sizeof(WCHAR), &cbActual);
|
---|
| 1814 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1815 | {
|
---|
| 1816 | /*
|
---|
| 1817 | * Must be a simple string value, terminate it.
|
---|
| 1818 | */
|
---|
| 1819 | if ( uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_EXPAND_SZ
|
---|
| 1820 | || uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_SZ)
|
---|
| 1821 | {
|
---|
| 1822 | /*
|
---|
| 1823 | * Expand any environment variable references before opening it.
|
---|
| 1824 | * We use the result buffer as storage for the expaneded path,
|
---|
| 1825 | * reserving space for the windows name space prefix.
|
---|
| 1826 | */
|
---|
| 1827 | UNICODE_STRING Src;
|
---|
| 1828 | Src.Buffer = (WCHAR *)uBuf.PartialInfo.Data;
|
---|
| 1829 | Src.Length = uBuf.PartialInfo.DataLength;
|
---|
| 1830 | if (Src.Length >= sizeof(WCHAR) && Src.Buffer[Src.Length / sizeof(WCHAR) - 1] == '\0')
|
---|
| 1831 | Src.Length -= sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
| 1832 | Src.MaximumLength = Src.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
| 1833 | Src.Buffer[uBuf.PartialInfo.DataLength / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
|
---|
| 1834 |
|
---|
| 1835 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[0] = '\\';
|
---|
| 1836 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[1] = '?';
|
---|
| 1837 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[2] = '?';
|
---|
| 1838 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[3] = '\\';
|
---|
| 1839 | UNICODE_STRING Dst;
|
---|
| 1840 | Dst.Buffer = &s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer[4];
|
---|
| 1841 | Dst.MaximumLength = sizeof(s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->awcBuffer) - sizeof(WCHAR) * 5;
|
---|
| 1842 | Dst.Length = Dst.MaximumLength;
|
---|
| 1843 |
|
---|
| 1844 | if (uBuf.PartialInfo.Type == REG_EXPAND_SZ)
|
---|
| 1845 | rcNt = RtlExpandEnvironmentStrings_U(NULL, &Src, &Dst, NULL);
|
---|
| 1846 | else
|
---|
| 1847 | {
|
---|
| 1848 | memcpy(Dst.Buffer, Src.Buffer, Src.Length);
|
---|
| 1849 | Dst.Length = Src.Length;
|
---|
| 1850 | }
|
---|
| 1851 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1852 | {
|
---|
| 1853 | Dst.Buffer[Dst.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
|
---|
| 1854 |
|
---|
| 1855 | /*
|
---|
| 1856 | * Include the \\??\\ prefix in the result and open the path.
|
---|
| 1857 | */
|
---|
| 1858 | Dst.Buffer -= 4;
|
---|
| 1859 | Dst.Length += 4 * sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
| 1860 | Dst.MaximumLength += 4 * sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
| 1861 | InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &Dst, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/);
|
---|
| 1862 | HANDLE hFile = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
|
---|
| 1863 | IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
|
---|
| 1864 | NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile,
|
---|
| 1865 | FILE_READ_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE,
|
---|
| 1866 | &ObjAttr,
|
---|
| 1867 | &Ios,
|
---|
| 1868 | NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
|
---|
| 1869 | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
|
---|
| 1870 | FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
|
---|
| 1871 | FILE_OPEN,
|
---|
| 1872 | FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT
|
---|
| 1873 | | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
|
---|
| 1874 | NULL /*EaBuffer*/,
|
---|
| 1875 | 0 /*EaLength*/);
|
---|
| 1876 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1877 | rcNt = Ios.Status;
|
---|
| 1878 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1879 | {
|
---|
| 1880 | /*
|
---|
| 1881 | * Query the real NT name.
|
---|
| 1882 | */
|
---|
| 1883 | ULONG cbIgn;
|
---|
| 1884 | rcNt = NtQueryObject(hFile,
|
---|
| 1885 | ObjectNameInformation,
|
---|
| 1886 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath,
|
---|
| 1887 | sizeof(*s_aPaths[i].pNtPath) - sizeof(WCHAR),
|
---|
| 1888 | &cbIgn);
|
---|
| 1889 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1890 | {
|
---|
| 1891 | if (s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length > 0)
|
---|
| 1892 | {
|
---|
| 1893 | /* Make sure it's terminated.*/
|
---|
| 1894 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer[s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR)] = '\0';
|
---|
| 1895 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%s:%*s %ls\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, 9 - strlen(s_aPaths[i].pszLogName), "",
|
---|
| 1896 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer));
|
---|
| 1897 | }
|
---|
| 1898 | else
|
---|
| 1899 | {
|
---|
| 1900 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryObject returned empty string\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName));
|
---|
| 1901 | rcNt = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
---|
| 1902 | }
|
---|
| 1903 | }
|
---|
| 1904 | else
|
---|
| 1905 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryObject failed: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt));
|
---|
| 1906 | NtClose(hFile);
|
---|
| 1907 | }
|
---|
| 1908 | else
|
---|
| 1909 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtCreateFile failed: %#x (%ls)\n",
|
---|
| 1910 | s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt, Dst.Buffer));
|
---|
| 1911 | }
|
---|
| 1912 | else
|
---|
| 1913 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: RtlExpandEnvironmentStrings_U failed: %#x (%ls)\n",
|
---|
| 1914 | s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt, Src.Buffer));
|
---|
| 1915 | }
|
---|
| 1916 | else
|
---|
| 1917 | {
|
---|
| 1918 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: type mismatch: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, uBuf.PartialInfo.Type));
|
---|
| 1919 | rcNt = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
|
---|
| 1920 | }
|
---|
| 1921 | }
|
---|
| 1922 | else
|
---|
| 1923 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%s: NtQueryValueKey failed: %#x\n", s_aPaths[i].pszLogName, rcNt));
|
---|
| 1924 |
|
---|
| 1925 | /* Stub the entry on failure. */
|
---|
| 1926 | if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 1927 | {
|
---|
| 1928 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length = 0;
|
---|
| 1929 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer = NULL;
|
---|
| 1930 | }
|
---|
| 1931 | }
|
---|
| 1932 | NtClose(hKey);
|
---|
| 1933 | }
|
---|
| 1934 | else
|
---|
| 1935 | {
|
---|
| 1936 | SUP_DPRINTF(("NtOpenKey(%ls) failed: %#x\n", NtName.Buffer, rcNt));
|
---|
| 1937 |
|
---|
| 1938 | /* Stub all the entries on failure. */
|
---|
| 1939 | for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPaths); i++)
|
---|
| 1940 | {
|
---|
| 1941 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Length = 0;
|
---|
| 1942 | s_aPaths[i].pNtPath->UniStr.Buffer = NULL;
|
---|
| 1943 | }
|
---|
| 1944 | }
|
---|
| 1945 | }
|
---|
[52943] | 1946 | #endif /* IN_RING3 && !VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE */
|
---|
[52365] | 1947 |
|
---|
| 1948 |
|
---|
| 1949 | /**
|
---|
[51770] | 1950 | * This initializes the certificates globals so we don't have to reparse them
|
---|
| 1951 | * every time we need to verify an image.
|
---|
| 1952 | *
|
---|
| 1953 | * @returns IPRT status code.
|
---|
| 1954 | * @param pErrInfo Where to return extended error info. Optional.
|
---|
| 1955 | */
|
---|
[85127] | 1956 | DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier(PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
|
---|
[51770] | 1957 | {
|
---|
| 1958 | AssertReturn(!RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert), VERR_WRONG_ORDER);
|
---|
| 1959 |
|
---|
| 1960 | /*
|
---|
| 1961 | * Get the system root paths.
|
---|
| 1962 | */
|
---|
| 1963 | int rc = supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(&g_System32NtPath, sizeof(g_System32NtPath), kSupHardNtSysRootDir_System32, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 1964 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1965 | rc = supHardNtGetSystemRootDir(&g_WinSxSNtPath, sizeof(g_WinSxSNtPath), kSupHardNtSysRootDir_WinSxS, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 1966 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1967 | {
|
---|
[52365] | 1968 | SUP_DPRINTF(("System32: %ls\n", g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer));
|
---|
| 1969 | SUP_DPRINTF(("WinSxS: %ls\n", g_WinSxSNtPath.UniStr.Buffer));
|
---|
[52943] | 1970 | #if defined(IN_RING3) && !defined(VBOX_PERMIT_EVEN_MORE)
|
---|
[52365] | 1971 | supHardenedWinInitImageVerifierWinPaths();
|
---|
| 1972 | #endif
|
---|
| 1973 |
|
---|
[51770] | 1974 | /*
|
---|
| 1975 | * Initialize it, leaving the cleanup to the termination call.
|
---|
| 1976 | */
|
---|
| 1977 | rc = supHardNtViCertInit(&g_BuildX509Cert, g_abSUPBuildCert, g_cbSUPBuildCert, pErrInfo, "BuildCertificate");
|
---|
| 1978 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1979 | rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcRootStore, g_aSUPSpcRootTAs, g_cSUPSpcRootTAs,
|
---|
| 1980 | NULL, 0, NULL, 0, pErrInfo, "SpcRoot");
|
---|
| 1981 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1982 | rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hNtKernelRootStore, g_aSUPNtKernelRootTAs, g_cSUPNtKernelRootTAs,
|
---|
| 1983 | NULL, 0, NULL, 0, pErrInfo, "NtKernelRoot");
|
---|
| 1984 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1985 | rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore,
|
---|
| 1986 | g_aSUPSpcRootTAs, g_cSUPSpcRootTAs,
|
---|
| 1987 | g_aSUPNtKernelRootTAs, g_cSUPNtKernelRootTAs,
|
---|
| 1988 | g_aSUPTimestampTAs, g_cSUPTimestampTAs,
|
---|
| 1989 | pErrInfo, "SpcAndNtKernelRoot");
|
---|
| 1990 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 1991 | rc = supHardNtViCertStoreInit(&g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore,
|
---|
| 1992 | NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
|
---|
| 1993 | pErrInfo, "SpcAndNtKernelSupplemental");
|
---|
| 1994 |
|
---|
[51824] | 1995 | #if 0 /* For the time being, always trust the build certificate. It bypasses the timestamp issues of CRT and SDL. */
|
---|
[51770] | 1996 | /* If the build certificate is a test singing certificate, it must be a
|
---|
| 1997 | trusted root or we'll fail to validate anything. */
|
---|
| 1998 | if ( RT_SUCCESS(rc)
|
---|
| 1999 | && RTCrX509Name_Compare(&g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.Subject, &g_BuildX509Cert.TbsCertificate.Issuer) == 0)
|
---|
[51824] | 2000 | #else
|
---|
| 2001 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 2002 | #endif
|
---|
[51770] | 2003 | rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
|
---|
| 2004 | g_abSUPBuildCert, g_cbSUPBuildCert, pErrInfo);
|
---|
| 2005 |
|
---|
| 2006 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
[52365] | 2007 | {
|
---|
| 2008 | /*
|
---|
| 2009 | * Finally initialize known SIDs that we use.
|
---|
| 2010 | */
|
---|
| 2011 | SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY s_NtAuth = SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY;
|
---|
| 2012 | NTSTATUS rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, &s_NtAuth, SECURITY_SERVICE_ID_RID_COUNT);
|
---|
| 2013 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 2014 | {
|
---|
| 2015 | *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 0) = SECURITY_SERVICE_ID_BASE_RID;
|
---|
| 2016 | *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 1) = 956008885;
|
---|
| 2017 | *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 2) = 3418522649;
|
---|
| 2018 | *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 3) = 1831038044;
|
---|
| 2019 | *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 4) = 1853292631;
|
---|
| 2020 | *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_TrustedInstallerSid, 5) = 2271478464;
|
---|
[52482] | 2021 |
|
---|
[52907] | 2022 | rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_LocalSystemSid, &s_NtAuth, 1);
|
---|
[52482] | 2023 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 2024 | {
|
---|
| 2025 | *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_LocalSystemSid, 0) = SECURITY_LOCAL_SYSTEM_RID;
|
---|
[52907] | 2026 |
|
---|
| 2027 | rcNt = RtlInitializeSid(&g_AdminsGroupSid, &s_NtAuth, 2);
|
---|
| 2028 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 2029 | {
|
---|
| 2030 | *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_AdminsGroupSid, 0) = SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID;
|
---|
| 2031 | *RtlSubAuthoritySid(&g_AdminsGroupSid, 1) = DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS;
|
---|
| 2032 | return VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 2033 | }
|
---|
[52482] | 2034 | }
|
---|
[52365] | 2035 | }
|
---|
| 2036 | rc = RTErrConvertFromNtStatus(rcNt);
|
---|
| 2037 | }
|
---|
[51770] | 2038 | supHardenedWinTermImageVerifier();
|
---|
| 2039 | }
|
---|
| 2040 | return rc;
|
---|
| 2041 | }
|
---|
| 2042 |
|
---|
| 2043 |
|
---|
| 2044 | /**
|
---|
| 2045 | * Releases resources allocated by supHardenedWinInitImageVerifier.
|
---|
| 2046 | */
|
---|
[85127] | 2047 | DECLHIDDEN(void) supHardenedWinTermImageVerifier(void)
|
---|
[51770] | 2048 | {
|
---|
| 2049 | if (RTCrX509Certificate_IsPresent(&g_BuildX509Cert))
|
---|
| 2050 | RTAsn1VtDelete(&g_BuildX509Cert.SeqCore.Asn1Core);
|
---|
| 2051 |
|
---|
| 2052 | RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore);
|
---|
| 2053 | g_hSpcAndNtKernelSuppStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
|
---|
| 2054 | RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore);
|
---|
| 2055 | g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
|
---|
| 2056 |
|
---|
| 2057 | RTCrStoreRelease(g_hNtKernelRootStore);
|
---|
| 2058 | g_hNtKernelRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
|
---|
| 2059 | RTCrStoreRelease(g_hSpcRootStore);
|
---|
| 2060 | g_hSpcRootStore = NIL_RTCRSTORE;
|
---|
| 2061 | }
|
---|
| 2062 |
|
---|
| 2063 | #ifdef IN_RING3
|
---|
| 2064 |
|
---|
| 2065 | /**
|
---|
| 2066 | * This is a hardcoded list of certificates we thing we might need.
|
---|
| 2067 | *
|
---|
| 2068 | * @returns true if wanted, false if not.
|
---|
| 2069 | * @param pCert The certificate.
|
---|
| 2070 | */
|
---|
| 2071 | static bool supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA(PCRTCRX509CERTIFICATE pCert)
|
---|
| 2072 | {
|
---|
[52500] | 2073 | char szSubject[512];
|
---|
| 2074 | szSubject[sizeof(szSubject) - 1] = '\0';
|
---|
| 2075 | RTCrX509Name_FormatAsString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, szSubject, sizeof(szSubject) - 1, NULL);
|
---|
| 2076 |
|
---|
[51770] | 2077 | /*
|
---|
| 2078 | * Check that it's a plausible root certificate.
|
---|
| 2079 | */
|
---|
| 2080 | if (!RTCrX509Certificate_IsSelfSigned(pCert))
|
---|
[52500] | 2081 | {
|
---|
| 2082 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - not-self-signed: %s\n", szSubject));
|
---|
[51770] | 2083 | return false;
|
---|
[52500] | 2084 | }
|
---|
| 2085 |
|
---|
[51770] | 2086 | if (RTAsn1Integer_UnsignedCompareWithU32(&pCert->TbsCertificate.T0.Version, 3) > 0)
|
---|
| 2087 | {
|
---|
| 2088 | if ( !(pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.fExtKeyUsage & RTCRX509CERT_KEY_USAGE_F_KEY_CERT_SIGN)
|
---|
| 2089 | && (pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.fFlags & RTCRX509TBSCERTIFICATE_F_PRESENT_KEY_USAGE) )
|
---|
[52500] | 2090 | {
|
---|
| 2091 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - non-cert-sign: %s\n", szSubject));
|
---|
[51770] | 2092 | return false;
|
---|
[52500] | 2093 | }
|
---|
[51770] | 2094 | if ( pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.pBasicConstraints
|
---|
| 2095 | && !pCert->TbsCertificate.T3.pBasicConstraints->CA.fValue)
|
---|
[52500] | 2096 | {
|
---|
| 2097 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - non-CA: %s\n", szSubject));
|
---|
[51770] | 2098 | return false;
|
---|
[52500] | 2099 | }
|
---|
[51770] | 2100 | }
|
---|
| 2101 | if (pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.cBits < 256) /* mostly for u64KeyId reading. */
|
---|
[52500] | 2102 | {
|
---|
| 2103 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - key too small: %u bits %s\n",
|
---|
| 2104 | pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.cBits, szSubject));
|
---|
[51770] | 2105 | return false;
|
---|
[52500] | 2106 | }
|
---|
| 2107 | uint64_t const u64KeyId = pCert->TbsCertificate.SubjectPublicKeyInfo.SubjectPublicKey.uBits.pu64[1];
|
---|
[51770] | 2108 |
|
---|
[52500] | 2109 | # if 0
|
---|
[51770] | 2110 | /*
|
---|
[52500] | 2111 | * Whitelist - Array of names and key clues of the certificates we want.
|
---|
[51770] | 2112 | */
|
---|
| 2113 | static struct
|
---|
| 2114 | {
|
---|
| 2115 | uint64_t u64KeyId;
|
---|
| 2116 | const char *pszName;
|
---|
| 2117 | } const s_aWanted[] =
|
---|
| 2118 | {
|
---|
| 2119 | /* SPC */
|
---|
| 2120 | { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority" },
|
---|
| 2121 | { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "L=Internet, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Commercial Software Publishers CA" },
|
---|
| 2122 | { UINT64_C(0x491857ead79dde00), "C=US, O=The Go Daddy Group, Inc., OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority" },
|
---|
| 2123 |
|
---|
| 2124 | /* TS */
|
---|
| 2125 | { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "O=Microsoft Trust Network, OU=Microsoft Corporation, OU=Microsoft Time Stamping Service Root, OU=Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp." },
|
---|
| 2126 | { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "O=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Time Stamping Service Root, OU=NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, (c)97 VeriSign, Inc." },
|
---|
| 2127 | { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Durbanville, O=Thawte, OU=Thawte Certification, CN=Thawte Timestamping CA" },
|
---|
| 2128 |
|
---|
| 2129 | /* Additional Windows 8.1 list: */
|
---|
| 2130 | { UINT64_C(0x5ad46780fa5df300), "DC=com, DC=microsoft, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority" },
|
---|
| 2131 | { UINT64_C(0x3be670c1bd02a900), "OU=Copyright (c) 1997 Microsoft Corp., OU=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Authority" },
|
---|
| 2132 | { UINT64_C(0x4d3835aa4180b200), "C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2011" },
|
---|
| 2133 | { UINT64_C(0x646e3fe3ba08df00), "C=US, O=MSFT, CN=Microsoft Authenticode(tm) Root Authority" },
|
---|
| 2134 | { UINT64_C(0xece4e4289e08b900), "C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Root Certificate Authority 2010" },
|
---|
| 2135 | { UINT64_C(0x59faf1086271bf00), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=GoDaddy.com, Inc., CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2" },
|
---|
| 2136 | { UINT64_C(0x3d98ab22bb04a300), "C=IE, O=Baltimore, OU=CyberTrust, CN=Baltimore CyberTrust Root" },
|
---|
| 2137 | { UINT64_C(0x91e3728b8b40d000), "C=GB, ST=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=COMODO CA Limited, CN=COMODO Certification Authority" },
|
---|
| 2138 | { UINT64_C(0x61a3a33f81aace00), "C=US, ST=UT, L=Salt Lake City, O=The USERTRUST Network, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, CN=UTN-USERFirst-Object" },
|
---|
| 2139 | { UINT64_C(0x9e5bc2d78b6a3636), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, OU=Certification Services Division, CN=Thawte Premium Server CA, Email=premium-server@thawte.com" },
|
---|
| 2140 | { UINT64_C(0xf4fd306318ccda00), "C=US, O=GeoTrust Inc., CN=GeoTrust Global CA" },
|
---|
| 2141 | { UINT64_C(0xa0ee62086758b15d), "C=US, O=Equifax, OU=Equifax Secure Certificate Authority" },
|
---|
| 2142 | { UINT64_C(0x8ff6fc03c1edbd00), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., CN=Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2" },
|
---|
| 2143 | { UINT64_C(0xa3ce8d99e60eda00), "C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA" },
|
---|
| 2144 | { UINT64_C(0xa671e9fec832b700), "C=US, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., OU=Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority" },
|
---|
| 2145 | { UINT64_C(0xa8de7211e13be200), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root CA" },
|
---|
| 2146 | { UINT64_C(0x0ff3891b54348328), "C=US, O=Entrust.net, OU=www.entrust.net/CPS incorp. by ref. (limits liab.), OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited, CN=Entrust.netSecure Server Certification Authority" },
|
---|
| 2147 | { UINT64_C(0x7ae89c50f0b6a00f), "C=US, O=GTE Corporation, OU=GTE CyberTrust Solutions, Inc., CN=GTE CyberTrust Global Root" },
|
---|
| 2148 | { UINT64_C(0xd45980fbf0a0ac00), "C=US, O=thawte, Inc., OU=Certification Services Division, OU=(c) 2006 thawte, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=thawte Primary Root CA" },
|
---|
| 2149 | { UINT64_C(0x9e5bc2d78b6a3636), "C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc, OU=Certification Services Division, CN=Thawte Premium Server CA, Email=premium-server@thawte.com" },
|
---|
| 2150 | { UINT64_C(0x7c4fd32ec1b1ce00), "C=PL, O=Unizeto Sp. z o.o., CN=Certum CA" },
|
---|
| 2151 | { UINT64_C(0xd4fbe673e5ccc600), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA" },
|
---|
| 2152 | { UINT64_C(0x16e64d2a56ccf200), "C=US, ST=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O=Starfield Technologies, Inc., OU=http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/, CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority" },
|
---|
| 2153 | { UINT64_C(0x6e2ba21058eedf00), "C=US, ST=UT, L=Salt Lake City, O=The USERTRUST Network, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, CN=UTN - DATACorp SGC" },
|
---|
| 2154 | { UINT64_C(0xb28612a94b4dad00), "O=Entrust.net, OU=www.entrust.net/CPS_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits liab.), OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited, CN=Entrust.netCertification Authority (2048)" },
|
---|
| 2155 | { UINT64_C(0x357a29080824af00), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5" },
|
---|
| 2156 | { UINT64_C(0x466cbc09db88c100), "C=IL, O=StartCom Ltd., OU=Secure Digital Certificate Signing, CN=StartCom Certification Authority" },
|
---|
| 2157 | { UINT64_C(0x9259c8abe5ca713a), "L=ValiCert Validation Network, O=ValiCert, Inc., OU=ValiCert Class 2 Policy Validation Authority, CN=http://www.valicert.com/, Email=info@valicert.com" },
|
---|
| 2158 | { UINT64_C(0x1f78fc529cbacb00), "C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 1999 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G3" },
|
---|
| 2159 | { UINT64_C(0x8043e4ce150ead00), "C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root CA" },
|
---|
| 2160 | { UINT64_C(0x00f2e6331af7b700), "C=SE, O=AddTrust AB, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, CN=AddTrust External CA Root" },
|
---|
| 2161 | };
|
---|
| 2162 |
|
---|
| 2163 |
|
---|
| 2164 | uint32_t i = RT_ELEMENTS(s_aWanted);
|
---|
| 2165 | while (i-- > 0)
|
---|
| 2166 | if ( s_aWanted[i].u64KeyId == u64KeyId
|
---|
| 2167 | || s_aWanted[i].u64KeyId == UINT64_MAX)
|
---|
| 2168 | if (RTCrX509Name_MatchWithString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, s_aWanted[i].pszName))
|
---|
[52500] | 2169 | {
|
---|
| 2170 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: Adding %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
|
---|
[51770] | 2171 | return true;
|
---|
[52500] | 2172 | }
|
---|
[51770] | 2173 |
|
---|
[52500] | 2174 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
|
---|
[51770] | 2175 | return false;
|
---|
[52500] | 2176 | # else
|
---|
| 2177 | /*
|
---|
| 2178 | * Blacklist approach.
|
---|
| 2179 | */
|
---|
| 2180 | static struct
|
---|
| 2181 | {
|
---|
| 2182 | uint64_t u64KeyId;
|
---|
| 2183 | const char *pszName;
|
---|
| 2184 | } const s_aUnwanted[] =
|
---|
| 2185 | {
|
---|
| 2186 | { UINT64_C(0xffffffffffffffff), "C=US, O=U.S. Robots and Mechanical Men, Inc., OU=V.I.K.I." }, /* dummy entry */
|
---|
| 2187 | };
|
---|
| 2188 |
|
---|
| 2189 | uint32_t i = RT_ELEMENTS(s_aUnwanted);
|
---|
| 2190 | while (i-- > 0)
|
---|
| 2191 | if ( s_aUnwanted[i].u64KeyId == u64KeyId
|
---|
| 2192 | || s_aUnwanted[i].u64KeyId == UINT64_MAX)
|
---|
| 2193 | if (RTCrX509Name_MatchWithString(&pCert->TbsCertificate.Subject, s_aUnwanted[i].pszName))
|
---|
| 2194 | {
|
---|
| 2195 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: skipping - blacklisted: %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
|
---|
| 2196 | return false;
|
---|
| 2197 | }
|
---|
| 2198 |
|
---|
| 2199 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA: Adding %#llx %s\n", u64KeyId, szSubject));
|
---|
| 2200 | return true;
|
---|
| 2201 | # endif
|
---|
[51770] | 2202 | }
|
---|
| 2203 |
|
---|
[52375] | 2204 |
|
---|
[51770] | 2205 | /**
|
---|
[52375] | 2206 | * Loads a module in the system32 directory.
|
---|
| 2207 | *
|
---|
[55017] | 2208 | * @returns Module handle on success. Won't return on failure if fMandatory = true.
|
---|
[52375] | 2209 | * @param pszName The name of the DLL to load.
|
---|
[55017] | 2210 | * @param fMandatory Whether the library is mandatory.
|
---|
[52375] | 2211 | */
|
---|
[85127] | 2212 | DECLHIDDEN(HMODULE) supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll(const char *pszName, bool fMandatory)
|
---|
[52375] | 2213 | {
|
---|
| 2214 | WCHAR wszName[200+60];
|
---|
[52403] | 2215 | UINT cwcDir = GetSystemDirectoryW(wszName, RT_ELEMENTS(wszName) - 60);
|
---|
| 2216 | wszName[cwcDir] = '\\';
|
---|
| 2217 | RTUtf16CopyAscii(&wszName[cwcDir + 1], RT_ELEMENTS(wszName) - cwcDir, pszName);
|
---|
[52375] | 2218 |
|
---|
| 2219 | DWORD fFlags = 0;
|
---|
| 2220 | if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
|
---|
| 2221 | fFlags = LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32;
|
---|
| 2222 | HMODULE hMod = LoadLibraryExW(wszName, NULL, fFlags);
|
---|
| 2223 | if ( hMod == NULL
|
---|
| 2224 | && fFlags
|
---|
| 2225 | && g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 2)
|
---|
[52940] | 2226 | && RtlGetLastWin32Error() == ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER)
|
---|
[52375] | 2227 | {
|
---|
| 2228 | fFlags = 0;
|
---|
| 2229 | hMod = LoadLibraryExW(wszName, NULL, fFlags);
|
---|
| 2230 | }
|
---|
[55017] | 2231 | if ( hMod == NULL
|
---|
| 2232 | && fMandatory)
|
---|
[52940] | 2233 | supR3HardenedFatal("Error loading '%s': %u [%ls]", pszName, RtlGetLastWin32Error(), wszName);
|
---|
[52375] | 2234 | return hMod;
|
---|
| 2235 | }
|
---|
| 2236 |
|
---|
| 2237 |
|
---|
| 2238 | /**
|
---|
[51770] | 2239 | * Called by supR3HardenedWinResolveVerifyTrustApiAndHookThreadCreation to
|
---|
| 2240 | * import selected root CAs from the system certificate store.
|
---|
| 2241 | *
|
---|
| 2242 | * These certificates permits us to correctly validate third party DLLs.
|
---|
| 2243 | */
|
---|
[52375] | 2244 | static void supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs(void)
|
---|
[51770] | 2245 | {
|
---|
| 2246 | uint32_t cAdded = 0;
|
---|
| 2247 |
|
---|
| 2248 | /*
|
---|
| 2249 | * Load crypt32.dll and resolve the APIs we need.
|
---|
| 2250 | */
|
---|
[55017] | 2251 | HMODULE hCrypt32 = supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll("crypt32.dll", true /*fMandatory*/);
|
---|
[51770] | 2252 |
|
---|
| 2253 | #define RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(a_Name, a_pfnType) \
|
---|
| 2254 | a_pfnType pfn##a_Name = (a_pfnType)GetProcAddress(hCrypt32, #a_Name); \
|
---|
[52940] | 2255 | if (pfn##a_Name == NULL) supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating '" #a_Name "' in 'crypt32.dll': %u", RtlGetLastWin32Error())
|
---|
[51770] | 2256 | RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertOpenStore, PFNCERTOPENSTORE);
|
---|
| 2257 | RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertCloseStore, PFNCERTCLOSESTORE);
|
---|
| 2258 | RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API(CertEnumCertificatesInStore, PFNCERTENUMCERTIFICATESINSTORE);
|
---|
| 2259 | #undef RESOLVE_CRYPT32_API
|
---|
| 2260 |
|
---|
| 2261 | /*
|
---|
| 2262 | * Open the root store and look for the certificates we wish to use.
|
---|
| 2263 | */
|
---|
| 2264 | DWORD fOpenStore = CERT_STORE_OPEN_EXISTING_FLAG | CERT_STORE_READONLY_FLAG;
|
---|
| 2265 | HCERTSTORE hStore = pfnCertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING | X509_ASN_ENCODING,
|
---|
| 2266 | NULL /* hCryptProv = default */, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE | fOpenStore, L"Root");
|
---|
| 2267 | if (!hStore)
|
---|
| 2268 | hStore = pfnCertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W, PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING | X509_ASN_ENCODING,
|
---|
| 2269 | NULL /* hCryptProv = default */, CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_CURRENT_USER | fOpenStore, L"Root");
|
---|
| 2270 | if (hStore)
|
---|
| 2271 | {
|
---|
| 2272 | PCCERT_CONTEXT pCurCtx = NULL;
|
---|
| 2273 | while ((pCurCtx = pfnCertEnumCertificatesInStore(hStore, pCurCtx)) != NULL)
|
---|
| 2274 | {
|
---|
| 2275 | if (pCurCtx->dwCertEncodingType & X509_ASN_ENCODING)
|
---|
| 2276 | {
|
---|
[52207] | 2277 | RTERRINFOSTATIC StaticErrInfo;
|
---|
[51770] | 2278 | RTASN1CURSORPRIMARY PrimaryCursor;
|
---|
[52207] | 2279 | RTAsn1CursorInitPrimary(&PrimaryCursor, pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded,
|
---|
| 2280 | RTErrInfoInitStatic(&StaticErrInfo),
|
---|
[51770] | 2281 | &g_RTAsn1DefaultAllocator, RTASN1CURSOR_FLAGS_DER, "CurCtx");
|
---|
| 2282 | RTCRX509CERTIFICATE MyCert;
|
---|
| 2283 | int rc = RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1(&PrimaryCursor.Cursor, 0, &MyCert, "Cert");
|
---|
| 2284 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 2285 | {
|
---|
| 2286 | if (supR3HardenedWinIsDesiredRootCA(&MyCert))
|
---|
| 2287 | {
|
---|
| 2288 | rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
|
---|
| 2289 | pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded, NULL /*pErrInfo*/);
|
---|
| 2290 | AssertRC(rc);
|
---|
| 2291 |
|
---|
| 2292 | rc = RTCrStoreCertAddEncoded(g_hSpcAndNtKernelRootStore, RTCRCERTCTX_F_ENC_X509_DER,
|
---|
| 2293 | pCurCtx->pbCertEncoded, pCurCtx->cbCertEncoded, NULL /*pErrInfo*/);
|
---|
| 2294 | AssertRC(rc);
|
---|
| 2295 | cAdded++;
|
---|
| 2296 | }
|
---|
| 2297 |
|
---|
| 2298 | RTCrX509Certificate_Delete(&MyCert);
|
---|
| 2299 | }
|
---|
[52207] | 2300 | /* XP root certificate "C&W HKT SecureNet CA SGC Root" has non-standard validity
|
---|
| 2301 | timestamps, the UTC formatting isn't Zulu time but specifies timezone offsets.
|
---|
| 2302 | Ignore these failures and certificates. */
|
---|
| 2303 | else if (rc != VERR_ASN1_INVALID_UTC_TIME_ENCODING)
|
---|
| 2304 | AssertMsgFailed(("RTCrX509Certificate_DecodeAsn1 failed: rc=%#x: %s\n", rc, StaticErrInfo.szMsg));
|
---|
[51770] | 2305 | }
|
---|
| 2306 | }
|
---|
| 2307 | pfnCertCloseStore(hStore, CERT_CLOSE_STORE_CHECK_FLAG);
|
---|
| 2308 | g_fHaveOtherRoots = true;
|
---|
| 2309 | }
|
---|
| 2310 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs: cAdded=%u\n", cAdded));
|
---|
| 2311 | }
|
---|
| 2312 |
|
---|
| 2313 |
|
---|
| 2314 | /**
|
---|
| 2315 | * Resolves the WinVerifyTrust API after the process has been verified and
|
---|
| 2316 | * installs a thread creation hook.
|
---|
| 2317 | *
|
---|
| 2318 | * The WinVerifyTrust API is used in addition our own Authenticode verification
|
---|
| 2319 | * code. If the image has the IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_FORCE_INTEGRITY flag
|
---|
| 2320 | * set, it will be checked again by the kernel. All our image has this flag set
|
---|
| 2321 | * and we require all VBox extensions to have it set as well. In effect, the
|
---|
| 2322 | * authenticode signature will be checked two or three times.
|
---|
[52356] | 2323 | *
|
---|
| 2324 | * @param pszProgName The program name.
|
---|
[51770] | 2325 | */
|
---|
[85127] | 2326 | DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinResolveVerifyTrustApiAndHookThreadCreation(const char *pszProgName)
|
---|
[51770] | 2327 | {
|
---|
| 2328 | # ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
|
---|
| 2329 | /*
|
---|
| 2330 | * Load our the support library DLL that does the thread hooking as the
|
---|
| 2331 | * security API may trigger the creation of COM worker threads (or
|
---|
| 2332 | * whatever they are).
|
---|
| 2333 | *
|
---|
| 2334 | * The thread creation hook makes the threads very slippery to debuggers by
|
---|
| 2335 | * irreversably disabling most (if not all) debug events for them.
|
---|
| 2336 | */
|
---|
| 2337 | char szPath[RTPATH_MAX];
|
---|
[56733] | 2338 | supR3HardenedPathAppSharedLibs(szPath, sizeof(szPath) - sizeof("/VBoxSupLib.DLL"));
|
---|
[51770] | 2339 | suplibHardenedStrCat(szPath, "/VBoxSupLib.DLL");
|
---|
[56746] | 2340 | HMODULE hSupLibMod = (HMODULE)supR3HardenedWinLoadLibrary(szPath, true /*fSystem32Only*/, 0 /*fMainFlags*/);
|
---|
[51770] | 2341 | if (hSupLibMod == NULL)
|
---|
[52940] | 2342 | supR3HardenedFatal("Error loading '%s': %u", szPath, RtlGetLastWin32Error());
|
---|
[51770] | 2343 | # endif
|
---|
| 2344 |
|
---|
| 2345 | /*
|
---|
[52414] | 2346 | * Allocate TLS entry for WinVerifyTrust recursion prevention.
|
---|
| 2347 | */
|
---|
| 2348 | DWORD iTls = TlsAlloc();
|
---|
| 2349 | if (iTls != TLS_OUT_OF_INDEXES)
|
---|
| 2350 | g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion = iTls;
|
---|
| 2351 | else
|
---|
[52940] | 2352 | supR3HardenedError(RtlGetLastWin32Error(), false /*fFatal*/, "TlsAlloc failed");
|
---|
[52414] | 2353 |
|
---|
| 2354 | /*
|
---|
[54997] | 2355 | * Resolve the imports we need.
|
---|
[51770] | 2356 | */
|
---|
[55017] | 2357 | HMODULE hWintrust = supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll("Wintrust.dll", true /*fMandatory*/);
|
---|
[51770] | 2358 | #define RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(a_Name, a_pfnType, a_uMinWinVer) \
|
---|
| 2359 | do { \
|
---|
| 2360 | g_pfn##a_Name = (a_pfnType)GetProcAddress(hWintrust, #a_Name); \
|
---|
| 2361 | if (g_pfn##a_Name == NULL && (a_uMinWinVer) < g_uNtVerCombined) \
|
---|
[52940] | 2362 | supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating '" #a_Name "' in 'Wintrust.dll': %u", RtlGetLastWin32Error()); \
|
---|
[51770] | 2363 | } while (0)
|
---|
| 2364 |
|
---|
| 2365 | PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust = (PFNWINVERIFYTRUST)GetProcAddress(hWintrust, "WinVerifyTrust");
|
---|
| 2366 | if (!pfnWinVerifyTrust)
|
---|
[52940] | 2367 | supR3HardenedFatal("Error locating 'WinVerifyTrust' in 'Wintrust.dll': %u", RtlGetLastWin32Error());
|
---|
[51770] | 2368 |
|
---|
| 2369 | RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminAcquireContext, PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT, 0);
|
---|
| 2370 | RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE, 0);
|
---|
| 2371 | RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash, PFNCRYPTCATADMINENUMCATALOGFROMHASH, 0);
|
---|
| 2372 | RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext, PFNCRYPTCATADMINRELEASECATALOGCONTEXT, 0);
|
---|
| 2373 | RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminReleaseContext, PFNCRYPTCATDADMINRELEASECONTEXT, 0);
|
---|
| 2374 | RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext, PFNCRYPTCATCATALOGINFOFROMCONTEXT, 0);
|
---|
| 2375 |
|
---|
| 2376 | RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminAcquireContext2, PFNCRYPTCATADMINACQUIRECONTEXT2, SUP_NT_VER_W80);
|
---|
| 2377 | RESOLVE_CRYPT_API(CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2, PFNCRYPTCATADMINCALCHASHFROMFILEHANDLE2, SUP_NT_VER_W80);
|
---|
| 2378 |
|
---|
[54997] | 2379 | # ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
|
---|
[51770] | 2380 | /*
|
---|
[54997] | 2381 | * Load bcrypt.dll and instantiate a few hashing and signing providers to
|
---|
| 2382 | * make sure the providers are cached for later us. Avoid recursion issues.
|
---|
[51770] | 2383 | */
|
---|
[55017] | 2384 | HMODULE hBCrypt = supR3HardenedWinLoadSystem32Dll("bcrypt.dll", false /*fMandatory*/);
|
---|
[54997] | 2385 | if (hBCrypt)
|
---|
| 2386 | {
|
---|
| 2387 | PFNBCRYPTOPENALGORTIHMPROVIDER pfnOpenAlgoProvider;
|
---|
| 2388 | pfnOpenAlgoProvider = (PFNBCRYPTOPENALGORTIHMPROVIDER)GetProcAddress(hBCrypt, "BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider");
|
---|
| 2389 | if (pfnOpenAlgoProvider)
|
---|
| 2390 | {
|
---|
| 2391 | SUP_DPRINTF(("bcrypt.dll loaded at %p, BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider at %p, preloading providers:\n",
|
---|
| 2392 | hBCrypt, pfnOpenAlgoProvider));
|
---|
| 2393 | # define PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(a_Name) \
|
---|
| 2394 | do { \
|
---|
| 2395 | BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgo = NULL; \
|
---|
| 2396 | NTSTATUS rcNt = pfnOpenAlgoProvider(&hAlgo, a_Name, NULL, 0); \
|
---|
| 2397 | SUP_DPRINTF(("%sBCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider(,'%ls',0,0) -> %#x (hAlgo=%p)\n", \
|
---|
| 2398 | NT_SUCCESS(rcNt) ? " " : "warning: ", a_Name, rcNt, hAlgo)); \
|
---|
| 2399 | } while (0)
|
---|
| 2400 | PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_MD2_ALGORITHM);
|
---|
| 2401 | PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_MD4_ALGORITHM);
|
---|
| 2402 | PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_MD5_ALGORITHM);
|
---|
| 2403 | PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_SHA1_ALGORITHM);
|
---|
| 2404 | PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_SHA256_ALGORITHM);
|
---|
| 2405 | PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_SHA512_ALGORITHM);
|
---|
| 2406 | PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_RSA_ALGORITHM);
|
---|
| 2407 | PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER(BCRYPT_DSA_ALGORITHM);
|
---|
| 2408 | # undef PRELOAD_ALGO_PROVIDER
|
---|
| 2409 | }
|
---|
| 2410 | else
|
---|
| 2411 | SUP_DPRINTF(("Warning! Failed to find BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider in bcrypt.dll\n"));
|
---|
| 2412 | }
|
---|
| 2413 | else
|
---|
| 2414 | SUP_DPRINTF(("Warning! Failed to load bcrypt.dll\n"));
|
---|
| 2415 |
|
---|
| 2416 | /*
|
---|
| 2417 | * Call the verification API on ourselves and ntdll to make sure it works
|
---|
| 2418 | * and loads more stuff it needs, preventing any recursive fun we'd run
|
---|
| 2419 | * into after we set g_pfnWinVerifyTrust.
|
---|
| 2420 | */
|
---|
[51770] | 2421 | RTERRINFOSTATIC ErrInfoStatic;
|
---|
| 2422 | RTErrInfoInitStatic(&ErrInfoStatic);
|
---|
| 2423 | int rc = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(NULL, g_SupLibHardenedExeNtPath.UniStr.Buffer, 0,
|
---|
[53042] | 2424 | &ErrInfoStatic.Core, pfnWinVerifyTrust, NULL);
|
---|
[51770] | 2425 | if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
|
---|
[52356] | 2426 | supR3HardenedFatalMsg(pszProgName, kSupInitOp_Integrity, rc,
|
---|
| 2427 | "WinVerifyTrust failed on stub executable: %s", ErrInfoStatic.szMsg);
|
---|
[62677] | 2428 | # else
|
---|
| 2429 | RT_NOREF1(pszProgName);
|
---|
[51770] | 2430 | # endif
|
---|
| 2431 |
|
---|
| 2432 | if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0)) /* ntdll isn't signed on XP, assuming this is the case on W2K3 for now. */
|
---|
[53042] | 2433 | supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(NULL, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\ntdll.dll", 0, NULL, pfnWinVerifyTrust, NULL);
|
---|
[51770] | 2434 | supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(NULL, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\ntdll.dll", 0, NULL, pfnWinVerifyTrust);
|
---|
| 2435 |
|
---|
| 2436 | g_pfnWinVerifyTrust = pfnWinVerifyTrust;
|
---|
[52356] | 2437 | SUP_DPRINTF(("g_pfnWinVerifyTrust=%p\n", pfnWinVerifyTrust));
|
---|
[51770] | 2438 |
|
---|
[52375] | 2439 | # ifdef IN_SUP_HARDENED_R3
|
---|
[51770] | 2440 | /*
|
---|
[52375] | 2441 | * Load some problematic DLLs into the verifier cache to prevent
|
---|
| 2442 | * recursion trouble.
|
---|
| 2443 | */
|
---|
| 2444 | supR3HardenedWinVerifyCachePreload(L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\crypt32.dll");
|
---|
| 2445 | supR3HardenedWinVerifyCachePreload(L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\Wintrust.dll");
|
---|
| 2446 | # endif
|
---|
| 2447 |
|
---|
| 2448 | /*
|
---|
[51770] | 2449 | * Now, get trusted root CAs so we can verify a broader scope of signatures.
|
---|
| 2450 | */
|
---|
[52375] | 2451 | supR3HardenedWinRetrieveTrustedRootCAs();
|
---|
[51770] | 2452 | }
|
---|
| 2453 |
|
---|
| 2454 |
|
---|
| 2455 | static int supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(PCRTUTF16 pwszNtName, PCRTUTF16 *ppwszWinPath,
|
---|
| 2456 | PRTUTF16 pwszWinPathBuf, size_t cwcWinPathBuf)
|
---|
| 2457 | {
|
---|
| 2458 | static const RTUTF16 s_wszPrefix[] = L"\\\\.\\GLOBALROOT";
|
---|
| 2459 |
|
---|
| 2460 | if (*pwszNtName != '\\' && *pwszNtName != '/')
|
---|
| 2461 | return VERR_PATH_DOES_NOT_START_WITH_ROOT;
|
---|
| 2462 |
|
---|
| 2463 | size_t cwcNtName = RTUtf16Len(pwszNtName);
|
---|
| 2464 | if (RT_ELEMENTS(s_wszPrefix) + cwcNtName > cwcWinPathBuf)
|
---|
| 2465 | return VERR_FILENAME_TOO_LONG;
|
---|
| 2466 |
|
---|
| 2467 | memcpy(pwszWinPathBuf, s_wszPrefix, sizeof(s_wszPrefix));
|
---|
| 2468 | memcpy(&pwszWinPathBuf[sizeof(s_wszPrefix) / sizeof(RTUTF16) - 1], pwszNtName, (cwcNtName + 1) * sizeof(RTUTF16));
|
---|
| 2469 | *ppwszWinPath = pwszWinPathBuf;
|
---|
| 2470 | return VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 2471 | }
|
---|
| 2472 |
|
---|
| 2473 |
|
---|
| 2474 | /**
|
---|
| 2475 | * Calls WinVerifyTrust to verify an PE image.
|
---|
| 2476 | *
|
---|
| 2477 | * @returns VBox status code.
|
---|
| 2478 | * @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
|
---|
| 2479 | * @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
|
---|
| 2480 | * dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
|
---|
| 2481 | * error/logging.
|
---|
| 2482 | * @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
|
---|
| 2483 | * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
|
---|
| 2484 | * @param pfnWinVerifyTrust Pointer to the API.
|
---|
[53042] | 2485 | * @param phrcWinVerifyTrust Where to WinVerifyTrust error status on failure,
|
---|
| 2486 | * optional.
|
---|
[51770] | 2487 | */
|
---|
| 2488 | static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
|
---|
[53042] | 2489 | PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust, HRESULT *phrcWinVerifyTrust)
|
---|
[51770] | 2490 | {
|
---|
[62677] | 2491 | RT_NOREF1(fFlags);
|
---|
[53042] | 2492 | if (phrcWinVerifyTrust)
|
---|
| 2493 | *phrcWinVerifyTrust = S_OK;
|
---|
| 2494 |
|
---|
[51770] | 2495 | /*
|
---|
| 2496 | * Convert the name into a Windows name.
|
---|
| 2497 | */
|
---|
| 2498 | RTUTF16 wszWinPathBuf[MAX_PATH];
|
---|
| 2499 | PCRTUTF16 pwszWinPath;
|
---|
| 2500 | int rc = supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(pwszName, &pwszWinPath, wszWinPathBuf, RT_ELEMENTS(wszWinPathBuf));
|
---|
| 2501 | if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
|
---|
| 2502 | return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "Bad path passed to supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust: rc=%Rrc '%ls'", rc, pwszName);
|
---|
| 2503 |
|
---|
| 2504 | /*
|
---|
| 2505 | * Construct input parameters and call the API.
|
---|
| 2506 | */
|
---|
| 2507 | WINTRUST_FILE_INFO FileInfo;
|
---|
| 2508 | RT_ZERO(FileInfo);
|
---|
| 2509 | FileInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(FileInfo);
|
---|
| 2510 | FileInfo.pcwszFilePath = pwszWinPath;
|
---|
| 2511 | FileInfo.hFile = hFile;
|
---|
| 2512 |
|
---|
| 2513 | GUID PolicyActionGuid = WINTRUST_ACTION_GENERIC_VERIFY_V2;
|
---|
| 2514 |
|
---|
| 2515 | WINTRUST_DATA TrustData;
|
---|
| 2516 | RT_ZERO(TrustData);
|
---|
| 2517 | TrustData.cbStruct = sizeof(TrustData);
|
---|
| 2518 | TrustData.fdwRevocationChecks = WTD_REVOKE_NONE; /* Keep simple for now. */
|
---|
| 2519 | TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_VERIFY;
|
---|
| 2520 | TrustData.dwUIChoice = WTD_UI_NONE;
|
---|
| 2521 | TrustData.dwProvFlags = 0;
|
---|
| 2522 | if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
|
---|
| 2523 | TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL;
|
---|
| 2524 | else
|
---|
| 2525 | TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_REVOCATION_CHECK_NONE;
|
---|
| 2526 | TrustData.dwUnionChoice = WTD_CHOICE_FILE;
|
---|
| 2527 | TrustData.pFile = &FileInfo;
|
---|
| 2528 |
|
---|
| 2529 | HRESULT hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /*hwnd*/, &PolicyActionGuid, &TrustData);
|
---|
[93271] | 2530 | # ifdef DEBUG_bird /* TEMP HACK */
|
---|
| 2531 | if (hrc == CERT_E_EXPIRED)
|
---|
| 2532 | hrc = S_OK;
|
---|
| 2533 | # endif
|
---|
[51770] | 2534 | if (hrc == S_OK)
|
---|
| 2535 | rc = VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 2536 | else
|
---|
| 2537 | {
|
---|
| 2538 | /*
|
---|
| 2539 | * Failed. Format a nice error message.
|
---|
| 2540 | */
|
---|
| 2541 | # ifdef DEBUG_bird
|
---|
[52213] | 2542 | if (hrc != CERT_E_CHAINING /* Un-updated vistas, XPs, ++ */)
|
---|
| 2543 | __debugbreak();
|
---|
[51770] | 2544 | # endif
|
---|
| 2545 | const char *pszErrConst = NULL;
|
---|
| 2546 | switch (hrc)
|
---|
| 2547 | {
|
---|
[52795] | 2548 | case TRUST_E_SYSTEM_ERROR: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SYSTEM_ERROR"; break;
|
---|
| 2549 | case TRUST_E_NO_SIGNER_CERT: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_NO_SIGNER_CERT"; break;
|
---|
| 2550 | case TRUST_E_COUNTER_SIGNER: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_COUNTER_SIGNER"; break;
|
---|
| 2551 | case TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE"; break;
|
---|
| 2552 | case TRUST_E_TIME_STAMP: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_TIME_STAMP"; break;
|
---|
| 2553 | case TRUST_E_BAD_DIGEST: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_BAD_DIGEST"; break;
|
---|
| 2554 | case TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS"; break;
|
---|
| 2555 | case TRUST_E_FINANCIAL_CRITERIA: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_FINANCIAL_CRITERIA"; break;
|
---|
| 2556 | case TRUST_E_PROVIDER_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_PROVIDER_UNKNOWN"; break;
|
---|
| 2557 | case TRUST_E_ACTION_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_ACTION_UNKNOWN"; break;
|
---|
| 2558 | case TRUST_E_SUBJECT_FORM_UNKNOWN: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SUBJECT_FORM_UNKNOWN"; break;
|
---|
| 2559 | case TRUST_E_SUBJECT_NOT_TRUSTED: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_SUBJECT_NOT_TRUSTED"; break;
|
---|
| 2560 | case TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE"; break;
|
---|
| 2561 | case TRUST_E_FAIL: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_FAIL"; break;
|
---|
| 2562 | case TRUST_E_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST: pszErrConst = "TRUST_E_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST"; break;
|
---|
[58731] | 2563 | case CERT_E_EXPIRED: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_EXPIRED"; break;
|
---|
| 2564 | case CERT_E_VALIDITYPERIODNESTING: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_VALIDITYPERIODNESTING"; break;
|
---|
| 2565 | case CERT_E_ROLE: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_ROLE"; break;
|
---|
| 2566 | case CERT_E_PATHLENCONST: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_PATHLENCONST"; break;
|
---|
| 2567 | case CERT_E_CRITICAL: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_CRITICAL"; break;
|
---|
| 2568 | case CERT_E_PURPOSE: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_PURPOSE"; break;
|
---|
| 2569 | case CERT_E_ISSUERCHAINING: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_ISSUERCHAINING"; break;
|
---|
| 2570 | case CERT_E_MALFORMED: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_MALFORMED"; break;
|
---|
| 2571 | case CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT"; break;
|
---|
[52795] | 2572 | case CERT_E_CHAINING: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_CHAINING"; break;
|
---|
[58731] | 2573 | case CERT_E_REVOKED: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_REVOKED"; break;
|
---|
| 2574 | case CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDTESTROOT: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDTESTROOT"; break;
|
---|
[52795] | 2575 | case CERT_E_REVOCATION_FAILURE: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_REVOCATION_FAILURE"; break;
|
---|
[58731] | 2576 | case CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH"; break;
|
---|
| 2577 | case CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE"; break;
|
---|
| 2578 | case CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDCA: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDCA"; break;
|
---|
| 2579 | case CERT_E_INVALID_POLICY: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_INVALID_POLICY"; break;
|
---|
| 2580 | case CERT_E_INVALID_NAME: pszErrConst = "CERT_E_INVALID_NAME"; break;
|
---|
[52795] | 2581 | case CRYPT_E_FILE_ERROR: pszErrConst = "CRYPT_E_FILE_ERROR"; break;
|
---|
| 2582 | case CRYPT_E_REVOKED: pszErrConst = "CRYPT_E_REVOKED"; break;
|
---|
[51770] | 2583 | }
|
---|
| 2584 | if (pszErrConst)
|
---|
| 2585 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_LDRVI_UNSUPPORTED_ARCH,
|
---|
| 2586 | "WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%s on '%ls'", pszErrConst, pwszName);
|
---|
| 2587 | else
|
---|
| 2588 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_LDRVI_UNSUPPORTED_ARCH,
|
---|
| 2589 | "WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%Rhrc on '%ls'", hrc, pwszName);
|
---|
[52365] | 2590 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust: WinVerifyTrust failed with %#x (%s) on '%ls'\n",
|
---|
| 2591 | hrc, pszErrConst, pwszName));
|
---|
[53042] | 2592 | if (phrcWinVerifyTrust)
|
---|
| 2593 | *phrcWinVerifyTrust = hrc;
|
---|
[51770] | 2594 | }
|
---|
| 2595 |
|
---|
| 2596 | /* clean up state data. */
|
---|
| 2597 | TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_CLOSE;
|
---|
| 2598 | FileInfo.hFile = NULL;
|
---|
| 2599 | hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /*hwnd*/, &PolicyActionGuid, &TrustData);
|
---|
| 2600 |
|
---|
| 2601 | return rc;
|
---|
| 2602 | }
|
---|
| 2603 |
|
---|
| 2604 |
|
---|
| 2605 | /**
|
---|
| 2606 | * Calls WinVerifyTrust to verify an PE image via catalog files.
|
---|
| 2607 | *
|
---|
| 2608 | * @returns VBox status code.
|
---|
| 2609 | * @param hFile File handle to the executable file.
|
---|
| 2610 | * @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
|
---|
| 2611 | * dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
|
---|
| 2612 | * error/logging.
|
---|
| 2613 | * @param fFlags Flags, SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
|
---|
| 2614 | * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
|
---|
| 2615 | * @param pfnWinVerifyTrust Pointer to the API.
|
---|
| 2616 | */
|
---|
| 2617 | static int supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo,
|
---|
| 2618 | PFNWINVERIFYTRUST pfnWinVerifyTrust)
|
---|
| 2619 | {
|
---|
[62677] | 2620 | RT_NOREF1(fFlags);
|
---|
[51770] | 2621 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: hFile=%p pwszName=%ls\n", hFile, pwszName));
|
---|
| 2622 |
|
---|
| 2623 | /*
|
---|
| 2624 | * Convert the name into a Windows name.
|
---|
| 2625 | */
|
---|
| 2626 | RTUTF16 wszWinPathBuf[MAX_PATH];
|
---|
| 2627 | PCRTUTF16 pwszWinPath;
|
---|
| 2628 | int rc = supR3HardNtViNtToWinPath(pwszName, &pwszWinPath, wszWinPathBuf, RT_ELEMENTS(wszWinPathBuf));
|
---|
| 2629 | if (RT_FAILURE(rc))
|
---|
| 2630 | return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc, "Bad path passed to supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: rc=%Rrc '%ls'", rc, pwszName);
|
---|
| 2631 |
|
---|
| 2632 | /*
|
---|
| 2633 | * Open the file if we didn't get a handle.
|
---|
| 2634 | */
|
---|
| 2635 | HANDLE hFileClose = NULL;
|
---|
| 2636 | if (hFile == RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE || hFile == NULL)
|
---|
| 2637 | {
|
---|
| 2638 | hFile = RTNT_INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
|
---|
| 2639 | IO_STATUS_BLOCK Ios = RTNT_IO_STATUS_BLOCK_INITIALIZER;
|
---|
| 2640 |
|
---|
| 2641 | UNICODE_STRING NtName;
|
---|
| 2642 | NtName.Buffer = (PWSTR)pwszName;
|
---|
| 2643 | NtName.Length = (USHORT)(RTUtf16Len(pwszName) * sizeof(WCHAR));
|
---|
| 2644 | NtName.MaximumLength = NtName.Length + sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
| 2645 |
|
---|
| 2646 | OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjAttr;
|
---|
| 2647 | InitializeObjectAttributes(&ObjAttr, &NtName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL /*hRootDir*/, NULL /*pSecDesc*/);
|
---|
| 2648 |
|
---|
| 2649 | NTSTATUS rcNt = NtCreateFile(&hFile,
|
---|
[52365] | 2650 | FILE_READ_DATA | READ_CONTROL | SYNCHRONIZE,
|
---|
[51770] | 2651 | &ObjAttr,
|
---|
| 2652 | &Ios,
|
---|
| 2653 | NULL /* Allocation Size*/,
|
---|
| 2654 | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
|
---|
| 2655 | FILE_SHARE_READ,
|
---|
| 2656 | FILE_OPEN,
|
---|
| 2657 | FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT,
|
---|
| 2658 | NULL /*EaBuffer*/,
|
---|
| 2659 | 0 /*EaLength*/);
|
---|
| 2660 | if (NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 2661 | rcNt = Ios.Status;
|
---|
| 2662 | if (!NT_SUCCESS(rcNt))
|
---|
| 2663 | return RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromNtStatus(rcNt),
|
---|
| 2664 | "NtCreateFile returned %#x opening '%ls'.", rcNt, pwszName);
|
---|
| 2665 | hFileClose = hFile;
|
---|
| 2666 | }
|
---|
| 2667 |
|
---|
| 2668 | /*
|
---|
| 2669 | * On Windows 8.0 and later there are more than one digest choice.
|
---|
| 2670 | */
|
---|
[53022] | 2671 | int fNoSignedCatalogFound = -1;
|
---|
[51770] | 2672 | rc = VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
| 2673 | static struct
|
---|
| 2674 | {
|
---|
| 2675 | /** The digest algorithm name. */
|
---|
| 2676 | const WCHAR *pszAlgorithm;
|
---|
| 2677 | /** Cached catalog admin handle. */
|
---|
| 2678 | HCATADMIN volatile hCachedCatAdmin;
|
---|
| 2679 | } s_aHashes[] =
|
---|
| 2680 | {
|
---|
| 2681 | { NULL, NULL },
|
---|
| 2682 | { L"SHA256", NULL },
|
---|
| 2683 | };
|
---|
| 2684 | for (uint32_t i = 0; i < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aHashes); i++)
|
---|
| 2685 | {
|
---|
| 2686 | /*
|
---|
| 2687 | * Another loop for dealing with different trust provider policies
|
---|
| 2688 | * required for successfully validating different catalog signatures.
|
---|
| 2689 | */
|
---|
| 2690 | bool fTryNextPolicy;
|
---|
| 2691 | uint32_t iPolicy = 0;
|
---|
| 2692 | static const GUID s_aPolicies[] =
|
---|
| 2693 | {
|
---|
| 2694 | DRIVER_ACTION_VERIFY, /* Works with microsoft bits. Most frequently used, thus first. */
|
---|
| 2695 | WINTRUST_ACTION_GENERIC_VERIFY_V2, /* Works with ATI and other SPC kernel-code signed stuff. */
|
---|
| 2696 | };
|
---|
| 2697 | do
|
---|
| 2698 | {
|
---|
| 2699 | /*
|
---|
| 2700 | * Create a context.
|
---|
| 2701 | */
|
---|
| 2702 | fTryNextPolicy = false;
|
---|
[52403] | 2703 | bool fFreshContext = false;
|
---|
[51770] | 2704 | BOOL fRc;
|
---|
| 2705 | HCATADMIN hCatAdmin = ASMAtomicXchgPtr(&s_aHashes[i].hCachedCatAdmin, NULL);
|
---|
| 2706 | if (hCatAdmin)
|
---|
[52403] | 2707 | {
|
---|
| 2708 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: Cached context %p\n", hCatAdmin));
|
---|
| 2709 | fFreshContext = false;
|
---|
[51770] | 2710 | fRc = TRUE;
|
---|
[52403] | 2711 | }
|
---|
[51770] | 2712 | else
|
---|
[52403] | 2713 | {
|
---|
| 2714 | l_fresh_context:
|
---|
| 2715 | fFreshContext = true;
|
---|
| 2716 | if (g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2)
|
---|
| 2717 | fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2(&hCatAdmin, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], s_aHashes[i].pszAlgorithm,
|
---|
| 2718 | NULL /*pStrongHashPolicy*/, 0 /*dwFlags*/);
|
---|
| 2719 | else
|
---|
| 2720 | fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext(&hCatAdmin, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], 0 /*dwFlags*/);
|
---|
| 2721 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: New context %p\n", hCatAdmin));
|
---|
| 2722 | }
|
---|
[51770] | 2723 | if (fRc)
|
---|
| 2724 | {
|
---|
| 2725 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: hCatAdmin=%p\n", hCatAdmin));
|
---|
| 2726 |
|
---|
| 2727 | /*
|
---|
| 2728 | * Hash the file.
|
---|
| 2729 | */
|
---|
| 2730 | BYTE abHash[SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE];
|
---|
| 2731 | DWORD cbHash = sizeof(abHash);
|
---|
| 2732 | if (g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2)
|
---|
| 2733 | fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle2(hCatAdmin, hFile, &cbHash, abHash, 0 /*dwFlags*/);
|
---|
| 2734 | else
|
---|
| 2735 | fRc = g_pfnCryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle(hFile, &cbHash, abHash, 0 /*dwFlags*/);
|
---|
| 2736 | if (fRc)
|
---|
| 2737 | {
|
---|
| 2738 | /* Produce a string version of it that we can pass to WinVerifyTrust. */
|
---|
| 2739 | RTUTF16 wszDigest[SUPHARDNTVI_MAX_CAT_HASH_SIZE * 2 + 1];
|
---|
| 2740 | int rc2 = RTUtf16PrintHexBytes(wszDigest, RT_ELEMENTS(wszDigest), abHash, cbHash, RTSTRPRINTHEXBYTES_F_UPPER);
|
---|
| 2741 | if (RT_SUCCESS(rc2))
|
---|
| 2742 | {
|
---|
| 2743 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: cbHash=%u wszDigest=%ls\n", cbHash, wszDigest));
|
---|
| 2744 |
|
---|
| 2745 | /*
|
---|
| 2746 | * Enumerate catalog information that matches the hash.
|
---|
| 2747 | */
|
---|
| 2748 | uint32_t iCat = 0;
|
---|
| 2749 | HCATINFO hCatInfoPrev = NULL;
|
---|
| 2750 | do
|
---|
| 2751 | {
|
---|
| 2752 | /* Get the next match. */
|
---|
| 2753 | HCATINFO hCatInfo = g_pfnCryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash(hCatAdmin, abHash, cbHash, 0, &hCatInfoPrev);
|
---|
| 2754 | if (!hCatInfo)
|
---|
| 2755 | {
|
---|
[52403] | 2756 | if (!fFreshContext)
|
---|
| 2757 | {
|
---|
[52940] | 2758 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: Retrying with fresh context (CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash -> %u; iCat=%#x)\n", RtlGetLastWin32Error(), iCat));
|
---|
[52403] | 2759 | if (hCatInfoPrev != NULL)
|
---|
| 2760 | g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext(hCatAdmin, hCatInfoPrev, 0 /*dwFlags*/);
|
---|
| 2761 | g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext(hCatAdmin, 0 /*dwFlags*/);
|
---|
| 2762 | goto l_fresh_context;
|
---|
| 2763 | }
|
---|
[53022] | 2764 | ULONG ulErr = RtlGetLastWin32Error();
|
---|
| 2765 | fNoSignedCatalogFound = ulErr == ERROR_NOT_FOUND && fNoSignedCatalogFound != 0;
|
---|
[51770] | 2766 | if (iCat == 0)
|
---|
[76503] | 2767 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash failed ERROR_NOT_FOUND (%u)\n", ulErr));
|
---|
[53022] | 2768 | else if (iCat == 0)
|
---|
| 2769 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATAdminEnumCatalogFromHash failed %u\n", ulErr));
|
---|
[51770] | 2770 | break;
|
---|
| 2771 | }
|
---|
[53022] | 2772 | fNoSignedCatalogFound = 0;
|
---|
[51770] | 2773 | Assert(hCatInfoPrev == NULL);
|
---|
| 2774 | hCatInfoPrev = hCatInfo;
|
---|
| 2775 |
|
---|
| 2776 | /*
|
---|
| 2777 | * Call WinVerifyTrust.
|
---|
| 2778 | */
|
---|
| 2779 | CATALOG_INFO CatInfo;
|
---|
| 2780 | CatInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(CatInfo);
|
---|
| 2781 | CatInfo.wszCatalogFile[0] = '\0';
|
---|
| 2782 | if (g_pfnCryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext(hCatInfo, &CatInfo, 0 /*dwFlags*/))
|
---|
| 2783 | {
|
---|
| 2784 | WINTRUST_CATALOG_INFO WtCatInfo;
|
---|
| 2785 | RT_ZERO(WtCatInfo);
|
---|
| 2786 | WtCatInfo.cbStruct = sizeof(WtCatInfo);
|
---|
| 2787 | WtCatInfo.dwCatalogVersion = 0;
|
---|
| 2788 | WtCatInfo.pcwszCatalogFilePath = CatInfo.wszCatalogFile;
|
---|
| 2789 | WtCatInfo.pcwszMemberTag = wszDigest;
|
---|
| 2790 | WtCatInfo.pcwszMemberFilePath = pwszWinPath;
|
---|
| 2791 | WtCatInfo.pbCalculatedFileHash = abHash;
|
---|
| 2792 | WtCatInfo.cbCalculatedFileHash = cbHash;
|
---|
| 2793 | WtCatInfo.pcCatalogContext = NULL;
|
---|
| 2794 |
|
---|
| 2795 | WINTRUST_DATA TrustData;
|
---|
| 2796 | RT_ZERO(TrustData);
|
---|
| 2797 | TrustData.cbStruct = sizeof(TrustData);
|
---|
| 2798 | TrustData.fdwRevocationChecks = WTD_REVOKE_NONE; /* Keep simple for now. */
|
---|
| 2799 | TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_VERIFY;
|
---|
| 2800 | TrustData.dwUIChoice = WTD_UI_NONE;
|
---|
| 2801 | TrustData.dwProvFlags = 0;
|
---|
| 2802 | if (g_uNtVerCombined >= SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_SIMPLE(6, 0))
|
---|
| 2803 | TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL;
|
---|
| 2804 | else
|
---|
| 2805 | TrustData.dwProvFlags = WTD_REVOCATION_CHECK_NONE;
|
---|
| 2806 | TrustData.dwUnionChoice = WTD_CHOICE_CATALOG;
|
---|
| 2807 | TrustData.pCatalog = &WtCatInfo;
|
---|
| 2808 |
|
---|
| 2809 | HRESULT hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /*hwnd*/, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], &TrustData);
|
---|
[52365] | 2810 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: WinVerifyTrust => %#x; cat='%ls'; file='%ls'\n",
|
---|
| 2811 | hrc, CatInfo.wszCatalogFile, pwszName));
|
---|
[51770] | 2812 |
|
---|
| 2813 | if (SUCCEEDED(hrc))
|
---|
| 2814 | rc = VINF_SUCCESS;
|
---|
| 2815 | else if (hrc == TRUST_E_NOSIGNATURE)
|
---|
| 2816 | { /* ignore because it's useless. */ }
|
---|
| 2817 | else if (hrc == ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER)
|
---|
| 2818 | { /* This is returned if the given file isn't found in the catalog, it seems. */ }
|
---|
| 2819 | else
|
---|
| 2820 | {
|
---|
| 2821 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, VERR_SUP_VP_WINTRUST_CAT_FAILURE,
|
---|
| 2822 | "WinVerifyTrust failed with hrc=%#x on '%ls' and .cat-file='%ls'.",
|
---|
| 2823 | hrc, pwszWinPath, CatInfo.wszCatalogFile);
|
---|
[52403] | 2824 | fTryNextPolicy |= (hrc == CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT);
|
---|
[51770] | 2825 | }
|
---|
| 2826 |
|
---|
| 2827 | /* clean up state data. */
|
---|
| 2828 | TrustData.dwStateAction = WTD_STATEACTION_CLOSE;
|
---|
| 2829 | hrc = pfnWinVerifyTrust(NULL /*hwnd*/, &s_aPolicies[iPolicy], &TrustData);
|
---|
| 2830 | Assert(SUCCEEDED(hrc));
|
---|
| 2831 | }
|
---|
| 2832 | else
|
---|
| 2833 | {
|
---|
[52940] | 2834 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(RtlGetLastWin32Error()),
|
---|
[51770] | 2835 | "CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext failed: %d [file=%s]",
|
---|
[52940] | 2836 | RtlGetLastWin32Error(), pwszName);
|
---|
[51770] | 2837 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile: CryptCATCatalogInfoFromContext failed\n"));
|
---|
| 2838 | }
|
---|
| 2839 | iCat++;
|
---|
| 2840 | } while (rc == VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED && iCat < 128);
|
---|
| 2841 |
|
---|
| 2842 | if (hCatInfoPrev != NULL)
|
---|
| 2843 | if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseCatalogContext(hCatAdmin, hCatInfoPrev, 0 /*dwFlags*/))
|
---|
| 2844 | AssertFailed();
|
---|
| 2845 | }
|
---|
| 2846 | else
|
---|
| 2847 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, rc2, "RTUtf16PrintHexBytes failed: %Rrc", rc);
|
---|
| 2848 | }
|
---|
| 2849 | else
|
---|
[52940] | 2850 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(RtlGetLastWin32Error()),
|
---|
| 2851 | "CryptCATAdminCalcHashFromFileHandle[2] failed: %d [file=%s]", RtlGetLastWin32Error(), pwszName);
|
---|
[51770] | 2852 |
|
---|
| 2853 | if (!ASMAtomicCmpXchgPtr(&s_aHashes[i].hCachedCatAdmin, hCatAdmin, NULL))
|
---|
| 2854 | if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminReleaseContext(hCatAdmin, 0 /*dwFlags*/))
|
---|
| 2855 | AssertFailed();
|
---|
| 2856 | }
|
---|
| 2857 | else
|
---|
[52940] | 2858 | rc = RTErrInfoSetF(pErrInfo, RTErrConvertFromWin32(RtlGetLastWin32Error()),
|
---|
| 2859 | "CryptCATAdminAcquireContext[2] failed: %d [file=%s]", RtlGetLastWin32Error(), pwszName);
|
---|
[51770] | 2860 | iPolicy++;
|
---|
| 2861 | } while ( fTryNextPolicy
|
---|
| 2862 | && iPolicy < RT_ELEMENTS(s_aPolicies));
|
---|
| 2863 |
|
---|
| 2864 | /*
|
---|
| 2865 | * Only repeat if we've got g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2 and can specify the hash algorithm.
|
---|
| 2866 | */
|
---|
| 2867 | if (!g_pfnCryptCATAdminAcquireContext2)
|
---|
| 2868 | break;
|
---|
| 2869 | if (rc != VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
|
---|
| 2870 | break;
|
---|
| 2871 | }
|
---|
| 2872 |
|
---|
| 2873 | if (hFileClose != NULL)
|
---|
| 2874 | NtClose(hFileClose);
|
---|
| 2875 |
|
---|
[53005] | 2876 | /*
|
---|
| 2877 | * DLLs that are likely candidates for local modifications.
|
---|
| 2878 | */
|
---|
| 2879 | if (rc == VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
|
---|
| 2880 | {
|
---|
[53022] | 2881 | bool fCoreSystemDll = false;
|
---|
| 2882 | PCRTUTF16 pwsz;
|
---|
| 2883 | uint32_t cwcName = (uint32_t)RTUtf16Len(pwszName);
|
---|
| 2884 | uint32_t cwcOther = g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
|
---|
[53005] | 2885 | if (supHardViUtf16PathStartsWithEx(pwszName, cwcName, g_System32NtPath.UniStr.Buffer, cwcOther, true /*fCheckSlash*/))
|
---|
| 2886 | {
|
---|
| 2887 | pwsz = pwszName + cwcOther + 1;
|
---|
| 2888 | if ( supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "uxtheme.dll")
|
---|
| 2889 | || supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "user32.dll")
|
---|
| 2890 | || supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "gdi32.dll")
|
---|
| 2891 | || supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "opengl32.dll")
|
---|
[53022] | 2892 | || (fCoreSystemDll = supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "KernelBase.dll"))
|
---|
| 2893 | || (fCoreSystemDll = supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "kernel32.dll"))
|
---|
| 2894 | || (fCoreSystemDll = supHardViUtf16PathIsEqual(pwsz, "ntdll.dll"))
|
---|
[53005] | 2895 | )
|
---|
| 2896 | {
|
---|
| 2897 | if (RTErrInfoIsSet(pErrInfo))
|
---|
| 2898 | RTErrInfoAdd(pErrInfo, rc, "\n");
|
---|
| 2899 | RTErrInfoAddF(pErrInfo, rc, "'%ls' is most likely modified.", pwszName);
|
---|
| 2900 | }
|
---|
| 2901 | }
|
---|
[53022] | 2902 |
|
---|
| 2903 | /* Kludge for ancient windows versions we don't want to support but
|
---|
| 2904 | users still wants to use. Keep things as safe as possible without
|
---|
| 2905 | unnecessary effort. Problem is that 3rd party catalog files cannot
|
---|
| 2906 | easily be found. Showstopper for ATI users. */
|
---|
| 2907 | if ( fNoSignedCatalogFound == 1
|
---|
| 2908 | && g_uNtVerCombined < SUP_NT_VER_VISTA
|
---|
| 2909 | && !fCoreSystemDll)
|
---|
| 2910 | {
|
---|
| 2911 | rc = VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
| 2912 | }
|
---|
[53005] | 2913 | }
|
---|
| 2914 |
|
---|
[51770] | 2915 | return rc;
|
---|
| 2916 | }
|
---|
| 2917 |
|
---|
| 2918 |
|
---|
| 2919 | /**
|
---|
[52406] | 2920 | * Verifies the given image using WinVerifyTrust in some way.
|
---|
| 2921 | *
|
---|
| 2922 | * This is used by supHardenedWinVerifyImageByLdrMod as well as
|
---|
| 2923 | * supR3HardenedScreenImage.
|
---|
| 2924 | *
|
---|
[58339] | 2925 | * @returns IPRT status code, modified @a rc.
|
---|
[52406] | 2926 | * @param hFile Handle of the file to verify.
|
---|
| 2927 | * @param pwszName Full NT path to the DLL in question, used for
|
---|
| 2928 | * dealing with unsigned system dlls as well as for
|
---|
| 2929 | * error/logging.
|
---|
[58339] | 2930 | * @param fFlags SUPHNTVI_F_XXX.
|
---|
| 2931 | * @param rc The current status code.
|
---|
[52406] | 2932 | * @param pfWinVerifyTrust Where to return whether WinVerifyTrust was
|
---|
| 2933 | * actually used.
|
---|
| 2934 | * @param pErrInfo Pointer to error info structure. Optional.
|
---|
| 2935 | */
|
---|
[85127] | 2936 | DECLHIDDEN(int) supHardenedWinVerifyImageTrust(HANDLE hFile, PCRTUTF16 pwszName, uint32_t fFlags, int rc,
|
---|
| 2937 | bool *pfWinVerifyTrust, PRTERRINFO pErrInfo)
|
---|
[52406] | 2938 | {
|
---|
| 2939 | if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
|
---|
| 2940 | *pfWinVerifyTrust = false;
|
---|
| 2941 |
|
---|
| 2942 | /*
|
---|
| 2943 | * Call the windows verify trust API if we've resolved it and aren't in
|
---|
[52414] | 2944 | * some obvious recursion.
|
---|
[52406] | 2945 | */
|
---|
| 2946 | if (g_pfnWinVerifyTrust != NULL)
|
---|
| 2947 | {
|
---|
[54997] | 2948 | uint32_t const idCurrentThread = RTNtCurrentThreadId();
|
---|
| 2949 |
|
---|
| 2950 | /* Check if loader lock owner. */
|
---|
| 2951 | struct _RTL_CRITICAL_SECTION volatile *pLoaderLock = NtCurrentPeb()->LoaderLock;
|
---|
| 2952 | bool fOwnsLoaderLock = pLoaderLock
|
---|
| 2953 | && pLoaderLock->OwningThread == (HANDLE)(uintptr_t)idCurrentThread
|
---|
[55007] | 2954 | && pLoaderLock->RecursionCount > 0;
|
---|
[54997] | 2955 | if (!fOwnsLoaderLock)
|
---|
[52406] | 2956 | {
|
---|
[54997] | 2957 | /* Check for recursion. */
|
---|
| 2958 | bool fNoRecursion;
|
---|
| 2959 | if (g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX)
|
---|
| 2960 | {
|
---|
| 2961 | fNoRecursion = TlsGetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion) == 0;
|
---|
| 2962 | if (fNoRecursion)
|
---|
| 2963 | TlsSetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion, (void *)1);
|
---|
| 2964 | }
|
---|
| 2965 | else
|
---|
| 2966 | fNoRecursion = ASMAtomicCmpXchgU32(&g_idActiveThread, idCurrentThread, UINT32_MAX);
|
---|
[52406] | 2967 |
|
---|
[54997] | 2968 | if (fNoRecursion && !fOwnsLoaderLock)
|
---|
[52406] | 2969 | {
|
---|
[54997] | 2970 | /* We can call WinVerifyTrust. */
|
---|
| 2971 | if (pfWinVerifyTrust)
|
---|
| 2972 | *pfWinVerifyTrust = true;
|
---|
| 2973 |
|
---|
| 2974 | if (rc != VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
|
---|
[52406] | 2975 | {
|
---|
[54997] | 2976 | if (rc == VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED)
|
---|
[52406] | 2977 | {
|
---|
[54997] | 2978 | if (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_ALLOW_CAT_FILE_VERIFICATION)
|
---|
| 2979 | {
|
---|
| 2980 | int rc2 = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo,
|
---|
| 2981 | g_pfnWinVerifyTrust);
|
---|
| 2982 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile -> %d (org %d)\n", rc2, rc));
|
---|
| 2983 | rc = rc2;
|
---|
| 2984 | }
|
---|
| 2985 | else
|
---|
| 2986 | {
|
---|
| 2987 | AssertFailed();
|
---|
| 2988 | rc = VERR_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED;
|
---|
| 2989 | }
|
---|
[52406] | 2990 | }
|
---|
[54997] | 2991 | else if (RT_SUCCESS(rc))
|
---|
| 2992 | {
|
---|
| 2993 | HRESULT hrcWinVerifyTrust;
|
---|
| 2994 | rc = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust,
|
---|
| 2995 | &hrcWinVerifyTrust);
|
---|
| 2996 |
|
---|
| 2997 | /* DLLs signed with special roots, like "Microsoft Digital Media Authority 2005",
|
---|
| 2998 | may fail here because the root cert is not in the normal certificate stores
|
---|
| 2999 | (if any). Our verification code has the basics of these certificates included
|
---|
| 3000 | and can verify them, which is why we end up here instead of in the
|
---|
| 3001 | VINF_LDRVI_NOT_SIGNED case above. Current workaround is to do as above.
|
---|
| 3002 | (Intel graphics driver DLLs, like igdusc64.dll. */
|
---|
| 3003 | if ( RT_FAILURE(rc)
|
---|
| 3004 | && hrcWinVerifyTrust == CERT_E_CHAINING
|
---|
| 3005 | && (fFlags & SUPHNTVI_F_ALLOW_CAT_FILE_VERIFICATION))
|
---|
| 3006 | {
|
---|
| 3007 | rc = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust);
|
---|
| 3008 | SUP_DPRINTF(("supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrustCatFile -> %d (was CERT_E_CHAINING)\n", rc));
|
---|
| 3009 | }
|
---|
| 3010 | }
|
---|
[52406] | 3011 | else
|
---|
| 3012 | {
|
---|
[54997] | 3013 | int rc2 = supR3HardNtViCallWinVerifyTrust(hFile, pwszName, fFlags, pErrInfo, g_pfnWinVerifyTrust, NULL);
|
---|
| 3014 | AssertMsg(RT_FAILURE_NP(rc2),
|
---|
| 3015 | ("rc=%Rrc, rc2=%Rrc %s", rc, rc2, pErrInfo ? pErrInfo->pszMsg : "<no-err-info>"));
|
---|
[62677] | 3016 | RT_NOREF_PV(rc2);
|
---|
[52406] | 3017 | }
|
---|
| 3018 | }
|
---|
[53042] | 3019 |
|
---|
[54997] | 3020 | /* Unwind recursion. */
|
---|
| 3021 | if (g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX)
|
---|
| 3022 | TlsSetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion, (void *)0);
|
---|
[52406] | 3023 | else
|
---|
[54997] | 3024 | ASMAtomicWriteU32(&g_idActiveThread, UINT32_MAX);
|
---|
[52406] | 3025 | }
|
---|
[54997] | 3026 | /*
|
---|
| 3027 | * No can do.
|
---|
| 3028 | */
|
---|
[52414] | 3029 | else
|
---|
[54997] | 3030 | SUP_DPRINTF(("Detected WinVerifyTrust recursion: rc=%Rrc '%ls'.\n", rc, pwszName));
|
---|
[52406] | 3031 | }
|
---|
| 3032 | else
|
---|
[54997] | 3033 | SUP_DPRINTF(("Detected loader lock ownership: rc=%Rrc '%ls'.\n", rc, pwszName));
|
---|
[52406] | 3034 | }
|
---|
| 3035 | return rc;
|
---|
| 3036 | }
|
---|
| 3037 |
|
---|
| 3038 |
|
---|
| 3039 | /**
|
---|
| 3040 | * Checks if WinVerifyTrust is callable on the current thread.
|
---|
| 3041 | *
|
---|
| 3042 | * Used by the main code to figure whether it makes sense to try revalidate an
|
---|
| 3043 | * image that hasn't passed thru WinVerifyTrust yet.
|
---|
| 3044 | *
|
---|
| 3045 | * @returns true if callable on current thread, false if not.
|
---|
| 3046 | */
|
---|
[85127] | 3047 | DECLHIDDEN(bool) supHardenedWinIsWinVerifyTrustCallable(void)
|
---|
[52406] | 3048 | {
|
---|
| 3049 | return g_pfnWinVerifyTrust != NULL
|
---|
[52414] | 3050 | && ( g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion != UINT32_MAX
|
---|
| 3051 | ? (uintptr_t)TlsGetValue(g_iTlsWinVerifyTrustRecursion) == 0
|
---|
[52940] | 3052 | : g_idActiveThread != RTNtCurrentThreadId() );
|
---|
[52406] | 3053 | }
|
---|
| 3054 |
|
---|
| 3055 |
|
---|
| 3056 |
|
---|
| 3057 | /**
|
---|
[51770] | 3058 | * Initializes g_uNtVerCombined and g_NtVerInfo.
|
---|
| 3059 | * Called from suplibHardenedWindowsMain and suplibOsInit.
|
---|
| 3060 | */
|
---|
[85127] | 3061 | DECLHIDDEN(void) supR3HardenedWinInitVersion(bool fEarly)
|
---|
[51770] | 3062 | {
|
---|
| 3063 | /*
|
---|
| 3064 | * Get the windows version. Use RtlGetVersion as GetVersionExW and
|
---|
| 3065 | * GetVersion might not be telling the whole truth (8.0 on 8.1 depending on
|
---|
| 3066 | * the application manifest).
|
---|
[59810] | 3067 | *
|
---|
| 3068 | * Note! Windows 10 build 14267+ touches BSS when calling RtlGetVersion, so we
|
---|
| 3069 | * have to use the fallback for the call from the early init code.
|
---|
[51770] | 3070 | */
|
---|
| 3071 | OSVERSIONINFOEXW NtVerInfo;
|
---|
| 3072 |
|
---|
[52160] | 3073 | RT_ZERO(NtVerInfo);
|
---|
[51770] | 3074 | NtVerInfo.dwOSVersionInfoSize = sizeof(RTL_OSVERSIONINFOEXW);
|
---|
[59810] | 3075 | if ( fEarly
|
---|
| 3076 | || !NT_SUCCESS(RtlGetVersion((PRTL_OSVERSIONINFOW)&NtVerInfo)))
|
---|
[51770] | 3077 | {
|
---|
[52160] | 3078 | RT_ZERO(NtVerInfo);
|
---|
| 3079 | PPEB pPeb = NtCurrentPeb();
|
---|
| 3080 | NtVerInfo.dwMajorVersion = pPeb->OSMajorVersion;
|
---|
| 3081 | NtVerInfo.dwMinorVersion = pPeb->OSMinorVersion;
|
---|
[59810] | 3082 | NtVerInfo.dwBuildNumber = pPeb->OSBuildNumber;
|
---|
[51770] | 3083 | }
|
---|
[52160] | 3084 |
|
---|
[51770] | 3085 | g_uNtVerCombined = SUP_MAKE_NT_VER_COMBINED(NtVerInfo.dwMajorVersion, NtVerInfo.dwMinorVersion, NtVerInfo.dwBuildNumber,
|
---|
| 3086 | NtVerInfo.wServicePackMajor, NtVerInfo.wServicePackMinor);
|
---|
| 3087 | }
|
---|
| 3088 |
|
---|
| 3089 | #endif /* IN_RING3 */
|
---|
| 3090 |
|
---|